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1 results

  • Chapter 10 - Acquiring epistemic virtue

  • Edited by Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University, Owen Flanagan, Duke University, North Carolina
  • Book:
    Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue
    Published online:
    05 April 2014
    Print publication:
    27 March 2014, pp 175-196

  • Summary

    This chapter develops the version of indirect epistemic teleology (IET) that is supported by pluralist teleology, and explores how it might answer at least some of the more important objections. It lays out the basic ideas of pluralist teleology. The chapter explains that IET is the view that results from applying pluralist teleology to the field of epistemic normativity. It explores IET in relation to both meta-epistemic issues and issues in normative epistemology. IET is structurally analogous to a kind of rule-consequentialism in ethics. The chapter discusses the concept of justified belief and other epistemic evaluative concepts. It evaluates the epistemic practices in all possible worlds, considered as hypothetical or counterfactual possibilities, relative to the actually optimal set of norms. The chapter considers objections to IET and briefly explores the ability of the theory to respond to the objections.