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Chapter 6 uses this new understanding of chilling effects to elaborate the dangers of chilling effects both on an individual level and societal scale. The chapter elaborates the two dimensions of chilling effects – repressive and productive. The former speaks to how chilling effects today can repress speech and other rights on a mass scale; the latter speaks to how chilling effects are conforming effects, and thus produce conforming and compliant behavior on a societal scale, which has critical implications for individual identity, development, autonomy, and equality, but is also corrosive to democracy and democratic societies.
Information on registered primary healthcare diagnoses from the Register of Primary Health Care Visits (RPV) is used to allocate healthcare funding in Finland. Our aim was to analyse the diagnosis rate trajectories in the RPV and, through that, assess the equitable development of funding. We extracted national- and regional-level diagnosis numbers from the RPV. Joinpoint regression analysis with Model 1 (overall trend) and Model 2 (potential changes in trend) was used to assess diagnosis rate trajectories from 2018 to 2024. Model 1 demonstrated that the number of registered primary healthcare diagnoses has increased between 2018 and 2024, but the growth has not been uniform across all trajectories. Model 2 showed significant differences in the diagnosis rate trajectories between regions and diagnostic groups. There were significant discrepancies in the registration of primary care diagnoses. Reducing these discrepancies by standardizing diagnosis registration practices is necessary to ensure equitable healthcare funding.
The meaning of equality is highly contested. As a result, courts across different jurisdictions have developed distinct doctrinal approaches to operationalize the concept. This article argues that four primary equality frameworks can be identified, each reflecting not only different understandings of equality but also varying degrees of judicial deference to the legislature and executive. The first is the equality-as-non-discrimination model, which predominates in most common law jurisdictions and dominates the theoretical discourse on equality. The second, prevalent in many continental European jurisdictions, is the equality-as-reasonableness model, under which courts apply a relatively strict standard of review, even in cases that do not involve suspect classifications. The third, the positive-equality model, recognizes that courts can derive positive obligations from the principle of equality. Finally, the deferential model largely entrusts the definition and implementation of equality to the legislature and executive. This article highlights the normative strengths and weaknesses of each model, arguing that no single approach holds an absolute normative advantage over the others. Instead, the suitability of a particular model depends on the societal and institutional context in which a court operates.
Breaking new ground in the intellectual history of economic and social human rights, Christian Olaf Christiansen traces their justification from the outset of World War II until the present day. Featuring a series of fascinating thinkers, from political scientists to Popes, this is the first book to comprehensively map the key arguments made in defense of human rights and how they connect to ideas of social and redistributive justice. Christiansen traces this intellectual history from a first phase devoted to internationalizing these rights, a second phase of their unprecedented legitimacy deployed to criticize global inequality, to a third phase of a continued quest to secure their legitimacy once and for all. Engaging with the newest scholarship and building a bridge to political philosophy as well as global inequality studies, it facilitates a much-needed novel and nuanced history of rights-rights we should still consider defending today.
Human rights instruments in jurisdictions throughout the world assert the right to equality and non-discrimination. These principles lie at the heart of human rights. This chapter initially considers the meanings of equality and non-discrimination. It then examines equality and non-discrimination in the context of Article 14 of the ECHR. This includes an examination of direct and indirect discrimination and intersectionality. Examples from the Strasbourg jurisprudence illustrate the applicability of Article 14 ECHR to specific protected categories including race/ethnicity, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and sex characteristics. Article 14 ECHR and its influence in domestic UK law is analysed. The final section considers the UK Equality Act 2010 (EqA)and the complexities raised by competing equality claims. There are case studies concerning sexual orientation and religious belief, employment law, education and a discussion of the concept of ‘woman’ and ‘sex’ in the EqA as referring to a biological woman and biological sex.
A number of philosophical themes run throughout Marx’s corpus. Foremost is his focus on free social and political relations – on emancipated people governing themselves together rather than being mastered by others. There is no doubt, however, that Marx was a sharp critic of law, justice, and right (Recht) – which Kant had argued can only be realized in a state – and that Marx’s communist social ideal is nonjuridical. A second theme is that although Marx rejects the modern deontic conception of morality, he is very much aware that his own ideal of freedom is a modern conception, which is based, like modern morality, in a view of the unique value of human persons – the “self-worth of men” as “free.” A third is Marx’s communitarian emphasis on “a community of people [organized] for their highest ends”: a “democratic” society of free people, whether organized as a state or not. It is important that Marx does not ground his democratic conception as orthodox liberal moderns do in a deontic conception of fundamental equal human authority. Ultimately, Marx’s ideas must be understood as a liberal egalitarianism of the good rather than of the right.
The article examines how the Czech courts addressed restrictions on the right to conduct business during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although grounded in the Czech authorities’ response to the health crisis, the analysis extends to broader conclusions about the necessity of upholding rule-of-law principles. The article therefore highlights how constitutional imperatives of proportionality, equality and the justification of government actions must be preserved in judicial review, even in times of crises.
There is an increasing global focus on gender diversity and equality in the workplace, particularly regarding women in leadership roles. Our study explores this focus in the wine industry in Australia, examining women's representation in CEO, winemaker, viticulturist, and marketing roles. By using results from a previous Australian study, we find that women have significantly increased their presence in all roles but one (marketing role) when comparing 2007–2013 with 2021–2023. Our study also confirms that women are more likely to be in winemaking and viticulturist roles, conditional upon a woman being in the CEO role. However, women in winemaking and viticulturist roles still lag behind women in leadership roles across other industries in Australia. We offer conclusions and directions for future research.
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a growing interest in altering legal rules to redistribute wealth, with many scholars believing that neoclassical economic theory is biased against redistribution. Yet a growing number of progressive scholars are pushing back against this view. Toward an Inframarginal Revolution offers a fresh perspective on the redistribution of wealth by legal scholars who argue that the neoclassical concept of the gains from trade provides broad latitude for redistribution that will not harm efficiency. They show how policymakers can redistribute wealth via taxation, price regulation, antitrust, consumer law, and contract law by focusing on the prices at which inframarginal units of production change hands. Progressive and eye-opening, this volume uses conservative economic concepts to make a compelling case for radically redistributing wealth. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available open access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
This article documents the survival of gender inequalities in UK archaeology. We discover how an early equality and diversity agenda (Morris 1992) was dismantled in the late 1990s and explore the impact this had on women’s careers. Analysis of data from Chartered Institute for Archaeologists1 employment surveys for the period 1999–2008 enables a developed understanding of why many women, often reluctantly, left archaeology in their 30s, in a continual ‘leaky pipeline’, as volunteer group British Women Archaeologists was established. We find core issues linked to this ‘sector exodus’ as a gendering of tasks/under-employment, lack of support around parenting, and gendered promotion, leading to pay disparity. We argue that a refusal in the late 1990s to modernize employment structures around women workers’ needs underpins ongoing economic precarity in the sector.
In line with Singapore’s vision of the separation of powers, the courts’ duty is primarily to give effect to domestic law; the political branches take the lead in engaging with international law. A study of Singapore’s interface with international law would therefore be incomplete were it to consider only the courts’ role and not the political branches’ model of international law as primarily a guarantor of Singapore’s sovereignty and standing as a participant on the international stage. The political branches have been circumspect in engaging with international law in other areas, such as human rights, preferring a specifically Singaporean vision of rights. A symmetry emerges: the courts and political branches engage strongly with sovereignty-related norms; take other areas of international law as inspiration for developing domestic law; and take human rights law seriously even as their fidelity is ultimately to a specifically Singaporean legal framework for rights protection.
Where does our modern democracy come from? It is a composite of two very different things: a medieval tradition of political participation, pluralistic but highly elitist; and the notion of individual equality, emerging during the early modern period. These two things first converged in the American and French revolutions – a convergence that was not only unexpected and unplanned but has remained fragile to this day. Democracy's Double Helix does not simply project and trace our modern democracy back into history, assuming that it was bound to come about. It looks instead at the political practices and attitudes prevailing before its emergence. From this perspective, it becomes clear that there was little to predict the coming of democracy. It also becomes clear that the two historical trajectories that formed it obey very different logics and always remain in tension. From this genuinely historical vantage point, we can therefore better understand the nature of our democracy and its current crisis.
This Article explores the reach of Section 9 of South Africa’s democratic Constitution which entrenches the right to equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law in the light of the long legacy of apartheid geography. It argues that the equality clause has had its most profound impact in relation to areas of the law where discrimination is embedded in legal rules, perhaps most notably in the field of family law, and that it has had less impact in addressing patterns of material inequality that run along racial lines but that are not directly furthered by legislation or legal rules. It identifies some of the reasons why the equality clause is less effective at addressing patterns of racial inequality that arise from social and economic practices.
The German Federal Constitutional Court has defined constitutional limits for exclusionary legislation in social law. In these judgments, the Federal Constitutional Court has used human dignity and social equality doctrines to address poverty and social exclusion based on a specific group status as constitutional issues. In doing that, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed practices of a social constitutionalism. While the reviewing power of apex courts for restrictions in classic civil liberties is generally accepted, it is more contested and less obvious for distributive welfare policies. That is why, the practices of social constitutionalism of the Federal Constitutional Court have been an important constitutional development in recent years. The case law shows that they strengthen the social rights protection of the most vulnerable groups in society: people in need and refugees.
Millions worldwide face poverty daily. While its effects vary by society, poverty consistently marginalizes individuals, limiting their opportunities and access to societal benefits. Myths about poverty undergird and perpetuate socioeconomic exclusion, being the vehicles for cultural processes, such as stigmatization, racialization, and rationalization. These myths abound in law. They include the conception of poverty as solely concerned with the deprivation of basic material goods; equal opportunities and collective amnesia about the past; stigmatization of people in poverty as irresponsible and lazy; the categorization of aspects and elements of their poverty condition as criminal. This Article argues that judges, as (meta)narrators, have the power to challenge myths and develop new narratives about poverty, through the language of non-discrimination and equality. This could open the way to judicially redress certain troubling situations of misrecognition, social exclusion and inequality. Ultimately, as long as myths about poverty prevail in law any attempt to tackle the issue of socioeconomic exclusion is destined to fail. This article contributes to the law and sociology literature on poverty in judgecraft by addressing the research gap on narratives of poverty within judicial reasoning and practice.
This chapter seeks to strengthen the account of the Principle of Multispecies Legality offered in the previous chapter by responding to potential queries and concerns around the proposal’s structure, scope, and feasibility. The outlined concerns are as follows: that the PML is an attempt to redefine legal personhood; that a focus on interests is too inclusive, in that in opening the doors of legal inclusion to a relatively wide range of beings and entities it would put undesirable constraints on human activity; that a focus on interests is too limited in that it doesn’t capture the full scope of animals’ capabilities; that the PML will result in the equal treatment of humans and all other animals; that we shouldn’t base a being’s worth on their possession of a particular characteristic; and that the PML will be too unfeasible to implement.
This chapter asks: how did notions and practices of individual equality arise out of the experience of the Reformation and of the religious pluralism that it engendered across Europe?
This chapter asks: how did the Enlightenment bring together and interweave the various germinating strands of individual equality, and how did enlightened writers translate the notion into political ideas and institutional schemes?
The introductory chapter explains and legitimates the approach of the book: why does it make sense to write the long-term (pre)history of democracy as a history of two distinct phenomena – pluralistic participation and individual equality – and of their convergence? Why can it be argued that this convergence was not unavoidable and is not irreversible?