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This chapter tests observable implications of localized peace enforcement theory at the individual level using two experiments conducted in Mali. First, the chapter presents the results of a study designed to measure willingness to cooperate using a trust game where participants send money to an anonymous partner from a different ethnic group. A randomly assigned group of participants is told that two patrolling officers (from either the UN or France) will punish any low partner contributions with a fine. While the UN treatment increased participants’ willingness to cooperate, the France treatment had no effect. Follow-up interviews confirmed the importance of perceptions of the UN’s impartiality. Second, the chapter outlines the results of a survey that presents respondents with a vignette describing a communal dispute. Respondents were then randomly assigned to a control, UN, or French treatment group. Assignment to the UN treatment group – but not the French treatment group – reduced the likelihood that respondents said a communal dispute would escalate. To probe the plausibility of localized peace enforcement theory specifically, the chapter concludes with an analysis of specific questions about individuals’ perceptions of peacekeepers from the survey.
Chapter 9 concludes the book by highlighting implications that are relevant for academic researchers as well as policymakers. The book’s findings suggest at least three areas for future research. First, a more comprehensive analysis of the sources of perceptions of bias in conflict settings would productively inform scholarship and practice. Second, future work should investigate the conditions under which communal peace aggregates up to the national level. Third, scholars should examine whether governments and their partners succeed in leveraging gains from localized peace enforcement into states with robust institutions. The book also has two important implications for the practice of peacekeeping. First, given the importance of perceptions, policymakers must ensure that peacekeepers remain impartial. International actors perceived by local populations as relatively impartial are much more effective at promoting intergroup cooperation and facilitating the peaceful resolution of communal disputes. Second, given that communal peace in the analysis relies so heavily on the presence of UN peacekeepers, the international community must consider how to design peaceful transitions out of PKOs.
This chapter applies localized peace enforcement theory to a subnational analysis of patterns of dispute escalation in Mali. In order to investigate whether the previous chapters’ experimental findings generalize to real-world operations, the chapter presents the results of two analyses of UN peacekeeping efforts to prevent the onset of communal violence in the central Malian region of Mopti. The first study leverages a geographic regression discontinuity design to compare dispute escalation on either side of the Burkina Faso–Mali border. The border splits similar areas into those “treated” with UN peacekeeping patrols (on the Mali side) and “control” areas without peacekeeping (on the Burkina Faso side). The findings indicate that peacekeeping reduces the likelihood of communal violence. The second study delves deeper into the data with an analysis of UN peacekeepers from different countries deployed to the same regions of Mali and uncovers further evidence in line with the predictions of the theory. Rather than comparing UN peacekeeping in countries with against those without a peacekeeping operation, the study compares UN peacekeepers from different contributing countries – Togo and Senegal – deployed to the same area.
This introductory chapter explains the book’s motivating puzzles and outlines its theoretical and empirical strategies. The book focuses on local-level peacekeeping operations designed explicitly to prevent communal violence. It argues that deploying UN peacekeepers to fragile settings fundamentally changes the structural incentives facing communities in conflict. Scholars typically pinpoint the UN’s success at the negotiating table: peacekeepers help armed group leaders make lasting agreements that stabilize conflict settings from the top down. Yet such negotiations seem unable to prevent communal violence in places as diverse as South Sudan in East Africa, Mali in West Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Central Africa. This book shifts the analytical lens to the local level to investigate the conditions under which peacekeepers successfully build peace from the bottom up. The book’s main argument is that UN peacekeepers succeed when local populations perceive them to be relatively impartial enforcers who are unconnected to the country of deployment, the conflict, and the parties to the dispute. Impartial peacekeepers convince all parties that they will punish those who escalate communal disputes regardless of their identity, which increases communities’ willingness to cooperate without the fear of violence.
This chapter begins the second part of the book, which tests the main empirical implications of localized peace enforcement theory using data from Mali, a land-locked country in West Africa. Though Mali experienced three coups, a separatist civil war, and an Islamist extremist insurgency from 2012 to 2024, no source of conflict has been more fatal or detrimental to Malian society than communal violence. The chapter starts by providing a very brief history of identity-based conflict in the country. It also places Mali within a broader historical context and demonstrates that its experience of interethnic tensions is representative of countries with colonial legacies. The chapter then draws on detailed interviews with forty-eight local leaders to describe what communal violence and peacekeeping look like in Mali from the residents’ perspective. Given the theoretical importance domestic perceptions of peacekeepers, these interviews offer crucial insights into the plausibility of localized peace enforcement theory. There are distinct advantages of studying the Malian case, which the chapter describes in a brief overview of international interventions by the UN and France from 2012 to 2024.
Communal disputes over local issues such as land use, cattle herding, and access to scarce resources are a leading cause of conflict across the world. In the coming decades, climate change, forced migration, and violent extremism will exacerbate such disputes in places that are ill equipped to handle them. Local Peace, International Builders examines the conditions under which international interventions mitigate communal violence. The book argues that civilian perceptions of impartiality, driven primarily by the legacies of colonialism, shape interveners' ability to manage local disputes. Drawing on georeferenced data on the deployment of over 100,000 UN peacekeepers to fragile settings in the 21st century as well as a multimethod study of intervention in Mali – where widespread violence is managed by the international community – this book highlights a critical pathway through which interventions can maintain order in the international system. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Mali is a country where little information is known about the circulation of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in poultry. Implementing risk-based surveillance strategies would allow early detection and rapid control of AIVs outbreaks in the country. In this study, we implemented a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) method coupled with geographic information systems (GIS) to identify risk areas for AIVs occurrence in domestic poultry in Mali. Five risk factors associated with AIVs occurrence were identified from the literature, and their relative weights were determined using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Spatial data were collected for each risk factor and processed to produce risk maps for AIVs outbreaks using a weighted linear combination (WLC). We identified the southeast regions (Bamako and Sikasso) and the central region (Mopti) as areas with the highest risk of AIVs occurrence. Conversely, northern regions were considered low-risk areas. The risk areas agree with the location of HPAI outbreaks in Mali. This study provides the first risk map using the GIS-MCDA approach to identify risk areas for AIVs occurrence in Mali. It should provide a basis for designing risk-based and more cost-effective surveillance strategies for the early detection of avian influenza outbreaks in Mali.
Much of West Africa (and particularly the Sahel) may be once falling again under military government. This essay asks what, if anything, historians of Africa can contribute to an understanding of this phenomenon. I argue that writing the history and understanding the memory of military government will entail a renewed approach to political history and social theory. It will also entail confronting — just as so many citizens are currently doing — the peculiar failures of democracy in Africa's neoliberal era.
The familys economic and socio-cultural capital and how it is shared among its members influence a person’s capabilities and choices. This chapter posits that the family acts as a collective conversion factor, and presents a case study in Mali. A typology of household configurations that best expresses the diversity of family forms is built, then used to see the relation to the overall quality of life of household members, measured by goods (household assets) and opportunities (child education and women’s autonomy). The association between these configurations and children’s access to schooling, controlling for the household standard of living, is then considered, regression analysis results showing that access to education is correlated with the household standard of living, but there is also a household configuration net effect. Extended households seem better off and better suited to develop solidarity strategies that facilitate access to schooling. But the priority given to education also appears to play a role in differences between households, shown by a higher education rate of children in rural households headed by an educated man and in urban ones that are female-headed.
Bamako, March 1991. 100,000 protesters took to the street challenging Mali's military regime. Both men and women participated in six months of protests, their actions shaped by class, gender, and generation. The press, in its reporting, produced a specific, gendered, image of protest, involving young men protesters and their exceptional mères indociles (rebellious mothers) motivated to protest by the risk of bodily harm to their children.1
Jihadist groups have found a ‘safe haven’ in northern Mali. They have managed this by operating strategically to establish themselves and to develop relationships with local communities, but characteristics of the environment have also facilitated their development and survival. In northern Mali, the political landscape is fragmented, and replete with competition between the central authority and various groups of local elites, who are themselves divided. I conceptualise this fluid environment as a context that incentivises ‘political nomadism’. Using the Tuareg communities as an entry point, I explore the complex dynamics between local and national political actors and jihadist groups in northern Mali. I argue that the jihadist ‘safe haven’ in northern Mali is highly relational and has been facilitated by the form of political nomadism practiced in the region since the 1990s. The article is based on eight months of fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2017 in Mali and Niger.
Although considerable global initiatives have been undertaken to tackle anaemia, its prevalence continues to be high in sub-Saharan African nations. In Mali specifically, anaemia represents a significant and pressing public health issue. The purpose of the present study was to examine the key risk factors related to anaemia among children aged 6–24 months (younger age group) and 25–59 months (older age group). We used the Mali 2018 Demographic and Health Survey data, collected from 8861 mothers with children under five. Logistic regression was used to assess the risk factors for childhood anaemia. The results suggest that the prevalence of anaemia was 88 % in the younger and 76 % in the older age groups. The risk factors unique to the younger age group were malaria (OR 4⋅05; CI 0⋅95, 11⋅3) and place of residence (OR 0⋅55; CI 0⋅32, 0⋅94), while for the older age group, they were morbidity (OR 1⋅91; CI 1⋅12, 3⋅24), drinking from a bottle (OR 1⋅52; CI 1⋅04, 2⋅22), and micronutrient intake (OR 0⋅61; CI 0⋅40, 0⋅91). Risk factors that significantly contributed to both age groups include breastfeeding, deworming, maternal anaemia, maternal education, and wealth index. Anaemia also varied by region. The widespread prevalence of anaemia can be attributed to a multitude of factors. In addressing this issue, it is imperative to acknowledge the unique characteristics of specific regions and rural areas, where the incidence of anaemia surpasses the national average. Therefore, any intervention efforts should be tailored to the specific needs and challenges of these areas.
Using a classical perspective tending to interpret existing positive international law, this chapter pursues a double objective. First, it fits in with the doctrinal trend embodied by the Institut de droit international (IDI) in emphasising that intervention by invitation is unlawful if it implies interference in an internal situation, contrary to the right of peoples to self-determination. Second, this research highlights the growing role of the UN Security Council in appraising and characterising the conditions surrounding the legal validity of intervention by invitation. The chapter focuses on military operations in Mali (2013), Iraq (2014), Syria (2015), Yemen (2015), and The Gambia (2017). It observes how, by adopting resolutions, the UN Security Council made pronouncements on which authority was entitled to give its consent, and on the legitimacy of the object and effects of the intervention. The chapter concludes that the Council no longer necessarily authorises any military intervention, but centralises and multilateralises the appraisal of the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the invitation.
Aiming to move beyond the limited primary sources on which polarised debate is usually based, this chapter reviews new data on UN Security Council practice in response to consensual interventions. From 1990 to 2013, the Council passed resolutions on 76 per cent of all internal conflicts. This chapter evaluates that response in light of four leading theories: of the Court in Nicaragua, that governmental invitations are always valid; of the Institut de droit international (IDI), that pro-government interventions are ‘allowable’ until a conflict becomes a civil war; that intervention is allowable at the invitation of an elected ‘democratic’ government to secure or restore its power; and that it is allowable in response to an invitation to counter ‘terrorist’ threats. The data shows that the Council does not unequivocally support the Nicaragua or IDI views but has approved regularly the anti-terrorist, and occasionally the pro-democracy, views. Its active voice is more marked than its alignment with any one theory. Among other implications, the IDI view – a Cold War response to abuses of supposed invitations – may be less salient when a multilateral check on such abuses is available.
Available historical sources for West Africa's Middle Niger c. 1450–1650 reveal that the ‘indigenous’ (non-Arab) Islamic scholarly class was already a self-conscious, independent social entity long before the clerical revolutions of later centuries. The influence of Muslim scholars was not limited to urban environments like Timbuktu, and clerical elites claimed a number of mostly independent communities throughout West Africa by the end of the sixteenth century. Mostly based on a reading of Arabic texts such as Muḥammad al-Kābarī's Bustān al-fawāʾid (‘Garden of Beneficial Prayers’) in dialogue with the Tārīkh Ibn al-Mukhtār and Tārīkh al-Sūdān (‘Timbuktu Chronicles’), this article argues that Muslim scholars were engaged in a spiritual war for independence clearly on display since the beginning of the Songhay empire. Scholarly texts display deep concern for tempering unjust political power and the protection and attraction of women, discourses that reveal a perilous clerical struggle to assert community independence. Later armed jihads were thus not so much a break from earlier traditions of clerical pacificism, they were the natural evolution from this earlier spiritual jihad.
While studies on the role of knowledge and expertise have seen a resurgence of interest in International Relations and in literature on peacebuilding and security governance, little is known how knowledge enters the governance routines after the initial establishment of peacebuilding operations. Taking the mandate decision-making process of MINUSMA and EUTM operations in Mali in the German parliament as case for our explorative study, we ask how knowledge has entered the parliamentary process and how various epistemic practices and epistemic agency shape this peacebuilding governance since 2013. Informed by an object-centred knowledge framework, we argue that the practices and types of agency involved mostly ‘lock-in’ the governing of robust peacebuilding in Mali in much broader foreign- and security policies routines. Epistemic practices are not primarily concerned with new impulses or critical analysis, but with rendering Mali governable as interventionary object. The epistemic authority of the government is dominant and we do not find much evidence that hegemonic knowledge is challenged. Intervening agents do extract certain knowledge via transnational channels from Mali, however, broader knowledge debates or the involvement of Malian agents are missing.
Sorghum plays a crucial role in the rural economy and nutrition of rural households in Mali. Yet the productivity of this crop is constrained by limited adoption of agricultural intensification technologies, which could be partly because technology development does not properly consider farmers' preferences. This study with smallholder farmers in southern Mali aimed to assess farmers' preferences for different attributes of sorghum technologies through the lens of sustainable intensification. The study used a discrete choice experiment, a method which involves asking individuals to state their preference over hypothetical alternative scenarios, goods or services. We considered six attributes corresponding to different domains of sustainable intensification: grain yield, risk of yield loss, soil fertility, nutrition, labor requirement and fodder yield. We analyzed the data using the mixed logit model, while considering the multinomial logit model as a robustness check. The findings revealed that smallholder farmers are strongly interested in transitioning from their existing sorghum-based cropping systems to those that closely align with these domains of sustainable intensification. However, there were diverse preferences among all the smallholder farmers studied, and between distinct sub-groups of smallholder farmers characterized by their social networks and agroecological zones, which yield relevant policy implications. Overall, these results support the growing research and development prioritization and policy interests toward scaling sustainable intensification among farmers, with a particular focus on human nutrition.
This article scrutinizes recent histories of colonial and international law that use metropolitan reactions to the ‘scandals of empire’ to project a reform-oriented version of European colonialism. In French West Africa, most scandals never reached the level of metropolitan debate; they hit dead ends in colonial bureaucracies. Analyzing one dead-end scandal, the M'Pésoba Affair, this article argues that colonial justice on the ground often adhered to a politics of expediency, not a reformist rule of law. To maintain their precarious grip on power, colonial administrators had to simultaneously appease their superiors, economic interests, and powerful African actors. Resolving the M'Pésoba Affair, for one, entailed navigating the complex entanglements of cotton production, chiefly disputes, Islamic policy, and interracial sexual relationships in a backwater of empire marked by anticolonial revolt and world war. Especially in moments of crisis, political constraints shaped the application of justice.
This paper combines population and climate data to estimate the volume of migration induced by the drought events that have hit Mali since the late 1980s. The results show that droughts have had the effect of decreasing net migration rates in the affected localities. This is true for both men and women, regardless of their age. The effect of drought episodes, however, is found to differ according to localities and households’ capacity to adapt to climatic constraints: it fades in localities characterized by more diversified crops and in areas that receive more rainfall on average. Climate shocks also had an impact on international mobility: over the 2004–2009 period, around 2300 additional departures per year can be attributed to the droughts that hit Mali during the 2000s. We forecast that, under different climate scenarios and population growth projections, mobility induced by drought events will substantially grow in the next decades.