Research on administrative burdens has highlighted how policy design and implementation shape citizens’ experiences of the state. Little attention has been paid to how conflicts between target populations can also generate administrative burdens. Using the case of gamete donation policies in Canada, this article argues that target populations can shape administrative burdens for one another through competition within policy arenas, with winners experiencing less costly policy implementation at the expense of other target populations. In doing so, it positions citizens as agents who both experience and produce the costs of policy implementation. To capture these dynamics, the article introduces the concept of consequent populations to identify distinct groups disadvantaged by the outcomes of target group competition, and consequent costs to specify the sub-category of administrative burden borne by this group.

Since 2010, the UK government has transformed social security administration using digital technology and automated instruments to create and deliver a single working-age benefit known as Universal Credit (UC). Social policy scholars have given much attention to the key policy tenets of UC but engaged less with leading aspects of automated and digital delivery and their relationship to different forms of administrative burdens for UC recipients. This article addresses this empirical and conceptual gap by drawing on administrative burdens literature to analyse empirical data from forty-four interviews with UC recipients. We conclude by highlighting three costs: temporal, financial, and emotional. These costs illustrate the political dimensions of technical features of UC, as they affect accountability procedures and paths to legal entitlements that have bearings on certain claimants’ rights.