This chapter shows how a hierarchical organization and a dominant faction were crucial prerequisites for the strategy of instrumentalism. The union’s hierarchical structure enabled it to mobilize teachers in elections and a dominant faction enabled negotiations with political parties from across the ideological spectrum. The last section analyzes the political backlash against instrumentalism in 2013, which resulted in leadership turnover and policy changes that weakened the union overall. Despite this backlash, however, the union’s internal organization remained largely intact and union leaders continue to be ideologically flexible, in line with the main argument in this book.

Chapter 6 illustrates that household political cooperation begets a system of political organization that centers on men. Using network data from a census survey, it describes the structure of the overall village political network, including gender homophily of political ties, centrality in the entire network, and the average degree of connectivity between individuals and political elites. It shows that village political networks are structured such that men comprise the center of the network, while women remain on the periphery. As a result, influence is concentrated among men, and village politics is structured around men’s other intersecting identities, namely caste. It then compares the size and composition of women’s and men’s political networks and show that women are connected to village politics largely through the men in their household. For men, women do not register as political actors. Household political cooperation thus implies strong limits on women’s access to power, influence, and information and yields a broader gender and political system that perpetuates male dominance.

Chapter 4 brings the household into focus and demonstrates how it denies women political agency and constrains their political participation. Drawing on data from a census survey and interviews, it documents the alignment of the household in political decision-making and the authority of elder men in these decisions. It shows that women lack autonomy in their vote choice and are often coerced into compliance with the wishes of the heads of household. It further documents the inefficiency of household cooperation for women and demonstrate its perpetuation as rooted in coercion and strategic political mobilization.

This chapter uses a novel database on contractual arrangements between politicians, political brokers, and businessmen in Benin to investigate the way the nature of these arrangements depends on the level of political competition. We find that firms provide financial support to local and national politicians in exchange for policy concessions, direct budget support of firms, ‘favourable’ procurement auctions (bid-rigging), and various forms of state capture. In addition, while bid-rigging features constantly in politician–firm contracts, increased electoral uncertainty is associated with less demand for policy concessions and stronger preference for direct forms of state capture, that is, the appointment of firms’ agents or cronies to key government positions. In other words, electoral uncertainty could simultaneously contribute to democratic consolidation through political turnover, and to worse forms of corruption through state capture by business elites.

Modern states rely on the quality of their civil service. In the case of Tanzania, this chapter points to four key weaknesses: capacity, motivation and conduct, political interference, and resources and tools. Capacity and resources clearly depend on the level of economic development. From an institutional point of view, motivation and political interference play the most important role as they ultimately define the rules according to which the civil service, the political apparatus, and the private sector interact. The chapter maintains that the main factor behind these two weaknesses is the relationship betwwen civil servants and politicians, and recommends unplugging the civil service from political patronage through a transparent system of performance evaluation and promotion to senior positions, as well as a strengthening of the role and power of the Civil Service Commission. It also recognises that such a reform is unlikely to succeed unless supported by top politicians. While concurring with the need for this kind of reform, Jan Willem Gunning stresses in his comments the necessity to consider the political economy and the way in which compensation can be sought for losers.

To explain countries’ varying participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, this chapter begins with a discussion of recipient country characteristics that impact the demand for Chinese spending, including the political regime, clientelism, and the public-private orientation of the corporate sector. It then discusses the supply-side factors that influence Chinese foreign spending, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), state-owned entities (e.g., SOEs), and private firms. Finally, it evaluates the compatibility of these demand and supply characteristics. The key prediction is that electoral autocracies will display the strongest compatibility with Chinese foreign construction spending. This is amplified when the leaders of these regimes have a weak or insecure hold on power. Electoral autocracies are also predicted to be the most avid adopters of Chinese standards stemming from their eagerness for Chinese infrastructure spending.

This chapter establishes the empirical facts regarding political regimes and the prevalence of clientelism and the public-private orientation of the corporate sector. It begins by showing that electoral autocracies constitute around half of all developing countries during the 2010s, the most of any regime type. They are especially prevalent in Africa and Asia. The theory posits that clientelism plays an important role in driving Chinese foreign infrastructure spending. Several widely used proxies for clientelism establish that it is most prevalent in electoral autocracies. The theory also posits state control of the corporate sector is important to attracting Chinese foreign spending. A variety of measures are used to establish that state ownership of the corporate sector is significantly higher in autocracies than in democracies, especially in industries related to infrastructure. Overall, this chapter provides robust evidence about the characteristics of political regimes posited to influence Chinese infrastructure spending.

In 2013, Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative while visiting Indonesia. However, Malaysia became a far more avid recipient of Chinese spending in the years afterward. What can account for this surprising outcome? In this opening chapter, Richard Carney explains that we should care about the answer to this puzzle because it can help us understand how China can acquire global influence by addressing developing countries’ enormous unmet demand for infrastructure and spread the adoption of its digital standards. In contrast to existing explanations that focus on the demand for foreign investment by private firms, Carney proposes a novel explanation for why demand for Chinese SOE-led investment varies across countries. He argues state versus private control over the delivery of clientelist resources varies across political regimes, and this affects the demand for Chinese infrastructure spending that is principally delivered by SOEs. He argues electoral autocracies, which hold semi-competitive elections, possess the highest demand due to their heavy reliance on clientelism coupled with a high level of state control over the corporate sector.

In early prewar modernization period of Japan, party patronage was used to control the entrenched elite bureaucracy. Patronage was used to anchor the democratic representation of the national government officials who were given their own legitimacy. After Japan was defeated in World War II, Japan was institutionally fully liberalized and democratized. However, the reform of the old political regime was implemented through the Japanese bureaucracy. This fact demonstrates that the bureaucracy maintained substantial influence over the national policy-making process during post-war period. As the Liberal Democratic Party members accumulated policy-making capacities in certain economic fields, clientelism and particularism became key features of Japanese politics. But it did not particularly involve patronage appointments. It was rather connected with other “porks” such as economic benefits to the electoral consistency. As a result, from a comparative perspective, patronage practice in Japanese politics may be rather limited in its scope and depth, compared with other democracies in Asia.

The Islamic Republic relies on a number of distinct but related institutional clusters to maintain power. This include the institutional means through which the state politically incorporates social groups into its orbit; institutional mechanisms of control; a number of “veto players”; those institutions that help maintain the system; the deep state; intra-elite competition; and, patronage and clientelism.

An important feature of Iran’s political economy is the variety of opportunities it provides, through which individuals and groups can accrue economic benefits from and through the state. At the broadest level, the Iranian economy cannot be said to be in a healthy state. The Iranian economy is structurally unhealthy. But the economy’s maladies are products of, and also contributing factors to, means of personal enrichment for those with the right political connections. There are a number of areas to focus on, including the strong connections between the state and bazaari merchants; the perverse consequences of resource curses such as overreliance on oil and rampant corruption; the state’s efforts at various welfare schemes and the impulse toward statist economics; and the processes and consequences of pulling back from statism through privatization. All of these developments have combined to undermine the economy’s developmental potential. They have also coalesced to provide multiple means of patronage and clientelism in which the state plays a critical facilitating role. As such, Iran’s economy, diseased and underperforming as it is, provides important sources of support and resilience for the state.

This chapter begins the book’s comparative ethnographic enquiry. While the scholarship has advanced several explanations for the post-authoritarian deactivation of the underprivileged across Latin American cities, little is known about the trajectories by which mobilization survives in some neighborhoods and not in others. This chapter focuses on the case of Nuevo Amanecer to better grasp the mechanisms that led to the demise of collective action in post-dictatorial urban Chile. It describes how party activists belonging to the Alianza Democrática developed a managerial leadership style in many underprivileged neighborhoods when coordinating anti-dictatorial protests in the 1980s. The relationships these moderate political activists fostered with neighborhood dwellers throughout the decade often evolved into networks of political loyalty after the democratic transition. These networks are current and ongoing. To feed their political loyalty networks, community leaders learn to insistently monopolize political capital at the grassroots level. This dynamic has further prevented mobilizational citizenship from developing. It also fragments población spaces, deactivates local initiatives of governance, and depoliticizes the youth.