Fricker’s influential account of epistemic justice has turned feminist epistemology into one of the most vibrant and fertile subfields in feminist philosophy in recent decades. Even scholars critical of its limitations have utilized Fricker’s account as a base from which to launch their own theories of epistemic justice. I refer to theories of epistemic justice developed or inspired by Fricker Frickerian accounts of epistemic justice (FAEJ). Their influence is so wide-ranging that some now claim that these accounts can be conducive to promoting decoloniality. The aim of this paper is to critically assess this claim. To accomplish this aim, this paper starts with a conceptual clarification of “decoloniality” in accordance with Latin American decolonial theory. It then critically assesses three aspects of the claim that FAEJ can be conducive to decoloniality: first, the types of epistemic injustice in these accounts relevant to decoloniality; second, the application of these types of epistemic injustice to different stages of coloniality; and third, whether FAEJ can advance programs of decoloniality. After demonstrating that FAEJ cannot promote decoloniality, this paper concludes with a brief examination of how decoloniality can be promoted.