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A promising solution is to handle the problem of contribution in a contractual way. Antitrust infringers could conclude an agreement which would determine the amount of their relative liabilities regarding antitrust infringement. The freedom to determine relative shares of liability may yet be viewed reluctantly from a public policy perspective. It is claimed that liability sharing agreements constitute anticompetitive arrangements, they stabilize cartels, weaken the enforcement of competition law and have a negative impact on settlements. This Chapter reveals that these statements are mostly incorrect, being applicable to US antitrust law rather than EU one. The Chapter makes a positive case for liability sharing agreements. It demonstrates that liability sharing agreements are allowed by EU law and can be concluded within certain limitations dictated by compliance with the Commission’s fining decisions and public policy rules.
Claiming contribution in courts is currently a complex and uncertain task, which may lead to the unenforceability of the right to claim contribution in antitrust. The Chapter makes several recommendations that could simplify and make contribution more effective in the competition law context. Firstly, it must be clearly stated that antitrust infringers have the right to claim contribution in the context of EU competition law and that such a right does not interfere with the principle of effectiveness thereof. Secondly, rules on contribution should be the same for private and public antitrust enforcement, they should be based on one type of claim in the form of a personal right to claim contribution, available when the damages and Commission’s fine are paid. The criterion for determining internal liability should be based on a limited number of factors. A two-pillar rule based on division according to market shares and relative fault is suggested. Finally the regimes of special joint and several liability should be simplified and liability sharing agreements should be endorsed. Liability sharing agreements are the simplest and the most effective tool for securing the right to contribution.
Contribution claims in antitrust are controversial and under-researched in the legal literature. This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of contribution claims in EU competition law. By drawing on the historical and current practice of EU and national courts, as well as national laws of major EU jurisdictions, it explains contribution claims in antitrust law in concrete and practical terms. It also provides much needed clarity on the relationship between competition law and joint and several liability, as well as guiding those concerned by contribution claims through the issues that are likely to arise. Topics examined include the requirements competition law sets for contribution claims; the criteria for dividing antitrust liability between individual co-infringers; the impact of EU Directive 2014/10; and whether liability sharing agreements can resolve the problems joint and several liability brings to EU competition law.
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