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This chapter examines the emergence of the CCMCE, a legal/structural innovation that transformed the multinational firm into a constellation of legally separate but operationally unified corporate entities. Tracing its origins to the late nineteenth century, the CCMCE emerged from evolving doctrines of corporate personhood, limited liability, and the state’s adoption of territorial sovereignty as a legal principle. The pivotal shift occurred with New Jersey’s holding company laws (1888–96), enabling corporations to own other corporations and organize control through pyramidal structures. Combined with the formal recognition of intangible property – such as goodwill and future income streams – this model allowed firms to optimize control, risk, and regulatory positioning across jurisdictions. The CCMCE’s international diffusion, initially driven by practical business needs, soon enabled new forms of jurisdictional arbitrage, as corporate groups leveraged legal fragmentation to separate tangible operations from regulatory liabilities. By embedding the firm in a network of legally autonomous subsidiaries, the CCMCE model created opportunities to exploit the ‘law of two prices’ and selectively engage national regulatory regimes.
This chapter advances the argument that jurisdictional arbitrage is not merely a tactic of tax or liability avoidance, but a distinct form of power – rooted in autonomy, control, and legal engineering – that enables CCMCEs to reshape their operating environments. Drawing on insights from corporate strategy, international political economy, and the CORPLINK project, it reframes arbitrage as a modality of power akin to the creation of a ‘hidden empire’. Through the modular structure of the CCMCEs, MNCs exploit legal and jurisdictional fragmentation to escape regulatory constraints, minimize costs, and amplify market valuation. This structural agility insulates them from state oversight, enabling them to strategically socialize costs and privatize gains. Unlike traditional theories that depict corporate power as relational or behavioural, the chapter argues for a third dimension: power as autonomy – the ability to opt out of constraints by rearranging legal structures. This form of rule-based transgression is monopolized by a global elite of corporations, investors, and advisory firms who exploit regulatory differences not by violating rules but by mastering them. Jurisdictional arbitrage, then, is a primary mechanism of modern corporate power and a central driver of global inequality.
This chapter examines the obligations and responsibilities for protecting human rights and it does so by focusing mainly on ways in which states and other entities contribute to the violation of human rights standards. One of the major questions addressed here is whether the human rights obligations of states end at their territorial borders, or whether they also have extraterritorial obligations as well.
After highlighting patterns of types and targets of human rights violations, we introduce the main perpetrators. Trying to understand what motivates them, and, more importantly, how they can be constrained, is key to improving respect for human rights. We start by introducing a theoretical framework that helps us understand why human rights are violated. Why do peaceful forms of communication and negotiation collapse in favour of violence and destruction? Are acts of atrocity born out of rational calculations or are they the product of erratic and unpredictable behaviour? We then apply this theoretical model to understand the behaviour of the most common perpetrators of life integrity violations, the military and the police, as well as less prominent perpetrators, such as militias, rebel groups, and criminal cartels. Throughout this chapter we focus primarily on perpetrators of physical violence but integrate brief examples of other types of human rights violations.
The quest for corporate accountability remains unabated in the business and human rights (BHR) field. This paper examines the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and Business Interest Associations (BIA) as entrepreneurs, antipreneurs and saboteurs in setting human rights standards. Through this conceptualization, this paper argues that corporate accountability remains elusive because of corporate actors’ normative power and influence in the BHR norm contestation. It attributes corporate actors’ influence in the norm contestation to the UN multistakeholder design that sees nonstate actors as partners and stakeholders in setting global human rights standards. This article then argues that to force a norm change in the BHR field, there is a need to rethink the BHR governance model. Corporate actors must be reconceptualized as ‘regulated individuals’ during norm discussions and standard-setting processes.
Human rights due diligence (HRDD) is a buzzword in business and human rights (BHR) activities. However, multinational corporations (MNCs) often conduct it as a tick-box exercise without transparency. Using a relational contract theory, this article argues that when MNCs contract with local communities through community development agreements (CDAs) to perform HRDD, such contracts are internationalized relational contracts that attract a level of good faith. An established principle in international economic law, good faith serves as a standard for assessing conduct designed to discharge obligations in international contracts between states and MNCs (investor-state contracts). Similar to how investor-state arbitration tribunals use good faith jurisprudence in regulating the relationship between states and MNCs, this article proposes a BHR good faith jurisprudence to prescribe how HRDD obligations should be discharged. The article concludes that a good faith interpretational exercise in BHR would (1) reduce MNCs’ cosmetic compliance with HRDD principles; (2) increase transparency in the HRDD exercise; and (3) become a source of rights for local communities to enforce corporate accountability.
The chapter sets off by examining the theoretical bases upon which a non-state actor (NSA) may be deemed to possess human rights obligations and critiques the various approaches put forward by states and the scholarly community. It then goes on to examine a variety of NSAs along with their own distinct position as regards their human rights role. Some NSAs, such as international financial institutions (IFIs), take a legalistic approach to the matter and are generally wary of accepting even the more fundamental obligations, whereas other actors are keen to achieve a broader human rights agenda and are thus willing to accept some human rights commitments. Besides intergovernmental organisations we also focus on multinational corporations (MNCs) and the way in which their operations have a significant impact on the rights of populations worldwide. It shall be demonstrated that, while their human rights ‘obligations’, if any, have largely arisen as a result of voluntary undertakings, they are now entering a hybrid phase of limited regulation, or at least of an attempt at regulation. Finally, we shed some light on national liberation movements and rebel groups and their distinct responsibilities under international humanitarian law (IHL).
During the 1970s, governments increasingly expressed concerns about the loss of revenue through the use of tax havens by both individuals and corporations. This article explores a covert international working group (the Group of Four) set up between France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 1969 in response to such concerns. At regular meetings, officials exchanged information gathered by their respective tax authorities in auditing multinational companies. In the 1980s, under increasing pressure from governments in a now much more hostile climate to tax authorities, the Group’s work shifted away from multinationals and toward more general, technical questions. The history of the Group of Four illustrates the importance of the 1960s and 1970s as a period for regulating economic actors and the impact of broader circumstances on the success or failure of anti-tax avoidance measures.
This chapter underlines the need for contextualism in showing that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are more suited than multinational enterprises for wider corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and impacts in developing and emerging markets. While highlighting institutional conditions for enabling socially responsible practices by firms, it is argued that an appropriate regulatory environment is necessary to enhance the potential of SMEs.
Globalisation has placed democratic institutions under severe pressure as economic actors seek to take advantage of the disjuncture between national political governance and transnational economic activity. This chapter provides an introduction and overview as to the key themes to be addressed in the book. In particular, we highlight the debate between different approaches to democratic representation and associational democracy which is the theoretical framing for the remainder of the book: representation as claim versus representation as structure.
Transnational labour governance is in urgent need of a new paradigm of democratic participation, with those who are most affected - typically workers - placed at the centre. To achieve this, principles of industrial democracy and transnational governance must come together to inform institutions within global supply chains. This book traces the development of 'transnational industrial democracy', using responses to the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster as the empirical context. A particular focus is placed on the Bangladesh Accord and the JETI Workplace Social Dialogue programme. Drawing on longitudinal field research from 2013–2020, the authors argue that the reality of modern-day supply chain capitalism has neither optimal institutional frameworks nor effective structures of industrial relations. Informed by principles of industrial democracy, the book aims at enhancing emerging forms of private transnational governance as second-best institutions.
Scholars often assume that courts in authoritarian regimes cannot credibly protect foreign investors’ interests because these institutions lack judicial independence. In this article, we construct a novel data set on multinational corporations’ litigation activities in Chinese courts from 2002 to 2017. This supports the first systematic case-level analysis of foreign firms’ lawsuit outcomes in an authoritarian judiciary. We find that foreign companies frequently engage in litigation in authoritarian courts. Moreover, we theoretically and empirically distinguish between two types of government–business ties in terms of their effectiveness in incentivizing the host state to protect foreign investors’ interests. We argue that ad hoc, personal political connections deliver only trivial lawsuit success for multinational enterprises, while formal corporate partnerships with regime insiders can lead the state to structurally internalize foreign investors’ interests. In particular, we demonstrate that joint venture partnerships with state-owned enterprises help foreign firms obtain more substantial monetary compensation than other types of multinational enterprises. By contrast, the personal political connections of foreign firms’ board members do not foster meaningful judicial favoritism. These findings are robust to tests of alternative implications, matching procedures, and subsample robustness checks. This article advances our understanding of multinational corporations’ political risk in host countries, government–business relations, and authoritarian judicial institutions.
Which factors make some American multinational corporations (MNCs) take political action in response to the US–China Trade War and cause others to stay on the sidelines? We identify China-based subsidiaries of US firms to identify firms’ political actions in response to the trade war. We combine data on firms’ tariff exposure, economic actions in China, and political actions in the United States during the trade war. Together these data highlight the divergent strategies with which firms engage. Even though more than 63 percent of MNCs in our sample were adversely impacted by tariffs, only 22 percent voice opposition and 7 percent exit in response to the trade war. Our analysis reveals that US MNCs in China differ in their business models, ownership structure, experience in China, and size of capital investments. These firm-level factors determine the degree to which US MNCs are embedded in China. This in turn shapes how firms perceive political risk and choose from the menu of options to deal with the trade war. Size and age increase voice while joint-venture status decreases it.
The metal-mining boom Latin America experienced in recent decades precipitated highly contentious anti-mining social movements in Central America. In this context, El Salvador became the first country in the world to ban all metal mining by law. In contrast, policy in nearby Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua remained pro-mining. These cases are compared using a most similar systems design. Comparison reveals the importance of three variables: how national economic-elite networks and interests relate to multinational corporations; national movement coordination and goals, specifically in relation to prohibition; and how parties and leaders relied on popular bases or capital. These factors shaped the contention between elites and movements that influenced state actions around mining and led to this ‘least likely case’ of extractive policy change in El Salvador.
All across Africa, local transporters ferry humanitarian shipments, beer, powdered milk, mobile phones, soft drinks, and other ‘global’ commodities all the way into the interior of the continent. On their return journey, they feed local products like tropical hardwood, minerals and peanuts back into global supply chains. Through these logistical connections, whatever conspires in the dense forests of Central Africa is linked to the rest of the world. Whether it is to export timber from the Central African Republic, deliver food aid in South Sudan, or access consumer goods markets in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for logistical entrepreneurs, Central Africa is a ‘supply chain frontier’ where vast profits are made. But these expanding supply chains are also the engine behind new patterns of predation on the continent. To explore this hidden side of the global economy, Chapter 6 asks, how does a multinational corporation navigate roadblock politics? Or, put differently, how come today’s panoply of Central African roadblocks doesn’t disrupt global supply chains? Chapter 6 makes the case that transnational circulation is not somehow detached from the terrain through which it transacts; global supply chains come to life by empowering and sustaining a host of actors along their routes.
One dynamic for the entanglement of law might be the mobilization of law from below. The myriad mobilizations of law by local social struggles around transnational relations refer to presumed precedents from other situations and other jurisdictions, and claim the applicability of norms from other legal orders. Rumours of rights entangle law. Such mobilizations from below rely on strategic comparisons, sometimes conjectural and tentative, and a belief in law’s coherence. From their position of relative weakness, they appeal to any norm that might provide legal arguments. They struggle to make these norms binding, and hence for their trans-systemic validity. This chapter argues that these entanglements strive for relational coherence – a coherence that is simultaneously trans-systemic and unsystematic. It is trans-systemic inasmuch as it refers to norms from various normative orders, and unsystematic to the extent that it does not move towards an intra-systemic logic. Yet such entanglement might lead to cases being treated increasingly as singular, that is, in relation to their unique characteristics. This is evident in out-of-court settlements in which transnational legal struggles frequently end. The paradox is thus that entanglements engendered by struggles seeking the trans-systemic validity of norms increase attention to the singular characteristics of a constellation.
Transnational regulation of corporate behaviour is characterized by a multiplicity of reflexive norm-making processes in a variety of different forums, creating a web of corporate social responsibility (CSR) normativity in which relationing, cross-referencing but also contestation between bodies of norms become the rule rather than the exception. These interactions are particularly visible within a subset of CSR norms described as meta-regulatory, which often serve as focal points for entanglement. The chapter focuses on one such instrument – the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The structure of the guidelines facilitates coordinated entanglement by including strategic openings and references to external bodies of norms. Moreover, the existence of OECD National Contact Points (the guidelines’ implementation mechanism) also enables more fluid and contingent interactions between bodies of norms, described in the chapter as ad hoc entanglement. By analysing both coordinated and ad hoc entanglement in relation to the OECD guidelines, the chapter identifies some of the dynamics which characterise the interactions between bodies of CSR norms. The resulting picture is nuanced, with entanglement being present in varying shades ranging from distancing to proximity.
On June 17, 2021, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded a suit filed against Nestlé USA and Cargill under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for lack of jurisdiction. This case has already garnered attention over the nature of the dispute (child slaves in Africa), the Supreme Court's treatment of jurisdiction under the ATS, and the finding shared by five of the nine Supreme Court justices that domestic corporations can potentially be sued under the ATS. This analysis focuses on the child slavery and global supply chain aspects of the decision.
The goal of this chapter is to elucidate the role and responsibility of the business sector for safeguarding these two rights by clarifying the origins, legal nature, scope and enforcement of obligations placed upon corporate actors. Specifically, the chapter examines whether and how the status of a duty-bearer affects the ambit of the two rights and obligations they give rise to. In other words, what are the differences between the role of businesses and that of states in securing the rights to work and just and favourable conditions of work? While the traditional (positivist) paradigm of human rights protection sees states as ultimately responsible for ensuring that rights are respected by everyone within their respective jurisdictions, certain aspects of the two rights may be fulfilled only by states. In that sense, the scope of duties arising out of the rights to work and just and favourable conditions of work which businesses can in theory be responsible for is materially different.