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Women’s agency was contingent on the multiple parties concerned with it, and they formed its gendered understandings and practices. This chapter traces those understandings and practices in the courtroom, where Taiwanese women in premarital sexual relationships expressed their interests. From the early 1920s, more women made their voices heard in civil cases on marital affairs and divorce, which revealed changing attitudes toward marriage and premarital sexual relationships among themselves, their partners and family members, and Japanese judges. The judges joined the male litigants in highlighting the formal state of marriage and wifehood against women’s informal personal status and their sexual histories. Meanwhile, Taiwanese women continued to react against the discriminatory treatment of premarital sexual relationships and eventually won the more flexible treatment of premarital relationships as if they were formal marriages in the mid-1930s. However, this result was achieved only when those women agreed to be submissive to their male partners or otherwise considered promiscuous. Changing the direction of their sexual, marital, and family lives took on a gender-specific tone.
We introduce multilevel multivariate meta-analysis methodology designed to account for the complexity of contemporary psychological research data. Our methodology directly models the observations from a set of studies in a manner that accounts for the variation and covariation induced by the facts that observations differ in their dependent measures and moderators and are nested within, for example, papers, studies, groups of subjects, and study conditions. Our methodology is motivated by data from papers and studies of the choice overload hypothesis. It more fully accounts for the complexity of choice overload data relative to two prior meta-analyses and thus provides richer insight. In particular, it shows that choice overload varies substantially as a function of the six dependent measures and four moderators examined in the domain and that there are potentially interesting and theoretically important interactions among them. It also shows that the various dependent measures have differing levels of variation and that levels up to and including the highest (i.e., the fifth, or paper, level) are necessary to capture the variation and covariation induced by the nesting structure. Our results have substantial implications for future studies of choice overload.
We examine the ability of eye movement data to help understand the determinants of decision-making over risky prospects. We start with structural models of choice under risk, and use that structure to inform what we identify from the use of process data in addition to choice data. We find that information on eye movements does significantly affect the extent and nature of probability weighting behavior. Our structural model allows us to show the pathway of the effect, rather than simply identifying a reduced form effect. This insight should be of importance for the normative design of choice mechanisms for risky products. We also show that decision-response duration is no substitute for the richer information provided by eye-tracking.
This paper assesses the psychometric value of allowing test-takers choice in standardized testing. New theoretical results examine the conditions where allowing choice improves score precision. A hierarchical framework is presented for jointly modeling the accuracy of cognitive responses and item choices. The statistical methodology is disseminated in the ‘cIRT’ R package. An ‘answer two, choose one’ (A2C1) test administration design is introduced to avoid challenges associated with nonignorable missing data. Experimental results suggest that the A2C1 design and payout structure encouraged subjects to choose items consistent with their cognitive trait levels. Substantively, the experimental data suggest that item choices yielded comparable information and discrimination ability as cognitive items. Given there are no clear guidelines for writing more or less discriminating items, one practical implication is that choice can serve as a mechanism to improve score precision.
This article reviews recent advances in the psychometric and econometric modeling of eye-movements during decision making. Eye movements offer a unique window on unobserved perceptual, cognitive, and evaluative processes of people who are engaged in decision making tasks. They provide new insights into these processes, which are not easily available otherwise, allow for explanations of fundamental search and choice phenomena, and enable predictions of future decisions. We propose a theoretical framework of the search and choice tasks that people commonly engage in and of the underlying cognitive processes involved in those tasks. We discuss how these processes drive specific eye-movement patterns. Our framework emphasizes the central role of task and strategy switching for complex goal attainment. We place the extant literature within that framework, highlight recent advances in modeling eye-movement behaviors during search and choice, discuss limitations, challenges, and open problems. An agenda for further psychometric modeling of eye movements during decision making concludes the review.
Various recent works have developed “feature” or “aspect” models of similarity and preference. These models are more concerned with the fine detail of the judgment process than were prior models, but nevertheless they have not in general developed an underlying stochastic process compatible with the assumed structure. In this paper, we show that a particular class of multivariate stochastic processes, namely those associated with the Marshall-Olkin multivariate exponential distribution, generates several of these models. In particular, such stochastic processes (appropriately interpreted) yield Tversky's elimination by aspects model, Edgell and Geisler's (normal) additive random aspects model, and Shepard and Arabie's additive cluster model.
Social and naturally occurring choice phenomena are often of the “pick-any” type in which the number of choices made by a subject as well as the set of alternatives from which they are chosen is unconstrained. These data present a special analytical problem because the meaning of non-choice among pick-any choice data is always ambiguous: A non-chosen alternative may be either unacceptable, or acceptable but not considered, or acceptable and considered but not chosen. A model and scaling method for these data are introduced, allowing for this ambiguity of non-choice. Subjects are represented as points whose coordinates are proportional to the centroids of the points representing their choices. Alternatives are represented at points whose coordinates are proportional to the centroids of the points representing subjects who have chosen them. This centroid scaling technique estimates multidimensional joint spaces from the pick-any data.
Any family of simple response time distributions that correspond to different values of stimulation variables can be modeled by a deterministic stimulation-dependent process that terminates when it crosses a randomly preset criterion. The criterion distribution function is stimulation-independent and can be chosen arbitrarily, provided it is continuous and strictly increasing. Any family of N-alternative choice response time distributions can be modeled by N such process-criterion pairs, with response choice and response time being determined by the process that reaches its criterion first. The joint distribution of the N criteria can be chosen arbitrarily, provided it satisfies certain unrestrictive conditions. In particular, the criteria can be chosen to be stochastically independent. This modeling scheme, therefore, is a descriptive theoretical language rather than an empirically falsifiable model. The only role of the criteria in this theoretical language is to numerically calibrate the ordinal-scale axes for the deterministic response processes.
In the philosophical discussion of the last decades, the position has gained a foothold according to which there is a more or less well-identifiable, partly detached domain of values, which is not necessarily hypostatized, but which supposedly belongs to the furniture of the world. This discussion is commonly conducted using the vocabulary of “moral realism,” and it has in the meantime generated subtly nuanced formulations and argumentations. After an initial phase, the discussion has subsequently centred on the nature of normativity. The subtlety of positions and the ingenuity of argumentations is impressive – expressed in a philosophical style that ceased to be baroque, intended for outdoor use, and has taken up features of rococo, which is at home mainly indoors. This chapter suggests that empirical findings should be taken seriously and develops a novel naturalistic account of normativity informed by the deliverances of the sciences.
In solitude, as with any human experience, choice is an important driver. We know that humans, in general, like having some decision-making capability, or at least the perception of it. Positive time spent in solitude stems from the desire to be with ourselves, and we talk about how to exercise choice to be more comfortable and stronger in solitude. Simply wanting to avoid other people does not unlock its benefits and opportunities. The fact that you choose to devote your morning walk, drive to work, or shower time to solitude is what matters in building an enduring practice of everyday solitude. In this chapter, we also consider involuntary solitude, like prisoners in solitary confinement and pandemic lockdowns. This chapter also looks at what it means to have a "preference for solitude," the importance of understanding motivation in why we’re choosing time alone, and what it means to have the right framing and expectations for solitude.
Little in mainstream society indicates that when we choose it, solitude can be wonderful, even transformative. Instead, the focus on loneliness in modern life can make us think that solitude is a disease requiring treatment, and maybe cured by avoiding solo moments altogether. Until recently, science has supported those assumptions because decades of prevailing research have focused on humans as “social animals” and the fact that fulfilling relationships are integral to well-being. By comparison, scientists have spent very little time and resources on understanding the role of solitude, and the power of positive solitude in particular, in shaping our lives. That’s why we three researchers with very different backgrounds formed our Solitude Lab and have spent several years researching what time alone means to different people around the world. In Solitude, we share those insights from thousands of people from all walks of life who helped us to redefine and reframe time alone as a chosen place, a zone of truth, sincerity, independence, and intimacy where we can best connect with our values, interests, and emotions.
This chapter explores aspects of Sen’s analysis of self-interest and commitment, seeking to highlight their interplay by probing some imagined situations. Detailing three facets of self-interest the author detects in traditional economic theory and the two forms of committed behaviour he then identifies (not confining one’s goals to the pursuit of ones own welfare and not basing one’s choices exclusively on one’s goals at the expense of those of others), the implied eightfold pattern of interrelations between these subtle concepts is presented, illustrated by a hypothetical internet dating conundrum. Sen’s stress on the self as a reasoning, self-scrutinizing agent who may but (in contrast with much prevailing theory) need not choose on the basis of self-interest underpins an account of rational choice that pays more respect to individual freedom, with significance in economics. Using an example outlining conflicting duties and pressures UK MPs might have felt during Brexit votes, Sen’s account is defended against attacks that, through reliance on strained definitions of interests and goals, seem to over-exploit the potential malleability of language.
In a ‘very close replication’ study using the same attributes as the original, Chandrashekar et al. (2021) report a failure to replicate some choose–reject problems documented in Shafir (1993). We find that several of the original attributes have changed their valence three decades later, and we compose new versions with updated attributes that fully replicate Shafir’s (1993) original findings. Despite their apparent exactitude, ‘very close replications’ across contexts or time, when stimuli may have changed their meaning or valence, can be highly misleading, further exacerbating replication concerns.
In response to a crisis, policymakers face the decision of whether to enumerate specific actions the public must do or, instead, to aim at an overall outcome while leaving room open for choice. This essay evaluates the merits and demerits of crisis response that leaves room open for choice, with a particular focus on pandemic response. I evaluate two approaches: trades and offsets. Trades allow individuals or groups to exchange protection against harm or entitlement to engage in risky activity. Offsets allow the same actors to pay to mitigate the effects of decisions that increase risk for others. Choice-friendly approaches can free people to better align their actions with their values, harness local knowledge for better social outcomes, and act as natural experiments. However, they also are subject to objections, including negative externalities, agency problems, exploitation, and exacerbating inequality.
This chapter introduces the basics of the economic approach to understanding decision-making. This is done using examples drawn from consumer decision-making in the context of healthcare. Topics include how to think about preferences, different types of costs, optimization, and the importance of perceptions. The end of chapter supplement discusses how to use price indexes.
Chapter 4 explains how in traditional liberalism, autonomy as the ability to reason has been recognised as the foundation for personhood, thereby excluding adults with cognitive disability. Interpretations of Article 12 that require the abolition of decision-making by substitutes refashion autonomy from being marked by rationality and independence to being marked by shared personhood and interdependence so as to include adults with cognitive disability. I argue that these refashionings ultimately fail because despite avowals to the contrary, they perpetuate the privileging of rationality and of the bounded, independent individual. They also fail to recognise the interdependency of Article 12 with other rights in the CRPD, especially socio-economic rights. I argue that a concept of autonomy as achievement, as the development of autonomy competencies, as demanding the availability of a range of options and as demanding recognition of the indivisibility of human rights is the autonomy underpinning Article 12 and the CRPD.
Chapter 7 summarises the book’s findings and explains their implications for advocacy and law reform. It argues that recognition of the indivisibility of human rights is important to ensure that targeted services are provided for people with disability to address their disproportionate levels of socio-economic disadvantage. It decries the privileging of civil and political rights especially the right to legal capacity over all other rights, for encouraging the ‘lazy state’ that erroneously justifies its neglect of marginalised people in the name of upholding their human rights. It provides the example of personalised or individualised services premised on simplistic notions of choice and control, which often fail to uphold the rights of people with cognitive disabilities. It stresses the importance for the state and community of acknowledging difference to promote services that ensure civil, economic, political, social and cultural inclusion in all cases.
We introduce choreographic choice, another construct for choosing between alternative choreographies. Differently from conditionals, choreographic choices are not necessarily resolved by a single process but might require performing interactions instead.
Kant's early critics maintained that his theory of freedom faces a dilemma: either it reduces the will's activity to strict necessity by making it subject to the causality of the moral law, or it reduces the will's activity to blind chance by liberating it from rules of any kind. This Element offers a new interpretation of Kant's theory against the backdrop of this controversy. It argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept. Freedom, for Kant, is a power to initiate action from oneself, and the only way to exercise this power is through the law of one's own will, the moral law. Immoral action is not thereby rendered impossible, but it also does not express a genuine ability.