This chapter deals with two possible ways of closing the “responsibility gap” that can occur when AI devices cause harm: holding the device itself criminally responsible and punishing the corporation that employs the device. Robots can at present not be subject to criminal liability because they do not fit into the general scheme of criminal law and cannot feel punishment. But the present scope of corporate criminal responsibility could be expanded to cover harm caused by AI devices controlled by corporations and operating for their benefit. Corporate liability for AI devices should, however, at least require an element of negligence in programming, testing, or supervising the robot.

Vespasian V. Pella was Romanian jurist who dedicated his life to creating a system of international justice that would prevent war, punish atrocity, and vindicate humanity’s political and economic rights, objectives that he considered connected and indivisible. This chapter traces the origins of this project to Pella’s early commitment to republican, socialist, and internationalist ideals, a deeply personal interest in the psychology of individuals and crowds, and, especially, his reaction to the atrocities of World War I. War was what prompted Pella to campaign for the “international criminal law of the future,” a novel approach that combined the protection of social rights, the unification of domestic criminal law, and international and domestic criminal responsibility for states and individuals, with international institutions capable of playing a subsidiary role in resolving disputes, imposing sanctions, and punishing aggression and violations of the laws of war. Although Pella was successful in mobilizing professional support for his ideas, the political support necessary to bring his system to life never materialized. The chapter overturns many misconceptions surrounding Pella and is the most thorough study to date of his life and work

While international criminal law contains intricate rules regarding aiding and abetting, this specific body of law fails to elaborate on the ways in which one may aid or abet. This chapter first provides an overview of the relevant legal rules and the international case law regarding aiding and abetting. Next these rules are applied to funders of wars who provide financial support to a party to an armed conflict, in order to evaluate whether these funders can be held accountable as aiders and abettors. While individuals may be held responsible at the international level as aiders and abettors, companies themselves currently cannot. However, numerous individual States have enacted legislation to enable their domestic courts to determine corporate criminal liability in certain cases. This chapter therefore enquires whether domestic judicial systems can contribute effectively to the achievement of accountability when faced with cases involving companies having aided and abetted the principal perpetrator of an international crime.