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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the validity of the standard approach in expert judgment for evaluating precision medicines, in which experts are required to estimate outcomes as if they did not have access to diagnostic information, whereas in fact, they do.
Methods
Fourteen clinicians participated in an expert judgment task to estimate the cost and medical outcomes of the use of exome sequencing in pediatric patients with intractable epilepsy in Thailand. Experts were randomly assigned to either an “unblind” or “blind” group; the former was provided with the exome sequencing results for each patient case prior to the judgment task, whereas the latter was not provided with the exome sequencing results. Both groups were asked to estimate the outcomes for the counterfactual scenario, in which patients had not been tested by exome sequencing.
Results
Our study did not show significant results, possibly due to the small sample size of both participants and case studies.
Conclusions
A comparison of the unblind and blind approach did not show conclusive evidence that there is a difference in outcomes. However, until further evidence suggests otherwise, we recommend the blind approach as preferable when using expert judgment to evaluate precision medicines because this approach is more representative of the counterfactual scenario than the unblind approach.
Chapter 12 opens by asking readers to identify what they know about a relatively unknown topic, and to formulate some questions about the topic; they then study the topic, identify what’s now known, and finally compare notes from before and after study. It’s surprisingly hard for one person to perceive what is given information for someone else because what we know interferes with figuring out what they know. We are in a sense cursed by our knowledge, seeing more in hindsight than is justified. The chapter describes studies with children and studies with adults showing that our current understanding blinds us to our own prior understanding and to someone else’s current understanding. In part because people have strong funds of knowledge on the topic of language, this curse or bias is especially vital to consider. For example, speakers of English unconsciously know the language’s basic sentence structure even if they don’t describe that structure using grammatical terms. This chapter’s Closing Worksheet asks readers to find out how people typically use the terms for key concepts in their demonstrations. For example, what does "sentence" mean to many people?
Hindsight bias means knowing the outcome may profoundly influence the perception of past events and prevent a realistic appraisal of what actually occurred.
Aims:
To evaluate the role of hindsight bias on psychiatrists' diagnosis.
Methods:
A psychiatric vignette was made, and validated by expert psychiatrists in national board of psychiatry. They defined the most probable (Bipolar Mood Disorder) and the least probable diagnosis (Schizoaffective disorder). We designed three types of questionnaire, Type A: the basic vignette with an additional explain that in pervious admission the diagnosis was Schizoaffective disorder, Type B: the basic vignette with a suggestion of Bipolar mood disorder, and Type C: the basic vignette without any suggestion. These three forms were sent out to psychiatrists by randomization and concealment allocation in three groups to evaluate their diagnosis.
Results:
Of the 240 psychiatrists included,173 persons responded (response rate 72%).There were 52 persons in group A with Schizoaffective disorder suggestion, 63 in group B with Bipolar mood disorder suggestion and 58 in the control group. There was a significant increase of schizoaffective disorder diagnosis (Pv <0.001) but there was not a significant difference for Bipolar Mood Disorder or any other diagnoses. There was no difference in mean age, sex and duration of clinical practice between groups.
Conclusion:
According to this study decision-making in psychiatry may be vulnerable to biases like hindsight bias. Insight via education appears the major means to avoid distorting decision-making processes.
Rwanda has become the paradigmatic case for a missed opportunity to prevent genocide and human suffering on the largest scale, and subsequent analyses of this case have shaped a significant part of the practical and academic thinking. The chapter contests the dominant argument that Rwanda was a straightforward case for heeding plenty, early and high-quality warnings. It argues that indications need to be distinguished from actual warnings and persuasiveness of warnings needs to be empirically studied rather than assumed. The analysis shows that most sources cited in the literature did not contain an actual warning and gave a more ambiguous picture than is claimed by proponents who argue that lack of political will, not warnings, was the problem. It is suggested that hindsight bias partly explains why the availability of warnings has been overestimated, whereas the diagnostic difficulties in this case were underestimated. Contrary to expectations, persuasive warning communication appears to be no less of a problem for preventive policy as the will and ability to respond. The findings suggest that renewed attention is needed to the challenge of making knowledge, relevance and action claims about impending mass atrocities that are clear and persuasive enough.
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