Contrary to conventional wisdom, external freedom is ambiguous in Kant’s Rechtslehre. On the one hand, external freedom can refer to freedom in the external use of choice. On the other, external freedom can refer to the kind of independence encoded in our one innate right. Recognizing the ambiguity allows us not only to see the truth in the various and incompatible ways in which commentators have understood external freedom, but also to see more clearly external freedom’s relationship to autonomy (or internal freedom). In turn, better understanding the relationship between internal and external freedom sheds light on the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy, which are often (and wrongly) assumed to be discontinuous.

The abstract notion of freedom of thought, dating back at least to Roman times, has transmutated into a tangible legal right with its incorporation in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This chapter traces the genesis of the right through evolving formulations in the drafts of the Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also presents the few pertinent remarks on the right by notable figures such as Charles Malik and René Cassin as documented primarily in the Summary Records of the Commission on Human Rights between 1947 and 1949. An in-depth analysis of the travaux préparatoires yields ten significant findings for an understanding of the freedom. The analysis reaffirms some established facets of the right such as its unique twofold structure, and sheds light on hitherto unexplored facts such as the specific relation between thought, conscience, and religion. It further identifies unresolved questions and offers perspectives for contemporary interpretations of the freedom.