Iosif Stalin, along with Adolf Hitler and Mao Zedong, constituted the Big Three dictators of the twentieth century who decisively swayed the course of world history. As is the case with all tyrants, hubris was the underlining feature of Stalin’s rule. As a Marxist, he firmly believed in the inevitability of the demise of capitalism and the ultimate triumph of socialism. As a Bolshevik, he emphatically advanced his mission of spreading war and revolution abroad and defeating world imperialism once and for all. By means of disinformation, subversion, and camouflage, Stalin covertly and openly challenged the liberal world order dominated by Britain, France, and the United States. His defiance found common political ground with his nemesis Adolf Hitler, as seen in the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Nazi-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression) in August 1939. Ultimately, however, Stalin’s hubris blinded him to Hitler’s cunning, resulting in the humiliating and devastating betrayal of June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa). It was also Stalin’s hubris, however, that drove the country to victory over Nazi German, at unimaginable human and material costs.

This chapter examines the planning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. It sketches Hitler’s long-term economic and ideological motives for seeking to conquer the country, before examining the strategic considerations that determined the invasion’s particular timing in June 1941. Wehrmacht planners’ confidence was boosted by intelligence assessments that overlooked the less-than-overwhelming superiority of the German armed forces and underestimated Soviet military and economic potential. It was also boosted by their identification with the invasion’s ideological goals. Thus were the Panzer divisions and their air support, on which success depended more than anything else, committed to too many targets simultaneously, and the risk grew of a lengthy war in which superior Soviet resources would be increasingly likely to prevail. The chapter also sketches the peripheral roles played by Germany’s Axis allies in the invasion and the under-strength forces that the planners of Barbarossa would commit to rear area security. This underpowered occupation force would be compelled to cooperate closely with the SS and police in its efforts to control the occupied territories. This relationship, together with the Wehrmacht’s own ideological proclivities and harsh perception of military necessity, would help precipitate its deep involvement in Nazi crimes in the East.

This chapter focuses on policies of the Allies from 1941 until 1945. Responding to the news about the mass extermination of the Jews, individuals and Jewish organizations lobbied for making declarations denouncing Nazi atrocities and taking diplomatic and political measures. This chapter shows the complexity of Allied attitudes, logistical and political considerations, actions, and inactions with regard to the fate of the Jews in Europe. In particular, it concerns the response to the destruction of Hungarian Jewry, the rescue initiatives and role of Roul Wallenberg, and the refusal to bomb Auschwitz.

This chapter compares work done by Hugh Hamshaw Thomas (1885–1962) in two domains. First, in palaeobotany; second, in military intelligence in the First and Second World Wars. In each, Thomas investigated landscape processes using fragmentary visual evidence: plant evolution from fossils, enemy behaviour from aerial photographs. I propose we understand the connection between those domains by drawing together two, largely separate, scholarly discussions: (i) on the construction and evidential use of photographic archives; (ii) on evidence and causal explanations in the historical sciences. Through analysis of Thomas’s palaeobotanical and military work I situate narrative as the central and unifying principle of a practice in which neither evidence collection nor explanatory accounts were prior. This unifying ‘narrative practice’ was reticulate, multi-scalar and dynamic, as revealed by contemporary figures of speech that sought to describe it (working ‘like Sherlock Holmes’, ‘reading the book of nature’, thinking ‘like a river’).