In 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote Letter from Birmingham Jail in response to white clergy members who had urged him to cease demonstrating against segregation laws, follow the standards of law and order, and pursue change through official governmental channels. These remonstrations mirror arguments invoked to delegitimize dissent and provide support for legal but immoral governmental policies such as American slavery, Nazi atrocities, and apartheid. At the heart of religious justifications for such arguments is Romans 13:1–7, which endorses human government as God ordained but can be interpreted to require unqualified obedience to law. It is also the go to passage used by Christians to describe the role and authority of police officers in their law enforcement capacity. The way Romans 13 has often been interpreted and applied, however, is exegetically and theologically problematic. Most importantly, the passage is not describing the role of individual police officers as is often argued, but rather the operation of human government as an institution. This flawed starting point has led to a cascade of other interpretive errors, which include describing police officers as agents of God’s wrath and delegitimizing dissent against unjust laws. It also promotes some of the most pernicious features of American law enforcement, including the alienating idea of police as the thin blue line, the we-they mentality that demeans those being policed, the use of warrior to describe the policing role, the militarization of law enforcement, and the systemic racism that plagues U.S. policing. In this article, the author offers a more exegetically and theologically accurate reading of Romans 13, with very different implications for role of law enforcement, and gestures toward a much-needed Christian theology of policing.

1911 to 1935 was a chaotic, yet foundational, period in the transformation of the police force in Tehran and Iran more broadly. The nationalization of modern Iranian policing can be traced back to this time period. This article explores the role of nationalism and anti-imperialism on policing, how the structure and process of policing underwent transformation, including how police were recruited, trained, and deployed. Localized and decentralized policing was slowly abandoned in favor of an integrated national force, with policing through mediation being replaced with the exercise of power in a top-down and center to periphery manner. Education of police officers also underwent transformation, as new strategies were pursued to create a modern nationalist Iranian police force.

Evidence of a link between the retrenchment of the welfare state and the expansion of the penal state has sparked a debate about the existence of a nexus. In this study, we critically explore this link by focusing on political parties. First, we argue that welfare and penal policies are likely to follow distinct paths, with left-liberal/green parties pushing for less punitive penal and market-liberal/conservative parties for less generous welfare policy. Second, we only expect a nexus between both policy domains if conservative or “third way” social democratic governments are in power. The former follows a coherent ideology, the latter compensates for welfare retrenchment with tough-on-crime policies. We test these claims quantitatively on a unique dataset covering all changes to welfare and penal legislation in Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom and France between 1990 and 2014 and find our expectations supported except conservative influence on the penal–welfare nexus.

From the 1950s through the 1970s, American policymakers engaged in an extensive campaign against illegal gambling in an effort to turn the tide in the government’s crusade against organized crime. At the grassroots, however, voters endorsed a different form of state expansion to beat back the mob menace. Between 1963 and 1977, fourteen northeastern and Rust Belt states enacted the first government-run lotteries in the twentieth-century United States on the belief that legalized gambling would undercut the mob’s gambling profits. While gambling opponents pointed to Las Vegas as proof that organized crime would flourish following legalization, supporters argued that illegal gambling was already pervasive, so the state may as well profit from this irrepressible activity. The history of gambling legalization challenges narratives on the popularity of law-and-order politics and offers a new perspective on crime policy in the post–World War II period.

There has been little comparative policy research hitherto on the substantial differences in law and order policies between Western industrialised countries. Instead, criminologists have filled this void and used concepts such as Esping-Andersen's worlds of welfare or Lijphart's patterns of democracy to interpret cross-country variation. However, the state of the art has two weaknesses: it almost exclusively relies on imprisonment data as dependent variable and it remains silent as to why welfare state regimes or types of democracy should be responsible for similarities in law and order policies. The present article tackles these shortcomings by (1) examining differences and commonalities in law and order policies in twenty Western industrialised countries and by (2) investigating whether the clustering of countries is associated with features of the welfare state or the political system. We find three distinct clusters and show that their formation is related to the characteristics of the political economy of the countries.

A popular claim made by criminologists argues that globalization has created a general punitive turn in Western industrialized countries and led to much harsher law and order policies. The present paper challenges this view and adds to the literature in two respects as follows: first, it presents empirical evidence that substantial differences in law and order policies remain between Western industrialized countries even when law and order policy is measured in a much more finely grained manner than previously. Second, the paper provides empirical evidence for a persisting influence of the partisan ideology of governments and the party system characteristics of a country on its law and order policies: whereas the general trend of increasing economic globalization may well set the overall tone, this impact is conditioned by national political and institutional settings – and the ideology of the government as well as the party system in particular.

In times of an alleged waning of political business cycles and partisan policy-making, vote-seeking policy-makers can be expected to shift the use of political manipulation mechanisms towards other policy domains in which the macro-institutional environment allows them greater leverage. Public employment generally, and police employment specifically, are a promising domain for such tactics. Timing the hiring of police officers during election periods may increase votes, as these are “street-visible” jobs dealing with politically salient issues. Law-and-order competence signalling makes police hiring especially attractive for conservative parties. Testing these electioneering and partisanship hypotheses in the German states between 1992 and 2010, we find that socio-economic variables such as population density strongly determine police employment. But incumbents also hire more police officers before elections, while conservative party power increases police numbers. Subjectively “immediate” forms of crime (issue salience) and perceived causes of crime such as immigration are also positively associated with police numbers.