We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The navigational freedoms are unavoidably curtailed to some degree in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as compared with the traditional high seas freedoms. One of the main reasons for this compromise was to accommodate coastal States’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the newly established maritime zone. Nevertheless, the limitation of the navigational freedoms by the coastal State can only be justified if they are made in accordance with the formula of the attribution of rights and freedoms in the EEZ and must be exercised in good faith and by giving due regard to the exercise of these freedoms and rights. It is noteworthy that coastal States have been able to utilise mechanisms developed by competent international organisations to adopt and implement some of these limitations through the rules of reference, particularly regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment from international shipping. This chapter first identifies the scope of the preserved freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, then examines how they may have been affected by the exercise of a coastal State’s rights and jurisdiction, before discusses the remedies to address these impacts.
In practice, there are several obstacles to the application of the substantive legal framework analysed in the previous chapters. First, there is a risk of contractual provisions that deviate from the legal norm. The qualification of certain rules as mandatory law may prevent such contractual deviation. Even so, effective recourse to the protective regimes throughout the course of the contract is not guaranteed. Reference may be made to the possibility for corporate partners to have recourse to trade secret protection and the apparent limited invocation of the protective legal framework. Collective enforcement may contribute to enhanced transparency throughout the music value chain and counter musicians’ fear of commercial retaliation. Further bolstering extra-judicial enforcement is likely to fulfil an important complementary role.
This chapter brings together the research findings and answers the main research question, namely how the legal framework can contribute to a achieving a fair(er) balance between the interests of musicians and their main corporate partners. It summarises the potential bottom-up initiatives, as well as the possible regulatory action identified throughout the book.
This chapter tests observable implications of localized peace enforcement theory at the individual level using two experiments conducted in Mali. First, the chapter presents the results of a study designed to measure willingness to cooperate using a trust game where participants send money to an anonymous partner from a different ethnic group. A randomly assigned group of participants is told that two patrolling officers (from either the UN or France) will punish any low partner contributions with a fine. While the UN treatment increased participants’ willingness to cooperate, the France treatment had no effect. Follow-up interviews confirmed the importance of perceptions of the UN’s impartiality. Second, the chapter outlines the results of a survey that presents respondents with a vignette describing a communal dispute. Respondents were then randomly assigned to a control, UN, or French treatment group. Assignment to the UN treatment group – but not the French treatment group – reduced the likelihood that respondents said a communal dispute would escalate. To probe the plausibility of localized peace enforcement theory specifically, the chapter concludes with an analysis of specific questions about individuals’ perceptions of peacekeepers from the survey.
This book focuses on music industry contracts and the contractual dynamics between composing and/or performing musicians and their primary partners in the digitised music industry, namely music publishers and record companies, taking account of the ubiquitous nature of music streaming. It focuses on the question of how the legal framework intervenes and should intervene in such contracts, both in theory and in practice. Its objective is to contribute to a level playing field that counteracts the imbalance in bargaining power between musicians and their corporate partners in a proportionate way. The book draws upon an analysis of copyright contract law at the European Union and national level, as well as relevant principles of general contract law, competition law and related applicable rules that curb business-to-business contract terms and trade practices characterised as unreasonable. The book studies the applicable legal framework in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
Formal enforcement punishing defectors can sustain cooperation by changing incentives. In this paper, we introduce a second effect of enforcement: it can also affect the capacity to learn about the group's cooperativeness. Indeed, in contexts with strong enforcement, it is difficult to tell apart those who cooperate because of the threat of fines from those who are intrinsically cooperative types. Whenever a group is intrinsically cooperative, enforcement will thus have a negative dynamic effect on cooperation because it slows down learning about prevalent values in the group that would occur under a weaker enforcement. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence in support of this mechanism. Using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, we observe that, in early interactions, having faced an environment with fines in the past decreases current cooperation. We further show that this results from the interaction between enforcement and learning: the effect of having met cooperative partners has a stronger effect on current cooperation when this happened in an environment with no enforcement. Replacing one signal of deviation without fine by a signal of cooperation without fine in a player's history increases current cooperation by 10%; while replacing it by a signal of cooperation with fine increases current cooperation by only 5%.
Chapter 1 places the institution of belligerent reprisals in relation with the two conceptual frameworks of reciprocity and enforcement. First, it sketches the trajectories by which international law has approached the phenomenon of belligerent reprisals, identifying extant prohibitions and clarifying the requirements for their lawful adoption. After recalling outstanding questions in the international regulation of the mechanism, it describes the two paradigms that legal theory could draw from to conceptualize belligerent reprisals. On the one hand stands reciprocity, as embodied chiefly in the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach; on the other, the paradigm of enforcement as manifested in countermeasures. Having described their main tenets, the chapter shows how these two blueprints, despite co-existing in the early theories on belligerent reprisals, have come to be seen as mutually exclusive, thereby offering two clearly distinct alternatives for the following formalization of the purpose and function of the mechanism.
Chapter 2 explains how belligerent reprisals have come to be interpreted as tools to induce compliance with the laws of armed conflict. It does so by highlighting three cumulative processes. First, it looks at the role that post–World War II tribunals, the ICTY and the ICRC have played in stressing the procedural elements of belligerent reprisals, emphasizing the highly formalized set of steps to be taken before the adoption of the measure while downplaying the retaliatory act itself. Then, it claims that the main thrust of this proceduralization lies in the creation of a regulatory framework that attributes a specific legal meaning to the retaliatory conduct and, by so doing, allows for an assimilation of belligerent reprisals with the notion of countermeasures. In turn, this analogy leads to the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a sanctioning character that protects the primary norm from the risk of persistent non-compliance. The outcome of these three processes is the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a chiefly coercive purpose, interested in inducing compliance with the laws of armed conflict and markedly influenced by the enforcement paradigm.
The Introduction explains the relevance of a theoretical inquiry into the purpose and function of belligerent reprisals. It highlights several examples in recent practice where the vocabulary of belligerent reprisals has been harnessed by parties to an armed conflict, pointing to the continued relevance of the institution in contemporary warfare. At the same time, it outlines persisting difficulties in the terminology, regulation and governance of reprisals, and shows that they all derive from the failure by international legal theory to give a proper legal vest to the purpose and function of the mechanism. It points to fundamental fallacies both in how the question has been approached, and in how it has been answered. It proposes an alternative to existing accounts and outlines how it will be investigated in the book.
This book challenges the traditional understanding of belligerent reprisals as a mechanism aimed at enforcing the laws of armed conflict. By re-instating reciprocity at the core of belligerent reprisals, it construes them as tools designed to re-calibrate the legal relationship between parties to armed conflict and pursue the belligerents' equality of rights and obligations in both a formal and a substantive sense. It combines an inquiry into the conceptual issues surrounding the notion of belligerent reprisals, with an analysis of State and international practice on their purpose and function. Encompassing international and non-international armed conflicts, it provides a first comprehensive account of the role of reprisals in governing legal interaction during wartime, and offers new grounds to address questions on their applicability, lawfulness, regulation, and desirability. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
Whilst the United States ever more frequently imposes unilateral secondary sanctions, the debate on their lawfulness has only intensified. This chapter focuses specifically on the legality of imposing access restrictions, that is, denying third state sanctions evaders access to the United States and its commercial and financial markets. Until the late 2000s, it was widely held that access restrictions were a means of enforcing US prohibitions. The issue, therefore, was whether the United States had prescriptive jurisdiction to impose such prohibitions. If not, enforcement by way of access restrictions was unlawful. More recently, this has become contested. Some now argue that access restrictions are justified on uncontroversial jurisdictional grounds because they only regulate the behaviour of US persons on US territory. Others argue that access restrictions merely amount to a lawful withdrawal of privileges. In this chapter author’s view, these arguments are not convincing. Based on the relevant US legislation, the chapter shows why access restrictions are indeed enforcement tools. Since the underlying prohibitions cannot be justified under customary international law, such enforcement is unlawful. Furthermore, the international community has consistently condemned US secondary sanctions legislation, including access restrictions, as unlawful, leading to a customary international law prohibition.
Chapter 9 explores regulatory compliance, enforcement and certification. It analyses the vital role of enforcement action and how rules aimed at influencing human and institutional behaviour are translated into social reality. It draws attention to the human interaction that takes place during encounters with regulatory enforcement officials and regulators. We discuss how ‘risk-based’ approaches to regulation can be understood and operationalised. It then touches upon the investigatory powers of public regulators, and the nature, purpose and variety of regulatory sanctions. Finally, it examines the role of ‘private’ bodies and other ‘regulatory intermediaries’ in certifying that a regulatee’s activities complies regulatory standards which purport to offer consumers, as primary beneficiaries, ‘assurance’ of the quality of the resulting outputs.
This chapter is concerned with court orders made prior to final judgment, and with enforcement of final judgments. These are matters of civil procedure. They do not deal with final determinations of rights and are not remedies in the technical sense. Rather, they protect the ability of the court to award remedies.
First, if there is a dispute over certain subject matter, it is important that the subject matter of the dispute be maintained until the court can adjudicate the dispute. This is where interlocutory remedies and pre-judgment remedies are relevant. These remedies are awarded before the court makes a final determination of the proceedings and are generally intended to maintain the status quo pending the decision. Such remedies include interlocutory injunctions, which restrain or compel a person to do a particular thing. There are other pre-judgment remedies, such as freezing orders and search orders, which prevent the defendant from removing property from the jurisdiction or from destroying evidence before proceedings can be brought. These ensure that proceedings are not nugatory.
Secondly, after final judgment has been handed down, there must be a means of ensuring that the judgment debtor does what the court has ordered; otherwise the judgment lacks ‘teeth’. Courts have coercive mechanisms which ensure that a defendant complies with an order to pay damages or an order of specific relief.
The law of civil remedies has frequently been described as a ‘capstone’ private law subject. In other words, it is the culmination of a student’s knowledge of private law, and it is intended to assist all the disparate strands from previously studied private law subjects to come together.
It is for this reason that we will take a generally ‘functional’ approach to the organisation of this book, grouping remedies from across different areas according to the broad functions they perform so that parallels and contrasts can be made.
In a monetary model based on Lagos and Wright (2005) where unsecured credit and money are used as means-of-payments, we analyze how the cost and quality of the record-keeping technology affect welfare. Specifically, monitoring agents’ debt repayment is costly but is essential to the use of unsecured credit because of limited commitment. To finance this cost, fees on credit transactions are imposed, and the maximum credit limit that is incentive compatible depends on such fees and monitoring level. Alternatively, the use of money avoids such costs. A higher credit limit does not necessarily improve welfare, especially when the limit is high: the benefit from increased trade surpluses from a higher credit limit is offset by the increased cost of monitoring to achieve the improvement. Moreover, under the optimal arrangement, optimal credit limit decreases with the marginal cost of monitoring. When the cost is sufficiently low, a pure credit equilibrium is optimal. When the marginal cost is high, it is optimal to have a pure-currency economy. But when the cost is at an intermediate level, we show that credit is sustainable but not socially optimal. In this range, the implementable credit limit leads to a higher trade surplus than in a pure monetary economy, but owing to the cost of operating the record-keeping system, social welfare in credit equilibrium is lower than the welfare in a pure monetary equilibrium. In addition, we show that there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal record-keeping level and the optimal credit limit.
Following the contemporary debate surrounding two alternative perspectives on compliance – enforcement and management – this article suggests an analysis through the lens of the rule of law crisis. Specifically, the financial and techno-managerial strategy developed by the EU for the indirect protection of the rule of law relies on mechanisms that combine characteristics from both the enforcement and management approaches. This article will identify these mechanisms, namely the European Semester, the Conditionality regulation, the European Structural Investment Funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility, in order to determine their nature, features, and tools for ensuring compliance with the rule of law. The hypothesis of this article relies on the idea that the EU’s tools are characterised by a mismatch between the causes of the identified problems and the chosen solutions. Considering that the deployment of the above measures has not re-established compliance, the EU strategy toes between inducing rule conformity on the one hand and deterring rule of law violations on the other. However, it seems that only the former can restore the rule of law, as the latter is considered ill-equipped to reverse or at least halt instances of backsliding. This mismatch explains why the Justice Scoreboard, the Framework, and the Review Cycle with its Annual Report have not made any difference, and more generally, why management strategies are unfit for dealing with deliberate backsliding.1
This study investigates how agents in contested occupations justify and legitimize their work. It examines Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorneys who prosecute immigrant removal cases on behalf of the federal government, delving into the narrative strategies that attorneys use to attain self-legitimacy within the agency. While existing literature suggests that self-legitimacy stems from either public support or an intrinsic belief in one’s deservingness of power, this study introduces a third pathway to self-legitimacy, agency entrenchment, in which government prosecutors draw on a highly internalized sense of patriotism and a duty to their organizational role, in the face of heightened public protest and changing administrative priorities. Analyzing forty in-depth interviews with ICE attorneys, this study identifies two primary approaches to agency entrenchment. The first is a bureaucratic approach, in which attorneys derive an internalized sense of duty from the existing law. The second is an enforcement approach, in which attorneys derive moral authority from what they see as their protector status. By deploying these narratives of self-legitimacy, ICE prosecutors attempt to resolve perceived conflicts between their legally mandated responsibilities and the ethical and reputational criticisms they encounter. The findings contribute to the broader understanding of the occupational dynamics between political polarization and law enforcement prosecution.
The chapter outlines the distinct features and challenges of the legal regimes for the cooperation by states with international criminal jurisdictions. State compliance with the tribunals’ orders or requests for cooperation is key to their effective functioning absent direct law-enforcement and given the necessary reliance upon national authorities for executing arrests, obtaining evidence, enabling the collection of evidence, carrying out coercive measures, enforcing sentences, and so on. While being in theory more stringent than the ‘horizontal’ schemes for inter-state cooperation in criminal matters, the cooperation regime remains the Achilles heel of international criminal justice in the lack of failproof mechanisms for compelling compliance. The chapter sets out the scope, parameters, and addresses of the obligations to cooperate with UN ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court; the extent to which such obligations can be allowed to prevail over conflicting duties; and the ability of parties in the proceedings to seek cooperation from the respective duty-bearers. It also discusses issues arising in connection with the cooperation for the arrest and surrender of suspects and related to other forms of assistance to international criminal jurisdictions, as well as the challenges of enforcing cooperation obligations and addressing non-compliance.
International agreements save the costs of war, but complying with their terms can be costly. We analyse a model of interstate crisis bargaining in which one state may be unwilling or unable to make a costly investment that guarantees its subjects’ compliance. In equilibrium, peace is assured when the domestic government is militarily strong enough to demand terms that its subjects tolerate. When the domestic government is militarily weaker, peace requires that the foreign state compensate it for either the costs of enforcement or its subjects’ violations, and these prospective costs of peace may also lead the foreign state to solve the enforcement problem with war because peace is relatively costly. We also show that war due to enforcement problems is more common in militarily weak states and that equilibria at which the foreign state subsidizes enforcement are more common when the costs of violation fall disproportionately on the domestic state. The American invasion of Mexico in 1916 and the Red Army's peaceful withdrawal from East Germany in 1989 demonstrate the model's usefulness.
The final substantive chapter of the book looks at how all these rules are implemented and enforced, and what mechanisms exist to hold violators of the law accountable for their acts. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions requires states to ‘ensure respect’ for the rules of IHL, which is achieved through a range of measures such as education of the armed forces and civil society in the rules of IHL and entrenching the rules in domestic legislation. The chapter describes the roles of the ICRC, Protecting Powers and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. The development and content of international criminal law are examined, including individual responsibility for war crimes, lesser violations of IHL, crimes against humanity and genocide, and the concept of command responsibility is explained. The growth in international and hybrid criminal tribunals is noted, as well as the roles played by the United Nations and other organisations in encouraging adherence to the rules of IHL. Finally the chapter examines mechanisms for implementation, enforcement and accountability in non-international armed conflict.