The story opens in the solemn setting of the Great Hall of Justice, where the President of the ICJ is about to deliver the Court’s judgment on a long and difficult dispute. Among the attendees is Sophie Richter, a clerk to ICJ judge Jürgen Lehmann. Sophie ponders about the many steps it took to get to this day: all the actors, visible and invisible, who contributed to the judicial process; all the interactions that occurred at every turn; and all the possible realities that were discarded along the way. The issuance of today’s judgment is, in fact, the end of a long and strenuous journey, which will be chronicled through successive flashbacks in the following chapters. Having set the stage for the narrative, the chapter introduces the central themes of the book. First, it reviews existing literature on international adjudication, including formalist treatises, critical accounts, and legitimacy-oriented analyses. Second, it invites the reader to consider the importance of everyday socio-professional practices in the definition of international judicial outcomes.

As a number of modern sexual misconduct cases demonstrate, often there are multiple charges against a single individual under circumstances in which the proof of an individual charge may fall short of the required standard of proof, but in which it is clear – overwhelmingly, or beyond a reasonable doubt – that at least one of the charges is true, even if we cannot be sure which one. Building on earlier work by myself and Richard Zeckhauser, by Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, and by Ariel Porat and Eric Posner, among others, this paper, prepared for the World Congress on Evidential Reasoning at the University of Girona, offers a sympathetic examination of sanction imposition – inside and outside formal legal proceedings – on the basis of aggregate probabilities, and addresses a series of common objections. And the paper suggests that the greatest value of aggregating low (or lower) probability charges may be greatest outside the official judicial process. It also hints, albeit inconclusively, at the larger question of why the law focuses on acts when it is imposing sanctions rather than focusing on the actors who may have committed those acts.

No governing international text or generally accepted doctrine defines the procedure to be applied by international courts and tribunals. Yet these institutions’ tasks pose common challenges: providing notice of a dispute, defining its nature and scope, determining the legal rules, marshalling and assessing evidence, finding facts and applying legal rules to them, and then recording and communicating the result. There often is substantial similarity – indeed, convergence – in how courts and tribunals go about these tasks. This chapter examines some of the factors and institutions that contribute to this procedural harmonization among institutions dealing with disputes between parties from different countries and legal cultures. It looks at the shared historical foundations of important procedural practices, the influence of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the roles individuals sometimes play in transmitting “legal technology” between institutions, and the effect of competition among institutions seeking to meet the needs of their “customers.” It also notes areas where procedure can diverge, as users look for new ways to address procedural problems.

The Indian Supreme Court sits in panels and can have up to 31 judges. This chapter explores how the Indian Supreme Court developed its current structure and the impact of this structure on its functioning. It argues that the Supreme Court’s structure has a range of inter-related effects that includes increasing access to the Court, producing a “polyvocal” jurisprudence that destabilizes stare decisis, spurring experimentation among judges, fostering a “Chief Justice dominant” Court, and reducing the perceived partisanship of judges. Mapping the structure of the Court, as well as the Court’s relationship with the rest of the judiciary, helps us appreciate how judges ultimately interpret the law and the Constitution not in isolation, but within a larger judicial architecture.

The Indian Supreme Court sits in panels and can have up to 31 judges. This chapter explores how the Indian Supreme Court developed its current structure and the impact of this structure on its functioning. It argues that the Supreme Court’s structure has a range of inter-related effects that includes increasing access to the Court, producing a “polyvocal” jurisprudence that destabilizes stare decisis, spurring experimentation among judges, fostering a “Chief Justice dominant” Court, and reducing the perceived partisanship of judges. Mapping the structure of the Court, as well as the Court’s relationship with the rest of the judiciary, helps us appreciate how judges ultimately interpret the law and the Constitution not in isolation, but within a larger judicial architecture.