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This chapter describes the international and domestic backgrounds related to the regulations and practices of bankers’ remuneration in the UK and China. It provides an overview of the bank failures in the UK during the GFC and the practice of bankers’ remuneration incentives, which was a significant contributing factor to these bank failures. It also summarises the evolution and development of the modern banking system in China and the transitional reform of corporate governance and remuneration incentives in Chinese banks. Based on these backgrounds, this chapter highlights the rationales for the regulations of bankers’ remuneration in the UK and China respectively.
This chapter describes and analyses the traditional way adopted by Chinese banks to manage and incentivise bankers in the context of state ownership and intervention. It provides an overview of the modernisation reform of Chinese banks and argues that the essential factor that contributed to the successful reform was the predominant role of the state. The governance of banks was subject to state intervention, and bankers were identified and managed as state cadres. Therefore, bankers’ remuneration was administratively managed, and bankers were incentivised with the opportunity of political promotion. Reciprocally, the administration of remuneration and political incentives acted as a channel for state intervention in banks. However, this administrative and politicised approach was inconsistent with the principles of modern corporate governance, and reform to push forward the modernisation of bankers’ remuneration was considered necessary.
This book investigates the pre-crisis practice of bankers' remuneration in the UK to provide evidence of the problems in practice. It critically analyses the regulatory initiatives implemented after the crisis and investigates the post-crisis practice to reflect the effects and problems of the regulation. The book also discusses the traditional administration of remuneration and political incentives in Chinese banks and the regulatory initiatives for reforming bankers' remuneration. It investigates the recent practices in major Chinese banks to reveal the problems of the regulatory initiatives and the impact of political incentives. It will help academics, researchers, students and practitioners develop a comprehensive understanding of the ongoing reform of bankers' remuneration in the UK and the uniqueness of banks' remuneration systems and incentive mechanisms in China. Furthermore, it provides theoretical insights into the differences between the two jurisdictions in their regulations and practices and the deep-seated reasons for the differences.
China registered double-digit GDP growth for more than three decades. Recently, the rate has slowed down considerably. The slow growth period, which Chinese policymakers refer to as the 'new-normal', has created enormous curiosity among scholars and policymakers. In particular, scholars often tend to project if China is destined to follow Japan's fate. Insufficient reforms in the banking sector in commensuration with the real economy in Japan resulted in an unprecedented financial catastrophe. Similarly, an asymmetric development between the Chinese banking sector and the real economy is observed. This leads to an interesting question: is China destined to meet Japan's legacy? This Element attempts to answer this question. In so doing, it delves deep into the banking sector reforms of China. The Element concludes that China is not on course to meet an immediate financial chaos, but the country needs further banking reforms to avoid a potential crisis.
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