Chapter 4, by Patrick Egan and Markus Prior, continues with the examination of electoral accountability and the psychology of citizen evaluation of incumbents by using R. Douglas Arnold’s The Logic of Congressional Action as a springboard. The authors carefully explicate Arnold’s assumptions about voter psychology and then evaluate them in light of recent scholarship and political developments. In their account, tighter voter association between incumbents and parties, decreased information about incumbents and policy outcomes, and heightened motivated reasoning require significant modification of Arnold’s classic assumptions. Still, they argue, a realistic appreciation of the new voter psychology of accountability does not imply Westminster-style accountability of legislators based exclusively on party labels. The real consequences of policies continue to matter to voters. But, the changes do imply that party labels and primaries matter more than formerly.

With Chapter 6, the volume shifts its focus to the role of the media in creating an informational environment that affects voters’ ability to hold elected officials accountable. Opening Part II, Brandice Canes-Wrone and Michael Kistner exploit variation across districts and over time in the congruence between local newspaper markets and House members’ districts. Using this variation, the authors estimate the effect of media coverage on the link between candidate ideology and election outcomes. For incumbents, who have track records of roll- call voting in Congress, differences in coverage only modestly affect the relationship between incumbent ideology and election outcomes. For challengers, however, reduced coverage is associated with a substantial reduction in both the penalty for ideological extremity and the reward for ideological moderation. The authors also find, consistent with the decline of local media and the rise of the internet, that the effect of local newspaper congruence may have decreased over time. Overall, media coverage and information are important in accountability, but in surprisingly subtle ways.

In Chapter 3, Eric M. Patashnik, Patrick Tucker, and Alan S. Gerber employ evidence from two original survey experiments to explore voter responses to representatives’ actions. In the first set of experiments, voters learn that their representative has claimed credit for bringing the district a grant. But how do voters evaluate the lawmaker’s performance? Do they rely on the absolute size of the grant, or on its size relative to other grants when allocating rewards and punishment to a representative? The authors find that individuals are responsive to information about the relative, but not absolute, size of grants, and are more inclined to punish legislators for delivering below-average grants than reward them for securing above-average ones. The second set of experiments manipulates information about different kinds of benefits, and shows respondents react more strongly to information about specific policies than abstract ones. Together, the results indicate that citizens’ ability to hold representatives accountable depends on citizens’ ability to put policy actions into a concrete context they find meaningful.