Across the twentieth century, hundreds of women worked as nurses, cooks, cleaners, and teachers on Mexico’s railroads. They have been overlooked in histories of the railroads and Mexican industrialization more broadly, their limited number perhaps suggesting that their work is not of analytical importance in understanding processes of economic development and class formation. On the contrary, these women’s work constituted many of the most coveted labor rights of the postrevolutionary railroad workforce, itself a symbolic vanguard of Mexico’s working class and one of the most important beneficiaries of the expansion of social and economic rights ushered in by the Mexican Revolution. The gendered division of labor characteristic of the railroads was neither accidental nor insignificant. Railroads used the feminization of the work of social reproduction to write off structural failures and predictable shortcomings in welfare provision as failures of femininity. Women became scapegoats for the consistent violation of workers’ rights through underfunding and understaffing. In tracing this process, the article models a historiographical and methodological intervention with broader relevance. It suggests that the social and labor rights that expanded around the world in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries must be studied not only from the vantage of legal or political history, but as themselves questions of social and labor history. Making these rights real depended on socially reproductive work that has often been marginal in accounts of industrialization and economic development. It is impossible to understand the political economy of social and economic rights without understanding women’s work.

Throughout the nineteenth century, powerful railway unions in the USA and the UK cultivated an expansive system of voluntary sickness, death, unemployment, and superannuation benefits. By the early twentieth century, the movements had diverged: while the British Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants relinquished its commitment to voluntarism in favor of state healthcare and pensions, the American Railway Brotherhoods persisted along voluntarist lines, resisting social insurance in favor of exclusive schemes for their white male membership. What accounts for these diverging orientations? I highlight the importance of organizational forms as a lens for understanding comparative trade union strategy, emphasizing the role of law in designating legitimate forms of working-class association. I demonstrate that governing elites in both countries promoted voluntarism as a benign form of working-class organization throughout much of the nineteenth century. Consequently, I argue, early American and British trade unions adopted benefits in part because they enabled them to mimic the far more respected and legitimate friendly and fraternal mutual benefit societies. Toward the end of the century, the context had changed: while alternative organizational avenues were opened for trade unions in the UK, benefits presented an ongoing organizational lifeline for American unions. In defining and redefining the boundaries of legitimate forms of workers’ associations, legal decisions in both countries shaped not only trade union organizing strategies in the short run but also their positioning in broader social struggles.

This article examines with empirical evidence the social protection measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in ten welfare states in the Global North. We analysed the potential similarities and differences in responses by welfare regimes. The comparative study was conducted with data from 169 measures, collected from domestic sources as well as from COVID-19 response databases and reports. In qualitative terms, we redeveloped Hall’s theory on the distinction between first-, second- and third-order changes. In accordance with the path-dependence thesis, we show systematically that the majority of the studied changes (91%) relied on a pre-pandemic tool demonstrating flexibility within social security systems. The relative share of completely new instruments was notable but modest (9%). Thematically, the social protection measures converged beyond traditional welfare regimes, particularly among the European welfare states. Somewhat surprisingly, the changes to social security systems related not just to emergency aid to mitigate traditional risks but, to a greater extent, also to prevent new risks from being actualised.

This article examines out-of-home placements in Denmark over a seven-decade period from 1905 to 1975. The Danish state delegated this responsibility to a, using the words of Kimberly J. Morgan and Ann Shola Orloff, “difficult-to-classify public-private hybrid,” the Children’s Welfare Boards (CWBs). These CWBs comprised private citizens selected by the municipality. The article shows how the CWBs acted as interpreters, mediators, and implementers of state policy at the street level while also functioning as the direct link between government and citizens. The findings reveal an inherent conflict between center and periphery in that the state’s nationwide regulations and bureaucratic practices, intended to apply to all citizens uniformly, were to be implemented by local units within municipalities that operated according to logics other than those of the state. The vase of variations in child out-placement practices shows the importance of examining local variations in studying the history of policy implementation.

Across many countries, increases in inequality driven by rising top incomes and wealth have not been accompanied by growing popular concern. In fact, citizens in unequal societies are less concerned than those in more egalitarian societies. Understanding how the general public perceive richness is an essential step towards resolving this paradox. We discuss findings from focus group research in London, UK, a profoundly and visibly unequal city, which sought to explore public perceptions of richness and the rich. Participants from diverse socio-economic backgrounds discussed their views of the ‘wealthy’ and the ‘super rich’ with reference to both vast economic resources and more intangible aspects, including, crucially, security. High levels of wealth and income were perceived to be necessary for achieving security for oneself and one’s family. The security of the rich was discussed in contrast to participants’ own and others’ insecurity in the context of a (neo)liberal welfare regime – specifically, insecurity about housing, personal finances, social security, health care and the future of the welfare state. In unequal countries, where insecurity is widespread, lack of confidence in collective welfare state provision may serve in the public imagination to legitimate private wealth accumulation and richness as a form of self-protection.

In 2008, the world underwent one of its worst economic and financial crises, whose consequences are still visible in some countries. This paper aims to analyse the impact of the crisis within the long-term care systems of Germany, England, Sweden and Spain from a comparative perspective. The time period analysed spans from the outset of the crisis in 2008, up to 2017. This article starts off from the thesis of the divergent impact of the economic crisis in these countries and the convergence between the impact of the crisis and long-term care contractions in the most afflicted countries. The outcome highlights the power of economic and financial pressures in order to explain the contractions within the care policies. Equally, it emphasizes the contradictions between the formal development level of the care systems and their practical institutional implementation in the field.

Left-right partisan conflict has been a key driver of welfare state expansion and retrenchment over time and across countries. Yet, we know very little about how left-right differences in party appeals vary across social policy domains. Why are some issues contentious while there is broad consensus on others? This paper starts from the simple premise that partisan conflict is a function of how popular a certain policy is. Based on this assumption, it argues that the left-right gap should be (1) larger for revenue-side issues than for expenditure-side issues, (2) larger for policies targeted at groups that are viewed as less deserving and (3) larger for more redistributive programs than less redistributive ones (e.g. means-tested versus earnings-related benefits). These expectations are tested on fine-grained policy data coded from 65 Austrian party manifestos issued between 1970 and 2017 (N = 18,219). The analysis strongly supports the revenue–expenditure hypothesis and the deservingness hypothesis, but not the redistribution hypothesis.

Migration is often perceived as a challenge to the welfare state. To manage this challenge, advanced welfare states have established transgovernmental networks. This article examines how domestic factors condition the interaction of representatives of advanced welfare states when they cooperate on transnational welfare governance. Based on new survey data, it compares who interacts with whom in one of the oldest transgovernmental networks of the European Union (EU) – the network that deals with EU citizens' rights to cross-border welfare. First, the authors perform a welfare cluster analysis of EU-28 and test whether institutional similarity explains these interactions. Furthermore, they test whether the level and kind of migration explains interaction and examine the explanatory value of administrative capacity. To test what drives interactions, the study employs social network analysis and exponential random graph models. It finds that cooperation in networked welfare governance tends to be homophilous, and that political cleavages between sending and receiving member states are mirrored in network interactions. Domestic factors are key drivers when advanced welfare states interact.

Leading accounts of the politics of the welfare state focus on societal demands for risk-spreading policies. Yet current measures of the welfare state focus not on risk, but on inequality. To address this gap, this letter describes the development of two new measures, risk incidence and risk reduction, which correspond to the prevalence of large income losses and the degree to which welfare states reduce that prevalence, respectively. Unlike existing indicators, these measures require panel data, which the authors harmonize for twenty-one democracies. The study finds that large losses affect all income and education levels, making the welfare state valuable to a broad cross-section of citizens. It also finds that taxes and transfers greatly reduce the prevalence of such losses, though to varying degrees across countries and over time. Finally, it disaggregates the measures to identify specific ‘triggers’ of large losses, and finds that these triggers are associated with risks on which welfare states focus, such as unemployment and sickness.

As part of the institutional changes in Turkey since the 1980s that laid down the foundations of a market economy, the transformation of the social security system has recently come on the agenda. This article discusses the possible outcome of this transformation by situating the case of Turkey in the context of the contemporary international social policy environment shaped by neo-liberal globalization.

It is possible to suggest that throughout the world a new system of welfare governance has recently emerged, which is characterized, first, by a novel emphasis on workfare as opposed to welfare. It modifies, second, redistributive action by the state through diverse partnerships between the state, private sector and voluntary initiatives in the provision of social care and public services. The impact of this new system of welfare governance on social policy is especially important in less developed countries where the role of the state in welfare provision is recently being taken more seriously. With the new emphasis on workfare accompanied by the increasing role of non-state actors, the newly introduced social policy measures might not necessarily consolidate the basis of citizenship rights but they might mainly serve to keep under control the socio-economic insecurity aggravated by the expansion of market relations. This observation is of particular significance for the analysis of the contemporary social policy environment in Turkey that this article presents.

Social science researchers in the UK now accept that religion has returned to public life (Spalek and Imtoual, 2008; Dinham and Lowndes, 2009), after what has been described by Gorski (2005) as a considerable period of ‘intellectual and political repression’ that began in the post-World War II era. This lasted until around the beginning of the 1980s when political events such as the 1979 Iranian revolution, the rise of the ‘moral majority’ in North America and the spread of religious political mobilisation across the world, forced social scientists to recalculate their predictions about the effective demise of religion which had been considered to be a direct consequence of processes of modernisation (Casanova, 1994; Gorski, 2005; Habermas, 2006).

The introduction of choice and consumer mechanisms in public services has been identified as a fundamental shift in welfare service provision internationally. Within the United Kingdom (UK), such mechanisms developed and integrated into English services have not been replicated in their entirety in Scotland and Wales. For the first time since the inception of the UK welfare state, there are now formal differences in entitlement for older people as a result of devolution. This paper uses comparative policy analysis to review a range of sources not hitherto brought together in order to explore how these concurrent developments – choice and devolution – impact on people over state retirement age. We also consider the extent to which a more consumerist approach to public services might redress or increase later-life inequalities. Drawing on theoretical research and policy evidence, we argue that for many people over state retirement age, the prospect of becoming a consumer in these varied contexts is difficult and unwelcome. We suggest that although it is too early in the devolutionary process for any significant impact of these divergent policies to materialise, continued policy divergence will lead to different experiences and outcomes for older people in Scotland, Wales and England. We conclude that these divergent social policies offer significant research opportunities, particularly concerning their impact on later-life inequalities.