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In this chapter, we depart from the observation that a strong motivation for large firms to invest substantial amounts into R&D for an AGI is due to the winner-takes-all effects it may bestow on them. This feature, while important to incentivize AI investment, has the downside that it implies that AI arms races may take place. And the danger of an AI arms race is that it may result in an inferior AGI from a human safety perspective. In this chapter, we model such an AI arms race as an innovation contest and show how a government can steer such an arms race so as to obtain a better outcome in terms of the quality of the AGI. A crucial insight from our modeling is that the intention (or goals) of teams competing in an AGI race, as well as the possibility of an intermediate outcome (“second prize”), may be important.
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