A careful examination of the idea of democracy suggests that democracy is not best understood as a form of government that is unconditionally responsive to the preferences of the majority. In particular, a will-based conception of democracy—which assigns effectively unlimited power to the majority—can claim support neither in the intellectual history of democracy nor in a plausible interpretation of the idea of democracy. The western democratic tradition is contractualist, and that tradition works from the foundational intuition that legitimate power derives from the consent of the governed. That intuition justifies majority rule as an important element of social choice, but it also requires the entrenchment of rights protections as an element of any acceptable set of political institutions. If entrenched rights are to provide effective protections to liberty interests, they must be enforced by an institution that is not subject to majority control; a “constraint” on the will of the majority that is controlled by the majority is no constraint. Democratic institutions must therefore include an institution independent of majority control whose purpose is to enforce rights protections against the majority.

The “democratic” character of the representative legislature is routinely contrasted with the undemocratic character of courts administered by unelected judges. Since the legislature allegedly possesses a democratic pedigree while the courts allegedly lack such a pedigree, it is argued that the courts should defer to the legislature on questions regarding fundamental social values. I argue that this view does not survive a careful examination of the history and character of representative government and the judiciary. Representative government was designed to assign decisive political power to elites whose qualities distinguish them from the average citizen. The legislature, therefore, hardly possesses an impeccable democratic pedigree. The democratic pedigree of courts exercising the power of judicial review, on the other hand, is stronger than has been generally appreciated. The democratic pedigree of the Constitution is superior to that of statutory law because the Constitution represents a more fundamental and direct expression of the public will than statutory law. The courts, in exercising the power of judicial review to enforce constitutional requirements, can therefore plausibly claim a democratic pedigree—within their areas of competence—at least equal to that of the legislature.

In the last century, economic sanctions have been used with increasing frequency as a tool of global governance, as well as in foreign policy. At the same time, they have long been criticized for their lack of success in achieving the stated goals of the sanctioners. However, what has received far less attention is the question of whether, and when, it is legitimate to impose sanctions. It has become increasingly clear that the humanitarian impact of sanctions may be devastating, affecting healthcare and food security, as well as harming vulnerable populations such as migrants. Sanctions may interfere with the work of humanitarian aid organizations, create diplomatic problems, and undermine the autonomy of sovereign states. Further, there can be significant legal questions regarding the use of sanctions, whether they are imposed by states or by institutions of global governance.

The questions of accountability, legality, and legitimacy in regard to economic sanctions are remarkably convoluted. While they are distinct concepts, in the context of economic sanctions they are closely intertwined. Accountability can be found in many forms, including judicial venues, institutional oversight, political mechanisms, and public protest. In the case of the UNSC sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s, it might be said that the main forms of accountability that came into play were public pressure, as well as political pressure within the UN and outside of it. In the case of “targeted” sanctions, the perception that these measures are genuinely limited in their effects has obscured the fact that they are often indiscriminate and disproportionate, raising questions of legitimacy and legality, while undermining efforts at accountability. With regard to unilateral sanctions imposed by states, there are often significant issues of legality, where these measures do not properly constitute either retorsions or countermeasures. While asset freezes and similar blacklists of individuals (SDNs) appear to address the legal and ethical objections to comprehensive sanctions, there are issues related to the lack of due process, with implications for both the legality and legitimacy of these measures.

We use recent theories of the politics of economic development and of economic interdependence and war to construct an analytic narrative of the events covered in this volume.  We trace the end of China’s hegemony, and the instability that attended it, to the different policies the region’s states chose toward commerce, development, and reform.  States that pursued modernization gained wealth and power relative to those that did not.  These choices had fateful consequences for the regional balance of power and encouraged modernized upstarts to overthrow the traditional order.  A more dynamic order arose as great powers competed to impose a new hegemony or at least a new stability, forming coalitions with the region’s other states and offering new ideologies to legitimize their rule.  While existing theories shed light on the evolution of East Asian order, our consideration also reveals important gaps in explanation that merit further investigation.

This chapter conceptualizes deference as an international court’s acceptance of the state’s exercise of authority. It presents a method for measuring deference that combines case outcomes, interpretation, and remedial orders. The chapter introduces a novel theoretical account of deference. This explanation centers on a court’s strategic space, or the range of possible decisions that will satisfy a court’s legal and political imperatives, and argues that two political factors determine this strategic space: formal independence and political fragmentation. The former concerns the formal rules that safeguard independence while the latter refers to the heterogeneity of states’ preferences. These two constraints affect deference by way of their impact on a court’s legitimacy and the feasibility and credibility of state resistance. The theoretical account also considers the role of persuasive argumentation, public legitimation, and past resistance. This explanation is distinguished from accounts that emphasize judicial support networks and political norms and legal culture.

This chapter summarizes the empirical findings by comparing the three international courts. It shows that the EACJ has been the most deferential of the three courts, followed by the CCJ, and the African Court has been the least deferential. At the same time, the EACJ has the narrowest strategic space, the African Court the broadest and the CCJ lies between. The comparative analysis corroborates the theoretical argument of the book as each court’s deference closely aligns with its degree of formal independence and the extent of political fragmentation among its member states. The chapter revisits the book’s core argument by discussing the scope of the argument and considering its generalizability. It concludes with a discussion of the book’s implications for interdisciplinary research on international courts and IR literature on IOs in contemporary world politics.

Shah Tahmasb (r. 1524–76), the second Safavid ruler, faced the immense challenge of establishing his legitimacy and power in the shadow of his legendary father, Ismail, the founder of the dynasty. The Turkic tribal chiefs of Anatolia, including the Rumlus, Ustajlus, Afshars, Qajars, and Takkalus, were often resistant to subservience, especially to a ruler they perceived as lacking the military might and charismatic authority of Ismail. During the first half of Tahmasb’s reign, this challenge was particularly acute.

To secure his rule and the loyalty of his chiefs, Tahmasb turned to the spiritual concept of ikhlās (purity of intention), a powerful moral code drawn from the Qurʾan and expounded in Sufi ethics. This concept, used to consecrate the bond of loyalty between the chiefs and their Sufi king, made the loyalty morally binding and more difficult to break. In the face of political instability, marked by civil war and a massive Ottoman invasion, the Safavid dynasty’s survival depended on this cultivation of sacred loyalty.

Despite his lack of immediate personal charisma, Tahmasb’s cultivation of consecrated loyalty solidified the chiefs’ allegiance and helped the Safavids endure their most perilous period, preserving both the dynasty’s cohesion and its long-term survival.

This chapter concludes the book with normative messages on contexts where states can trust public cooperation without coercion, addressing jurisprudential and normative aspects of governments gaining public cooperation.

Chapter 4 involves a focus on the legitimacy and effectiveness of proxy-style institutions for future generations. It sets out criteria for assessing the legitimacy of such institutions based on Klaus Dingwerth, Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, and Antto Vihma. Criteria for assessing the legitimacy of international tribunals are developed based on an extension of Bogdandy and Venzke’s work with the idea of accountability to the demos being extended to include future generations. A concept of ‘future legitimacy’ is introduced which involves assessing institutions in operation now from the perspective of future generations when climate change is predicted to be ravaging the planet. Criteria for effectiveness are elaborated involving the Paris Agreement goals, as well as an assessment of the promotion of intergenerational justice and the values of inclusiveness, solidarity and addressing vulnerability. Particular challenges in application of these criteria in the context of international law and related institutions which represent future generations are discussed.

Chapter 8 makes a preliminary assessment of the likely effectiveness of the proposed UN special envoy for future generations by examining this proposal through the lens of three frameworks. These frameworks are, firstly, the rationale or normative basis for such a proposal measured against the principles of intergenerational justice, solidarity and vulnerability set out in Chapter 3 of the book. Next, the special envoy proposal is evaluated in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness using the criteria elaborated in Chapter 5 (inclusive representation, democratic control in the form of accountability and transparency, deliberation, source-based/input legitimacy in terms of expertise, legal legitimacy, tradition and discourse, substantial/output legitimacy in terms of effectiveness and equity). The possible functions of a special envoy are examined and recommendations are made as to what mandate the special envoy should have, applying the matrix of proxy functions elaborated earlier in this book, which involves breaking proxy representation down into its functions (representative, compliance, reform and norm entrepreneurial). Finally, an overarching framework is proposed for measuring the potential effectiveness of the special envoy which incorporates both frameworks – proxy representation functions and democratic legitimacy.

Affordable access to quality health and care is generally recognised as a basic human need and one of the grand challenges society currently faces, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, the focus on public health is driving a predominantly human-centric approach to One Health initiatives. Furthermore, the concerted reliance on innovation and technology-driven solutions may exacerbate the problem. Without the appropriate legal and policy framework to incentivise and capture the social value of research and innovation, there is a risk the resulting solutions will fail to achieve the balance between animal, environment, and human health. This chapter presents a legally supported approach, informed by the intellectual property framework and the policy objectives of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) and Value-Based Health and Care (VBHC) principles, to support the implementation of a true One Health framework. This enables the development of legal tools that will give credibility, legitimacy, and accountability to the design, development, and implementation of a sustainable One Health framework through meaningful and inclusive societal engagement.