In Kierkegaard, a three-part dialectical structure is set, first, by the two elements that comprise parts I and II of Either/Or, the “esthetic” and then the “ethical life.” A subsequent, third stage comes with a “teleological suspension of the ethical” (by which Kierkegaard means “suspension of the moral” in the modern sense) and a committing “leap” of faith. Unlike Marx’s version, Kierkegaard’s dialectic takes place not at the social level, but within an individual’s life in a way that can bring about an essentially individual authenticity and what Kierkegaard called “existential inwardness.” But if Kierkegaard’s dialectic, unlike Hegel’s and Marx’s, is decidedly not world historical, thus different from Hegel’s and Marx’s, the notions of individuality and authenticity that Kierkegaard develops are nonetheless themselves distinctively modern ethical ideas, more modern, indeed, than any idea of individuality that is in place in early modern moral philosophy. Kierkegaard’s concept of the “single individual” is more closely related to Nietzsche’s “sovereign individual,” to “individuality” in John Stuart Mill, and to the radically free subject of the twentieth-century existentialists, than it is to the “forensic” notion of the individual person or moral agent as, for example, in Locke or Kant.