This chapter tackles the issue of seemingly inconsistent statements by Kant across Groundwork and the second Critique. I show that Kant’s comment in the second Critique concerning the impossibility of proving the absolute necessity of the moral law has to do with a different question than that analysed by Kant in the first part of Groundwork III. Kant is really working with two deductions: the Groundwork deduction concerns the implications of having a will: If you take yourself as having a will, then you must also take yourself as bound by the moral law. I call this the EW deduction. But the problem of the second Critique is a different one. It actually picks up on issues already mentioned in the last part of Groundwork III (“On the Extreme Boundary of all Practical Philosophy”), and concerns insight into the real possibility of having a will (the RP deduction). We have no speculative access to such a possibility, for it would require us to have insight into the ground of both our receptivity and spontaneity. The first deduction, which concerns a hypothetical necessity, succeeds, but the second does not.

This chapter shows that early modern metaphysics was far more important for Pufendorf’s moral philosophy than has often been thought. In particular, it is essential to understanding Pufendorf’s theory of moral entities. This theory is often regarded as voluntarist and anti-metaphysical. Opposed to this, it has been argued, was a rationalist belief in objective and eternal moral values that was exemplified by philosophers like Leibniz. However, the main distinction for Pufendorf was not between voluntarism and rationalism, but between moral rules that were specific to a certain society because they were merely conventional, and others that were universal because they were natural, in the sense of being grounded in the physical characteristics of human nature as it had been created by God. The latter, according to Pufendorf, were necessarily true, though their necessity was hypothetical rather than absolute. Pufendorf’s intention was to turn moral philosophy into a science, which would supersede traditional Aristotelian-scholastic views that morality was concerned with the contingent circumstances of actions, and therefore incapable of ‘scientific’, that is syllogistic proof. Pufendorf’s theory of moral entities was central to this project of a moral science, which required him to provide a metaphysical foundation for these entities.

The activities undergone by living things are paradigmatically end-directed, and so this chapter examines Aristotle’s invocation of teleological notions (as well as their contrast with non-teleological notions) in his scientific investigation of life. In particular, the chapter looks at how Aristotle explains why various processes occur, why some kinds of organisms have (or lack) certain parts or features, and why those parts or features vary in their sizes and shapes. Aristotle’s biological explanations are complex and rich in detail, thus providing valuable resources for making headway into some of the interpretive challenges facing our understanding of his distinctive form of natural teleology – one that countenances purposes in the absence of intentions and volitions, and one that finds the occurrence of necessity compatible with goal-directedness.

This chapter argues that Providence is one of the key themes of the commentary, and examines how Calcidius (1) harmonizes Providence and fate with human free will through a notion of hypothetical necessity; and (2) refutes determinist positions, among which the Stoic view.