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To analyze the consequences of the Natech scenario of H2S toxic gas release from an oil refinery near Tehran and its effects on surrounding residential areas following an earthquake.
Methods:
This research was an applied study. The Natech risk map and the end-point distance of gas release were determined using the Rapid-n software and the Worst-Case Scenario of RMP, respectively.
Results:
Regarding the high seismic vulnerability of the structures affected by the Natech risk, all residents of this area were simultaneously affected by earthquake and the toxic gas inhalation. In comparison to earthquake, response capacities were poor for Natech events, due to insufficient resources, limited accessibility, lack of planning, and unsafe evacuation places in exposed regions. Unlike earthquake, few studies have been conducted on Natech risk assessment and related consequences in Iran. Our study not only covered this gap but also revealed some dimensions of consequences of human, structural, and response capacities.
Conclusions:
It is recommended to have plans for implementing short-term such as identifying vulnerable industries and areas, public awareness and long-term such as land use planning measures to reduce Natech risk and resilience improvement.
A chlorine gas release occurred at a poultry processing plant as a result of an accidental mixing of sodium hypochlorite and an acidic antimicrobial treatment. We evaluated the public health and emergency medical services response and developed and disseminated public health recommendations to limit the impact of future incidents.
Methods
We conducted key informant interviews with the state health department; local fire, emergency medical services, and police departments; county emergency management; and representatives from area hospitals to understand the response mechanisms employed for this incident.
Results
After being exposed to an estimated 40-pound chlorine gas release, 170 workers were triaged on the scene and sent to 5 area hospitals. Each hospital redistributed staff or called in extra staff (eg, physicians, nurses, and respiratory therapists) in response to the event. Interviews with hospital staff emphasized the need for improved communication with responders at the scene of a chemical incident.
Conclusions
While responding, hospitals handled the patient surge without outside assistance because of effective planning, training, and drilling. The investigation highlighted that greater interagency communication can play an important role in ensuring that chemical incident patients are managed and treated in a timely manner. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2016;10:553–556)