We define canonicity as a variable property of all cultural discourses: it refers to the extent to which the components of a given discourse – its terms, texts, practices, etc – tend to inhere within it over time. Law and religion may both be characterized as strongly canonical discourses, meaning that they tend not to change over time. This property stems from the particular functions that law and religion play within human culture; hence it is not dependent on the political ends to which law and religion are often used.

We follow Peter Berger’s assertion that any religion posits a particular conception of the cosmos; hence religion is irreducibly descriptive. In contradistinction to science, the descriptive elements of religion are generally not falsifiable by empirical observation. This resistance to falsification is what makes religion strongly canonical.

In contrast, legal discourse is irreducibly prescriptive. It is distinct from other prescriptive systems, such as morality, in the paramount value it places on consistency, both at any given moment and over time. This diachronic consistency is reflected in the fact that, once established, laws tend to remain in force until formally changed or annulled; this is the strong canonicity of law.