This chapter introduces a new framework for understanding US–China rivalry through the concepts of economic weight and displacement. It argues that China has economically displaced the US in much of Latin America by becoming an alternative provider of goods and services, despite not surpassing the US globally. The author develops a theory emphasizing the role of local agency in target countries in shaping this process. Economic displacement is presented as a gradual shift where China’s economic influence surpasses that of the US. The chapter outlines how this displacement may erode US political leverage through deteriorating public opinion, changing elite perspectives, and diminished influence in international organizations. By focusing on structural power rather than intentionality, this framework offers new insights into the dynamics of great power competition in the developing world.

This chapter examines how China’s economic displacement of the United States affects voting patterns in international organizations. Using data from the UN General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council, and Organization of American States, the analysis reveals that when China’s economic weight surpasses that of the US in Latin American countries, these nations are less likely to align their votes with US positions. The study finds that economic displacement reduces vote convergence with the US in the UNGA, increases the probability of voting against US-supported resolutions in the UNHRC, and decreases vote alignment in the OAS. These findings suggest that China’s growing economic influence diminishes US leverage in international forums, even in organizations where China is not a member. The chapter argues that this effect stems from reduced efficacy of US economic statecraft as countries gain alternative economic partners, granting them greater autonomy in foreign policy decisions.

This chapter examines the impact of China’s economic displacement of the United States on public opinion and political elites in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Using survey data from Latinobarometer and the University of Salamanca’s Elites Latinoamericanas project, the analysis reveals that in countries where China has economically displaced the US, both the public and legislators are more likely to view China favorably as a problem-solver for the region and preferred trade partner. The chapter also analyzes a case study of the Argentine legislative debate over a Chinese space station, demonstrating how economic displacement influences legislative behavior and creates a divide between ruling and opposition parties in their approach to China. Overall, the findings suggest that economic displacement erodes US soft power and political leverage in LAC, while increasing China’s perceived capability to address regional issues.

This chapter introduces and operationalizes the Economic Weight Index to measure China’s and the United States’s economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from 2001 to 2020. The index, comprising trade, aid, investment, and loans data, reveals China’s dramatic rise in economic weight across all world regions, with LAC experiencing the most pronounced growth. Conversely, the US saw a significant contraction in its economic weight in LAC during this period. The analysis highlights regional variations, with South America experiencing the most substantial increase in Chinese economic weight and decrease in US influence. This quantitative approach provides a nuanced understanding of the shifting economic dynamics between China, the US, and LAC, laying the groundwork for exploring the causes and consequences of these changes.

This chapter empirically examines the factors behind China’s growing economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from 2001 to 2020. It challenges conventional explanations focused on the commodity boom and ideological affinities, instead demonstrating that Chinese actors filled economic voids left by declining US presence. Using a novel metric of Chinese economic actors’ presence and econometric models, the analysis shows that decreased US economic weight significantly correlates with increased Chinese activity. The chapter also explores sectoral patterns of Chinese engagement and uses a conjoint experiment to reveal that LAC preferences for foreign investment are driven more by economic impact than investor nationality. These findings support the book’s central argument that China’s economic displacement of the US in LAC was primarily due to filling gaps left by US retrenchment, rather than deliberate Chinese strategy or inherent preference for Chinese goods.