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This chapter studies the development of Canadian family and economic immigration policy from the late 1950s to the mid-2010s. The first case study examines the end of the White Canada policy in favor of an immigration policy that selected on the basis of skills and family ties. This far-reaching change was first passed in two rounds of regulatory change in 1962 and 1967, before being legitimated with the passage of the 1976 Immigration Act. In a second case study, the chapter examines a series of reforms, passed between the mid-1980s and early 2000s, that lay the groundwork for a policy shift that tilted the balance of immigrant admissions from family to economic immigration. These regulatory reforms became institutionalized with the Immigration and Refugee Protection act of 2001. The chapter’s third case study examines a succession of reforms enacted between 2006 and 2015. Determined to fully exploit the executive’s policy-making autonomy, the government shifted the logic of economic admissions from human capital to employer demand, sidelined the centrality of permanent immigration in favor of temporary foreign worker recruitment, and curtailed the sponsorship of extended family members.
Chapter 2 lays out the dual thrust of immigration policy in the neoliberal era, which is to “court” high-skilled immigrants and to “fend off” all sorts of presumably (but not legally) low-skilled migrants, including family migrants. But the heart of the chapter examines the role of immigration in the populist storm. While immigration has been central to both Brexit and Trump, it has been central in different ways. Brexit, though driven by hostility to large-scale intra-EU migration, does not challenge the structure of (neo)liberal immigration policy—it will even make British policy more universalistic because cleansed of favoritism for other Europeans. By contrast, Trump`s immigration policy breaks with the “antipopulist norm” that Gary Freeman, in a classic paper (1995), held constitutive of a liberal immigration policy. Germany during and after the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis is an interesting negative case of stubbornly holding liberal course, though inadvertently fueling populism at home and abroad.
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