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This chapter details Schopenhauer’s critique of a key modern ideology that grew increasingly strong during his own lifetime: nationalism. First, it notes how Schopenhauer argued that ethnic sameness cannot ground any moral obligations of individuals. Second, it turns to Schopenhauer’s critical dissolution of teleological national history, according to which nations are collective agents with a singular fate. For him, nations were not unified subjects with one shared destiny. Third, it reviews his caustic comments on the increased importance of the vernacular in scholarly communication and the attempt to establish an exclusively German literary canon. To Schopenhauer, nationhood was not even a useful category of cultural appreciation. Through this reconstruction, Schopenhauer emerges as a fierce antinationalist who questioned the importance of the nation as a supposedly cohesive community of mutual care, a unified historical subject, or even a meaningful cultural phenomenon.
Drawing from the experiences of thirty-two refugee women who fled with their children from Ukraine to two German cities, Berlin and Frankfurt Oder, this article explores how being a refugee and a mother affects the anchoring, along with the un-anchoring and embedding of Ukrainian refugees in their new environment. It illustrates that solidarity practices and (inter)actions play a crucial role in mobility considerations, as the interlocutors engaging in solidarity work find meaning in building lives in their new environment. The identities of the interlocutors as refugees and mothers play an important role in shaping the solidarity they articulate as they work to support others in a similar situation in cultivating agency, which, at the same time, gives the interlocutors comfort in their own struggles. This article also makes a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature on transnational family ties through the case of Ukrainian refugee women in Germany, who often have family members remaining in/returning to Ukraine. The interlocutors positioning as mothers and refugees means that they engage in negotiating mobility considerations with these positions in hindsight — providing new avenues of enquiry into the agency of refugee-mothers, reflecting on life aspirations, and considering their specific positionalities and forced migration context.
In chapter 11, To act now if we are to act at all (June 16 - Jun 27) the relative calm in Austria is followed by increasing concern about Germany which looses foreign exchange. The Bank of England, the New York Fed, the Banque de France and the Bank for International Settlements arranges a $100 million credit to the Reichsbank. Meanwhile,on June 20, US President Herbert Hoover announces his plan for a one year moratorium, which is received positively in most of Europe, but not in France. George Harrison assumes a more active role in trying to defuse the concern about a breakdown in Europe, and he enters into dialogue with the Banque de France, which is more open to a solution than the French government. The chapter ends with some optimism that the Hoover proposal may have changed the situation in Europe.
Chapter 13, Germany will collapse (June 19 - July 10) begins with everyone’s eyes on Germany where the uncertainty about the French position towards the Hoover plan increases every day. More generally, politics comes to play a larger role, as Norman increasingly emphasizes that it’s about politics, and Harrison has to take Hoover’s plan into account. At the same time leadership in the epistemic community of central bankers shifts away from Norman toward Harrison, who enters into a dialogue with French central bankers. Tensions arise between Norman and Harrison, as the begin to subscribe to divergent narratives of the situation and what needs to be done. In Germany, the situation gets more concerning by the hour, and Hans Luther travels to London and Paris in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a giant credit to the Reichsbank.
Chapter 10, A world political problem (June 11 - June 16). This chapter recounts the endgame of the Austrian crisis, while instability spreads to Germany. Norman comes to realize that in reality there is not much the central banks can do, since the real issue is "a world political problem" going all the way back to the Versaille Peace Agreement of 1919, the German war reparations and the allied’s war debts. The International Creditors Committee negotiate in Vienna with the Credit Anstalt and the Austrian government and at the very last minute they succeed in getting guarantee for their deposits, while promising to leave them for at least two years. At the same time, on June 16, negotiations with French bankers over the Austrian bond loans fails, and the Bank of England singlehandedly steps in with a bridge credit to the government. Together, the loan and the standstill agreement stops the Austrian crisis, at least for a while.
Chapter 14, Aqnxiety within Germany at climax (July 11 - July 23). In this chapter tension reaches its climax as the Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danatbank) fails on July 13. Without help from outside of Germany, the German government declares a bank holiday and introduces exchange controls, effectively ending the gold standard in Germany. The New York Fed and Harrison declines to intervene and the BIS does not have the resources or the inclination to intervene. Norman’s position that the situation goes back to the Versaille Peace agreement and is now a matter for governments strengthens. A conference in London is unable to come up with new solutions and meanwhile sterling comes under pressure. The fear of contagion beginning in early May is now a reality.
Chapter 11 explores how German criminal procedure, in the same way as German substantive criminal law, builds on a main body of legislation that was drafted in the nineteenth century. While the German Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended numerous times – also with the intention to address digital transformation and the shift to an information society – the obtaining of digital evidence (in particular from service providers), its analysis and its transformation into evidence introduced in a criminal trial remain areas with many challenges, uncertainties of legal interpretation and need of legislative reform. This chapter aims to provide an overview of core themes of digital evidence in criminal justice and the cooperation of service providers in criminal matters in Germany – in particular those that seem of most relevance to an international audience.
Chapter 8, Surrounded with trouble (June 5 - June 10). The BIS board decides to grant a second credit to the BIS, but only after a prolonged discussion and it is made conditional on the placement of the Austrian government loan. There is increasing concern about the schilling as capital flows out of the country and the government issues take increasing priority, without being placed. At the same time, Germany’s reparations issues become ever more present as the German Chancellor Brüning meets with Prime Minister MacDonals at Chequers. Shortly before, Brüning published a statement saying that the burden on the German people has reached its limit. The international creditors too become increasingly nervous about the Austrian situation.
This study aimed to compare reimbursement prices for new, innovative non-orphan drugs in Germany based on price negotiation and cost-effectiveness analysis, using the efficiency frontier (EF) approach and cost-utility analysis (CUA). For the EF, the next effective intervention and no intervention were used as comparators. Three pairwise comparisons were conducted: negotiation vs EF, CUA vs EF and negotiation vs CUA. For the comparison between negotiation and EF, relative risk reductions for a given added health benefit were assigned, and resulting price premiums were determined using an empirical estimate from the literature and a conceptual model. The difference between CUA vs EF was determined based on an aggregation rule and thresholds for CUA based on the average and marginal cost-effectiveness of the health care system. The difference between negotiation and CUA was determined through an indirect comparison. Price premiums based on negotiation are approximately 10–40 per cent higher than those based on EF using no intervention as a comparator. Furthermore, price premiums based on CUA (threshold at system-average cost-effectiveness) are approximately 25–50 per cent higher than those based on EF using no intervention as a comparator. The indirect comparison predicts that price premiums based on CUA (threshold at system-average cost-effectiveness) are approximately 10–15 per cent higher than those based on negotiation. For a threshold set at system-marginal cost-effectiveness, price premiums based on CUA are more than threefold higher than those based on negotiation. In the German health care system, CUA with a threshold set at system-average or system-marginal cost-effectiveness is predicted to yield higher reimbursement prices than price negotiations or the EF approach based on no intervention as a comparator.
Germany’s 2022 Zeitenwende (watershed) has been widely interpreted as a break with Berlin’s decades-long attempts to offer security ‘with rather than against Russia’. In the 1970s, West Germany’s social democrat-led government had embarked on Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) as a way of normalising relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other Soviet satellites by fostering closer economic ties with Moscow. This policy was extended by subsequent governments and even endured, though in new form, after the fall of the Berlin wall. Ostpolitik is now commonly seen to have culminated in a Kremlin-friendly political landscape and an economy dependent on Russian gas. More than two years after Zeitenwende, the jury is still out as to whether Ostpolitik has been dismantled or simply remains on hold. This article shows that although German politics has experienced a seismic shift since the invasion, forces of continuity remain in operation. Ostpolitik was always in part the symptom of a desire to do realpolitik in Europe. This urge is unlikely to disappear.
How did we get from the religious core of the sixteenth-century Reformation to the notions of freedom popularised by Hegel and Ranke? Enlightenment's Reformation explores how two key cultural and intellectual achievements – the sixteenth-century Reformation and the late eighteenth-century birth of 'German' philosophy – became fused in public discussion over the course of the 'long' eighteenth century. Michael Printy argues that Protestant theologians and intellectuals recast the meaning of Protestantism as part of a wide-ranging cultural apology aimed at the twin threats of unbelief and deism on the one hand, and against Pietism and a nascent evangelical awakening on the other. The reimagining of the Reformation into a narrative of progress was powerful, becoming part of mainstream German intellectual culture in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Utilising Reformation history, Enlightenment history, and German philosophy, this book explores how the rich if unstable idea linking Protestantism and modern freedom came to dominate German intellectual culture until the First World War.
Northern Europe was the site of another great medieval experiment in statecraft, the Hanseatic League of cities that monopolized trade in the Baltic and North Seas. In a time and place of weak central authority, German-speaking cities in the northern tier of the Holy Roman Empire were the most powerful force in Northern Europe. They waged war against territorial states, winning steep concessions from the Danish Empire in 1370 that marked the league’s zenith. What was the source of Hanse power? Lübeck in northern Germany was the de facto capital. This city was the product of German migratory conquests in a vast Christianization effort. Soon it was an alpha city in a far-flung network that controlled trade from England to Russia and points between. The league led by Lübeck was locked in a zealous, centuries-long struggle to gain and protect trading privileges in the burgeoning financial centers of a new urban age. The Hanse cities formed a network within a network, establishing strongholds in the globally significant nodes of Bergen, Bruges, London, and Novgorod.
International Relations (IR) accounts of the post–World War II international order often claim that after its defeat, Germany ‘transformed’ from a fascist, militaristic, and racist state into a model liberal democracy, facilitating its full rehabilitation and integration into Western institutions and alliances. Yet a closer examination of post-war German domestic and international politics challenges this account: denazification was widely reviled, survivors faced ongoing persecution, and a retooled antisemitism asserted itself in international diplomacy. This article offers the concept of adaptive politics to capture how collectively held beliefs, identities, policies, and conduct travel across incisive political events like defeat in war, occupation, and genocide, outlining the complex concurrence of continuity, adaptation, and change in their aftermath. Drawing on theories of sovereignty, biopolitics, racism, and antisemitism, the article tracks the unfolding of West German adaptive politics in the immediate post-war period, focusing on efforts to exonerate perpetrators, modifications of racism and antisemitism, and the role of the trauma diagnosis in debilitating survivors. By sanitising this history, IR scholarship positions the post-war liberal international order, and the international politics of the West more broadly, as entirely disconnected from the disordered conduct associated with Nazism.
This chapter explores the link between eternity clauses and electoral democracy by looking at two instances of unamendable democracy: party bans, both direct and indirect, and the protection of parliamentary mandates. These two approaches are illustrated via a range of case studies: the ban of anti-democratic parties in Germany; bans of ethnic, separatist, and religious parties in Turkey; indirect unamendability and its chilling effect on party competition in Israel; and the judicial protection of parliamentary mandates as unamendable in Czechia. Whereas such measures are adopted in the name of protecting democracy, the analysis here indicates that courts will not always strike the right balance between safeguarding and unduly narrowing democratic commitments. In some cases, they may even unintentionally undermine multipartyism itself or significantly influence electoral outcomes. Thus, the bluntness and open-ended nature of unamendability risks having a chilling effect on electoral democracy in both fragile and more stable democratic contexts.
The chapter explores how Germany engages with its nationals abroad, covering the diplomatic/consular, economic/social and military dimensions. As of 2020, around 2.9 million Germans permanently lived outside Germany, mostly in other European countries and North America, and approximately 24 million Germans went abroad for their main holidays in 2021. The chapter finds that Germany’s activities towards these German nationals residing or travelling abroad is relatively limited overall, with a focus on supporting and assisting German citizens. There is only little evidence for policies to co-opt Germans abroad, for example in the context of return schemes for highly-skilled German citizens, and no indication for repression at all, as befits a liberal democracy. While Germany’s engagement is typically of low domestic salience, Germany can mobilize significant resources to support its nationals abroad at times of crisis (e.g., natural disasters or hostage situations), in particular through its global diplomatic network. Germany has also used its armed forces for military evacuations from conflict zones, often in close coordination with its European and transatlantic partners. Germany can thus be described as a capable protector that is, however, reluctant to engage with its national communities abroad on a more comprehensive and proactive basis.
In June 2020, the German Federal Government adopted its National Hydrogen Strategy (NWS), which was updated in July 2023, viewing green hydrogen as a key to the energy transition. To achieve net greenhouse gas neutrality by 2045, as required by law, the NWS envisages a rapid market ramp-up for hydrogen. This policy is supported by the recent amendment of the Energy Industry Act (EnWG), which introduces provisions for a prompt creation of a so-called hydrogen core network. However, for now, the required infrastructure does not exist. Against that background, this chapter will examine the existing permission regime in Germany for pure hydrogen infrastructure, specifically its transportation via pipelines and its large-scale storage in salt caverns as the best short-term storage option. The analytical focus will be trained on existing legal barriers that stand in the way of accelerating the construction and repurposing of infrastructure to disseminate hydrogen. To secure the planning and approval framework for the rapid expansion of hydrogen infrastructures in Germany, necessary adjustments to the current legal framework are proposed.
This chapter introduces cases motivating the book and presents a three-step argument about the effects of forced migration on societal cooperation, state capacity, and economic development. It reviews evidence from post-WWII displacement in Poland and West Germany, discusses the applicability of the findings to other cases, and highlights the main contributions of the book.
In 2012, a German district court in the city of Cologne decided that male circumcision for non-therapeutical reasons amounted to criminal assault that could not be justified by parental consent. Over a period of several months, between the decision and the drafting of the amending legislation, the German public and academy became embroiled in a remarkably heated and emotional debate about the future of the practice. But this time, the resentment did not just appear in the notorious online world but became woven into medical and legal arguments against circumcision. Even though critics of circumcision were eager to stress that their concerns were children’s rights alone, the Cologne debate sent a signal to Germany’s Jews that the law could easily turn them into strangers again. Through a close reading of this legal controversy, this chapter examines how contemporary secular legal responses to religious infant male circumcision reproduce Christian ambivalence and rely on a supersessionary logic that renders Jews as stuck in a backward past, while constituting the majoritarian secularised Christian culture as a superior locus of equality and progress.
This is the first of two chapters concerned with the Jewish practice of infant male circumcision. In this chapter, I trace the history of circumcision as a trope for Jewish difference in European Christian thought and consider its symbolic role in debates about the legal equality of Jews. Christian thinkers spent much time pondering Jewish circumcision and what it told them about the supposedly ‘carnal’, particularistic, and anachronistic nature of Jews. Apart from constituting a trope for what differentiated Jews from Christians, the bodily sign eventually also became enmeshed in discussions about the possibility of Jewish emancipation where it offered a site to debate the fitness of Jews to become citizens. However, regardless of how much Christians disdained circumcision, they mostly respected the Jewish right to circumcise and due to a curious twist of history, some Christian societies eventually even embraced circumcision themselves. More recently, circumcision has emerged as a human rights issue and I explore the role of Christian ambivalence in contemporary calls for a ban on the practice in the name of children’s rights and gender equality.
Summarizes the industrial policies of Germany since the late nineteenth century, emphasizing the idea of relationship-oriented, as opposed to transaction-oriented, capitalism.