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This chapter reviews the regulation of disinformation from an African human rights’ law perspective, focusing on the right to freedom of expression and the right to vote. It provides an overview of the African regional law framework, specifically the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981 (the African Charter) and corresponding jurisprudence. The chapter also analyses the way in which freedom of expression and disinformation laws have been applied in African countries, the aim being to contextualize and illustrate how African regional law plays out at the domestic level, but with an emphasis on the position in South Africa.
A broad consensus has emerged in recent years that although rumours, conspiracy theories and fabricated information are far from new, in the changed structure and operating mechanisms of the public sphere today we are faced with something much more challenging than anything to date, and the massive scale of this disinformation can even pose a threat to the foundations of democracy. However, the consensus extends only to this statement, and opinions differ considerably about the causes of the increased threat of disinformation, whom to blame for it, and the most effective means to counter it. From the perspective of freedom of speech, the picture is not uniform either, and there has been much debate about the most appropriate remedies. It is commonly argued, for example, that the free speech doctrine of the United States does not allow for effective legal action against disinformation, while in Europe there is much more room for manoeuvre at the disposal of the legislator.
The structure of society is heavily dependent upon its means of producing and distributing information. As its methods of communication change, so does a society. In Europe, for example, the invention of the printing press created what we now call the public sphere. The public sphere, in turn, facilitated the appearance of ‘public opinion’, which made possible wholly new forms of politics and governance, including the democracies we treasure today. Society is presently in the midst of an information revolution. It is shifting from analogue to digital information, and it has invented the Internet as a nearly universal means for distributing digital information. Taken together, these two changes are profoundly affecting the organization of our society. With frightening rapidity, these innovations have created a wholly new digital public sphere that is both virtual and pervasive.
The issue of mass disinformation on the Internet is a long-standing concern for policymakers, legislators, academics and the wider public. Disinformation is believed to have had a significant impact on the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election. Concern about the threat of foreign – mainly Russian – interference in the democratic process is also growing. The COVID-19 pandemic, which reached global proportions in 2020, gave new impetus to the spread of disinformation, which even put lives at risk. The problem is real and serious enough to force all parties concerned to reassess the previous European understanding of the proper regulation of freedom of expression.
The ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor tends to dominate US discourse about the First Amendment and free speech more generally. The metaphor is often deployed to argue that the remedy for harmful speech ought to be counterspeech, not censorship; listeners are to be trusted to sort the wheat from the chaff. This deep skepticism about the regulation of even harmful speech in the USA raises several follow-on questions, including: How will trustworthy sources of information fare in the marketplace of ideas? And how will participants know whom to trust? Both questions implicate non-regulatory, civil-society responses to mis- and disinformation. This chapter takes on these questions, considering groups and institutions that deal with information and misinformation. Civil society groups cannot stop the creation of misinformation – but they can decrease its potential to proliferate and to do harm. For example, advocacy groups might be directly involved with fact-checking and debunking misinformation, or with advancing truthful or properly contextualized counter-narratives. And civil society groups can also help strengthen social solidarity and reduce the social divisions that often serve as fodder for and drivers of misinformation.
The Concluding Reflections explore democracy’s potential to overcome its contradictions and challenges. The rise of populism, seen as democratic autoimmunity, is examined, where leaders manipulate public sentiment, often through xenophobia and anti-elitism, undermining democratic principles. The tyranny of an exclusory majority is also cautioned against. The potential for democracy’s reimagining in the face of contemporary challenges such as cybernetic culture, migration, and globalization is considered. Ezrahi reflects on the role of creative individuals and cultural forces in shaping political imaginaries. The transformation of the internet and major platforms like Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Twitter from democratizing communication to powerful monopolies is analyzed, as well as the misuse of Big Data, illustrated by the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and the unintended consequences of digital platforms, including the spread of misinformation. The discussion concludes with a reflection on the broader deterioration of democratic epistemology. Ezrahi argues for a shift from a positivistic, naturalistic ontology to an ethical-normative anchorage, proposing to replace the current ontological defense of democracy with a commitment to preserving freedom based on novel axioms, framing politics as alternative productive fictions. Ezrahi proposes to reimagine a democratic epistemology which is anchored in ethics and collective commitment.
In today's digital age, the spread of dis- and misinformation across traditional and social media poses a significant threat to democracy. Yet repressing political speech in the name of truth can also undermine democratic values. This volume brings together prominent legal scholars from democracies worldwide to explore and evaluate different regulatory approaches for addressing this complex problem – all taking into account that the cure must not be worse than the disease. Using a comparative lens, the book offers important and novel insights into methods ranging from national regulation of politicians' speech to empowering civil-society groups that are well-positioned to blunt the effects of disinformation and misinformation. The book also provides solutions-oriented recommendations for policymakers, judges, legal practitioners, and scholars seeking to promote democratic values by encouraging free political speech while combatting disinformation and misinformation. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
From 2018 to 2022, the ResisTIC (Criticism and circumvention of digital borders in Russia) project team has endeavored to analyze how different actors of the Russian Internet (RuNet) resist and adapt to the recent wave of authoritarian and centralizing regulations by the Russian state, with a particular focus on online resistance that reveals so far lesser-known social practices and techniques for circumventing online constraints. The chapter undertakes an infrastructure-based sociology of the RuNet, focusing on the technical devices and assets involved in surveillance and censorship, and on the strategies of resistance and circumvention “by infrastructure” that follow. The empirical core of the chapter will provide an overview of a number of studies undertaken by the ResisTIC project team in the past few years. While the presentation of the case studies will by necessity be relatively brief, presenting them together will allow to draw some general conclusions about the state of infrastructure-based digital sovereignization in Russia.
The Internet presents today’s researchers with unprecedented opportunities to conduct field experiments. Using examples from Economics and Computer Science, we present an analysis of the design choices, with particular attention to the underlying technologies, in conducting online field experiments and report on lessons learned.
A capitalist market has been part of modern Russian literature since at least the early nineteenth century. Even during the Soviet era, the market was never entirely abolished. But when socialism fell in 1991, capitalism rushed in. This chapter focuses on the economic, social, and aesthetic consequences of the market in post-Soviet Russian literature. The book market boomed just as thick journals and legacy critics lost cultural authority, and as readers, publishers, and writers were pulled towards bestselling imports, largely western pulp. Drawn by success and fascinated by new forms, many authors innovated genre conventions, authorial performance, and audience interaction, using misdirection, mystification, and online and social media, among other strategies. Others mobilised the terms of capitalism to mount a critique of the illusory values of the new market society.
A useful way to prepare the public for disasters is to teach them where to get information. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the readability and appropriateness of the content of websites prepared for the public on disaster preparedness.
Methods
In September-October 2022, we evaluated 95 disaster preparedness websites (intended for the public) using the Ateşman Readability Index, JAMA criteria, DISCERN, and a new researcher-created content comparison form. Evaluation scores were compared according to information sources.
Results
Of the websites included in the research, 45.2% represented government institutions (GIG), 38.0% non-profit organizations (NPOG), 8.4% municipal organizations (MOG), and 8.4% other organizations (OG). Those which scored above average on the websites were 36.8% on the content evaluation, 51.6% on the DISCERN scale, 53.7% on the Ateşman Readability Index, and 55.8% on the JAMA criteria. The content evaluation form showed that the scores of the websites belonging to the MOG were higher than the scores of the other websites. Others group websites also scored higher than altered websites on the JAMA criteria.
Conclusions
The study revealed that websites created to increase public knowledge on disaster preparedness are not good enough in terms of readability, quality, and content.
In recent years, a number of online outlets aligned with the right has emerged in Thai politics. Though it is often assumed that such actors are merely an extension of the Thai state propaganda apparatus, as the moniker “IO (short for Information Operation)” implies, closer inspection of their contents suggests a more complicated picture. Employing the morphological approach of ideological analysis, this article argues that the Thai Online Right articulates a decidedly conservative worldview, upholding a social order centred around the monarchy, and opposing particular instigators of change, similar to more traditional Thai conservatives. The concepts and ideas they deploy to bolster these core ideas, however, seem to emphasise more materialistic and personalised elements, as well as draw from more contemporaneous “Western” right-wing conspiracy theories, making their conservative expression a strange blend of the old and the new. The findings have implications to the study of conservatisms, both in the Thai context and comparatively.
Suicide-related internet use (SRIU), defined as internet use related to one's own feelings of suicide, can be both a risk and protective factor, especially for isolated individuals. Despite its influence on suicidality, clinicians face challenges in assessing SRIU because of the private nature of internet usage. Current recommendations on enquiring about SRIU in a clinical setting concern mostly young people.
Aims
To address the gap in understanding SRIU among patients of all ages, this study aims to explore mental health clinicians’ experiences, attitudes and beliefs regarding enquiring about SRIU, as well as the risks and benefits it presents in the assessment and management of patients. Finally, the study aims to establish the role SRIU potentially plays in the assessment and management of patients.
Method
Twelve clinicians practising at secondary mental health services in England participated in interviews. Thematic analyses were used for data interpretation.
Results
Clinicians who participated in interviews rarely initiate discussions on SRIU with their patients despite considering this an important factor in suicidality. Age of both patients and clinicians has the potential to influence enquiry into SRIU. Clinicians recognise the potential benefits of patients finding supportive online communities but also express concerns about harmful and low-quality online content related to suicide.
Conclusions
Integrating SRIU enquiry into standard clinical practice, regardless of the patient's age, is an important step towards comprehensive patient care. Broader training for clinicians on enquiring about online behaviours is essential to mitigate potential risks and harness the benefits of SRIU in mental health patients.
The aim of this 4-year follow-up study was to examine the predictive effects of demographics, three types of sexual stigma, three types of self-identity confusion, anxiety, depression, family support and problematic Internet use before the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on new-onset suicide risk and persistent suicide risk in young adult lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals who experienced the COVID-19 pandemic in Taiwan.
Methods
Baseline data were collected from 1,000 lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals in 2018 and 2019. Outcome data on suicide risk were collected again in 2023. The suicide module of the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview was used to assess suicide risk in terms of thoughts of death, desire to self-harm, thoughts of suicide, plans for suicide and suicide attempts in the preceding month at the initial and follow-up assessments. Baseline three types of sexual stigma, self-identity disturbance, depression, anxiety and problematic Internet use were used to examine their prediction of new-onset suicide risk and persistent suicide risk at follow-up.
Results
In total, 673 individuals participated in the follow-up survey. Notably, 16.5% of the participants who had no suicide risk at baseline had new-onset suicide risk at follow-up; 46.4% of the participants who had suicide risk at baseline also had suicide risk at follow-up. Participants who were transgender (p = .003), who perceived greater levels of microaggression (p < .001), and who had greater levels of problematic Internet use at baseline (p = .024) were more likely to have new-onset suicide risk at follow-up. Participants who had greater levels of self-identity confusion were more likely to have persistent suicide risk at follow-up (p = .023).
Conclusion
Intervention strategies for reducing suicide risk in lesbian, gay and bisexual individuals should be developed with consideration of the predictors identified in this study.
It is impossible to understand the phenomenon of disinformation without unraveling the more perplexing notion of “truth.” This article explores how a Bulgarian psychic or prophet named Baba Vanga (1911–1996) became one of the most noteworthy mediums of “truth” in twentieth- and twenty-first-century Russian imagination. With Bulgarian-Russian transnational ties as context, we trace how belief in Baba Vanga’s abilities and prophecies was propagated by witnesses via word-of-mouth, newspaper articles, books, TV programming, and the internet. We periodize the ways Vanga secured a place in Russian “truth worlds,” drawing upon both science and religion or a conglomeration of both. We look deeper into the origins and more recent circulation of a purported Vanga prophecy from 1979: namely, that Russia would rise to be the ruler of the world. The dissemination of this message, we argue, is not a Russian state plot to bolster aspirations in Ukraine and its standoff with the West. Instead it has been transmitted in far more fragmented and mediated ways and even countered by the Russian Orthodox Church. A deeper pondering of these mediations of Baba Vanga can help us better understand what we call the “post”-truth world, in which truth is crafted by online “posts.” In contrast to the notion of “post-truth” that posits a dearth of truth, our concept of “post”-truth recognizes that truth is not just in unprecedented excess today but is built through a complex and participatory bricolage that uses science and religion to build shared realities as never before in history.
This chapter examines the British essay in the age of the Internet, a period which has radically reshaped literary culture. Online magazines and journals now outnumber their print precursors, vastly increasing the venues available to budding essayists. But this transformation was predated by a more pivotal online trend: blogging. Beginning in the early years of the new millennium, and ending, effectively, with the rise of social media, the golden age of blogging allowed a wave of self-published writers to revolutionise literary criticism and cultural theory. Free from professional aims and ambitions, experimental and avidly personal, their essays left a lasting impression on both literary journalism and the academy. This chapter explores the underacknowledged possibilities and legacies of blogging, surveying the ways in which prominent bloggers reimagined the essay form.
The decades since the Second World War have seen dramatic shifts in the approved varieties of sexual experience in liberal democracies. Sexuality, once regarded as an intensely private matter, is now on display everywhere, on large and small screens. Effective contraception has made what was once primarily a procreative act into a form of recreation, available to both heterosexual and same-sex couples. From being regarded as a privilege of marriage in the 1950s, today access to sex might be regarded as a right. An extreme form of this belief might be seen in the “Incel” movement. Cohesive community ideals about sexuality within marriage disintegrated in the post-war world responding to growing demands to respect a diversity of individual desires. Democracies which hold to faith traditions promote a more traditional view of sex as contained within marriage. The promotion of a responsible sex life has become part of the commitment of many secular liberal democracies to ensure the health and welfare of citizens, particularly in light of AIDS and HPV. Countries have put laws in place to protect citizens from sexual abuse. The global nature of the digital realm, however, makes sexually exploitative visual material difficult to police.
Misinformation has only recently seen a surge in research interest and public attention, but the concept itself is much older. Not only have humans manipulated and lied to each other since the dawn of language, but animals are also known to use manipulation to achieve certain goals. This chapter provides a historical overview of misinformation. It first looks at some of its possible evolutionary origins, before tracing how false information has been used as a tool of persuasion throughout history, and discussing the role of technological innovations such as the printing press and mass communications. Finally, we look at the recent advent of the internet era, and what role misinformation plays in society today.
The promotion of suicide and description of suicide methods on the Internet have led to widespread concern that legal control is mandated. Apart from value concerns pertaining to attitudes about suicide, the guarantee of freedom of expression presents a serious challenge to the introduction of restrictive laws. Recent developments in Australia and Europe are presented, noting jurisdictional complexity as an obstacle to effective application. Scientific data of an epidemiological nature are revealed to be insufficient to warrant making causal assertions about the Internet and its relation to suicidal acts, including those of vulnerable populations. Regardless of restrictions, the uncontrolled Darknet hosts suicide encouragement and information on methods to kill oneself. Recommendations are made with respect to public education, suicide prevention and future research.
It is commonly recognized that the modern capacity for mass online communication carries various dangers: fake news, rampant conspiracy theories, trolling, and so forth. It is less commonly realized that moral problems remain when the contents of online communications are completely innocuous. This article discusses one of the noteworthy features of modern digital technology, the fact that it is possible to precisely target specific audiences, and argues that this can make mass communications such as advertising and political campaigns morally problematic. What is more, this holds even if the communicator is using only rational persuasion. In being selective about who sees which arguments, one becomes liable to mislead the audience despite sticking to honest, evidence-based, rational argumentation.