We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 2 focuses on the critical role played by Chinese Comintern delegate Wang Ming in the birth of the second Communist–Nationalist “United Front” of 1937 following the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War. It begins with a summary of the first months of the war, with the capture of Peking and Shanghai, and soon the Nationalist capital of Nanjing. This is followed by a summary of the situation for socialism in Germany, Spain, and the Soviet Union, providing context for Soviet support of the Chinese in their war against Japan. Wang’s meeting with Mao Zedong in the Communist Party (CCP) wartime base of Yan’an is discussed, with an overview of his arguments for uniting with KMT forces under Chiang Kai-shek, before turning to a discussion of Wang’s meeting with the Nationalist leader in Wuhan. Zhou Enlai’s appointment to vice director of the Political Department is discussed as a way of pulling Communists into Chiang’s government without recognizing them as equals. In contrast, evidence of Wang’s relative success in developing a political platform around which all anti-Japanese groups could unite in Wuhan is presented. Finally, the eventual abandonment of Wuhan under the orders of Chiang is discussed, and the conflict between Mao and Wang is explored in light of later purges.
The decade between the first and second united fronts, from the KMT-CCP break-up in mid-1927 to mid-1937, was a time of disaster, trial and tribulation for the Communist movement that brought it close to extinction. By the end of 1927 there appeared clearly two streams of communism in China - the rural Soviets and the urban leadership; the former had to be led by the latter, else the whole movement might have sunk into the traditional pattern of Chinese peasant rebellions. The theoretical framework of the CCP's strategy in this period was laid out in Wang Ming's famous pamphlet, The two lines, of July 1931 which made much of the crisis of postwar capitalism in its third stage of development, when the contradictions among imperialist powers became increasingly acute. Since the creation of the rural Soviets, tension as well as cooperation had developed between the 'white area' work and the land revolution.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.