I propose to situate my contribution in a long chronological sequence that goes from the pontificate of Pius IX to the “Vatican II moment” (including the pontificate of Paul VI). The chapter is structured around three axes. The first takes into account the doctrinal and dogmatic developments that sanction papal primacy without detaching them from the socio-political context. The second evaluates the refusals and acceptance of the model thus developed by questioning the concept of “romanity,” the practices that result from it and the institutional and doctrinal impasses, sensitive under the pontificate of Pius XII. The third axis analyzes the development of the idea of collegiality before the Council and evaluates the conciliar debates before understanding how the pontificate of Paul VI assumes and renews the pontifical heritage of the previous century in the context of the crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.

After the First Vatican Council, some believed that a council was not necessary any more: the Pope alone was able to govern the Catholic Church. John XXIII’s decision to convene a council was surprising in this context. Considered by some as an extension of Vatican I, which originally was to produce a whole teaching on the Church in which the pope was to be situated, the Second Vatican Council teaching situates the pope in the people of God and within the College of Bishops, proclaiming the doctrine of collegiality. The two popes of the council were going to modify the figure and the style of the papacy. John XXIII, by developing fraternal ties with the non-Catholic Christians invited to the council and who came in large numbers; Paul VI gave worldwide influence to the papacy through his travels to Jerusalem, India, and to the United Nations headquarters in New York, establishing relationships with non-Christians.

Medieval Jewish philosophers thinking about creation were influenced by Aristotle’s model of an eternally existing world, by Kalam arguments for a created universe, and of course by the Biblical account of creation found in Genesis. Aristotle’s theory of time reinforces a cosmology supportive of an eternally existing universe, thus obviating the need for a creator. Although Aristotle’s eternity thesis is often regarded as the target of medieval philosophers, both Dhanani and Langermann suggest that it was possibly Galen rather than Aristotle who posed an equal if not greater threat. In contrast to Aristotle, both Greek and Islamic atomists denied the continuity of time, and posited the existence of discrete time atoms, thus undermining the very assumption that things “persist” through time. Like Aristotle, Galen was famous for having denied creation and emphasizing a self-contained natural order that eschewed a creator; because Galen was careful to reject atomism, the Islamic Kalam theologians might have gravitated toward atomism as an effort to develop an alternative world-view to the Galenic. Given Galen’s staunch anti-atomist views, Langermann suggests that “it is not beyond the realm of the possible that Galen’s notion of minima, and not just his reports concerning his atomist opponents, had some influence upon the Mutakallimûn.”

Alexis Torrance considers early Church Fathers’ many treatments of the origins and roles of conscience in patristic literature. Contemporary commentators are especially prone to speak of conscience to affirm private judgments about personal feelings. Early Church Fathers, however, stressed that conscience is a communal gift presupposing shared convictions. They also stressed that conscience may become impaired under a variety of influences. The idea of conscience existed in Greek and Roman culture. Christians’ reflections, especially St. Paul, were crucial to the deliberations of Church Fathers. New Testament letters speak of conscience as a human faculty. Though not God’s voice, conscience does bring God’s voice to bear in our lives. Christian innovation connected conscience with the idea of a divine law, and some patristic authors identify conscience with a natural law. Human knowledge of right and wrong will be clouded by sin, thus conscience needs cleansing, by baptism, by following the commandments, and by continual examination of conscience and confession. It continually requires the grace of the Holy Spirit to govern one’s moral action in a way that might lead to God.

Christian Brugger treats a question of Catholic theology: the sensus fidei (the sense of the faith) in relation to conscience. Some theologians have claimed that when a significant number of the faithful conclude about a matter of faith or morals, they are expressing the sensus fidei, which merits recognition. Thus, such a conclusion can unfailingly inform the conscience. The sensus fidei has a long history but was noticeably used in Lumen Gentium from the Second Vatican Council. There it concerned the capacity of the baptized to know the truths of the faith, by the Holy Spirit. It is an intellectual power, however many false ideas about it followed the Council. Properly understood, the sensus fidei is inclusive of the teachings of Jesus and the Church about right and wrong. It is about the Church as a whole and is witnessed by consent of the whole Church – lay, hierarchy and religious. It can be blunted by poor liturgy and formation. It is limited to matters of faith and morals, and attendant to building up the Church. When properly exercised, it is one of the ways the Church can speak infallibly about what is to be believed.

In the course of discussing the nature of justice in the first book of the Republic, a number of claims are made concerning the nature of technê and what it is to be skilful or to have an ability. Nawar shows how three of these claims, which do significant conceptual work in both Plato and Aristotle, can be explained and defended. The first claim, by Socrates, concerns the ‘two-way’ nature of certain skills. For instance, the person who is skilful at hitting is not only proficient at hitting well, but also proficient at avoiding being hit. The second claim, by Thrasymachus, is that the practitioner of a technê is, in a certain way, infallible and cannot fail to bring about what they intend. The third claim, made by Socrates, is that technai are not value-neutral, but rather are directed at the good of their object. Namar examines these claims, clarifies them, and attempts to explain them (so far as possible). Furthermore, he shows that these claims play an important role in Aristotle’s thought and examines how Aristotle aims to incorporate or adapt these claims in his own discussion of the modal and teleological aspects of skills and rational capacities.

After a long debate, Vatican II affirmed the doctrine of episcopal collegiality with virtual unanimity, marking a significant step toward renewing governance in the Catholic Church. In doing so, Lumen Gentium resolved the old question concerning the difference between the presbyteral and episcopal orders, reinterpreted the doctrine of infallibility, and took steps toward developing the theology of communion that would prove to be so important in the postconciliar church.

Hobbes’s On the Citizen discussed religion and church-state relations less fully than his later Leviathan. In Leviathan, he trenchantly attacked theories which granted the clergy power that was independent from that of the state and its sovereign. In On the Citizen, he expressed his views with greater moderation and circumspection. Modern scholars debate whether Hobbes changed his ideas or just his tone between the two books. This chapter discusses the evidence for and against the claim that On the Citizen put forward relatively conventional views on the relationship between the powers of the state and the church, and that it was only in Leviathan that he abandoned a theory that was close to orthodox Anglicanism, and characteristic of royalists at the time of the English Civil War. The chapter examines what Hobbes said in On the Citizen, and also discusses the ideas of some of his contemporaries. It notes that the book soon encountered criticism for its contentions concerning religion and church-state relations, and especially for granting the sovereign too great power over the church and the clergy. It argues that the theory presented in On the Citizen is not so very distant from that which Hobbes espoused in Leviathan.