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This study investigates the public health implications of terrorist attacks on telecommunications infrastructure globally, assessing the direct and indirect impacts on emergency response and medical services.
Methods
Utilizing retrospective analysis, this research delves into incidents recorded in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 1970 to 2020. The study employs descriptive statistical methods to identify patterns and examine the regional distribution and frequency of these attacks, alongside the types of weaponry used and the direct casualties involved.
Results
The analysis underscores a significant focus on telecommunications by terrorist groups, revealing a frequent use of high-impact weapons like explosives and incendiary devices aimed at maximizing disruption. The study highlights considerable regional variations in the frequency and nature of attacks, emphasizing the strategic importance of these infrastructures to public safety and health systems.
Conclusions
The findings demonstrate the critical need for robust security enhancements tailored to regional threats and the integration of advanced technologies in public safety strategies. The research advocates for enhanced international cooperation and policymaking to mitigate the impacts of these attacks, ensuring telecommunications resilience in the face of global terrorism.
For the past decade, U.S. communications policymakers have been debating the need for net-neutrality regulation of “dominant” communications carrier platforms. One of the reasons advanced for regulating these carriers derives from a fear that carriers could reduce competition in the production and distribution of video media through their ownership of media companies, but is there any evidence supporting the notion that vertically integrated communications companies have successfully used such a strategy? This paper provides evidence from the financial markets that carrier integration into video production has not redounded to the benefit of these companies’ stockholders. In fact, this integration appears to reduce the value that investors place on such carriers, a result that suggests that the difficulties in managing a large, vertically integrated media and communications company more than offset any benefits (if any) that may derive from anticompetitive behavior induced by vertical integration.
This article analyses labour-intensive workforce strategies in Japan's government-run informational infrastructure (post, telegraph, and telephone) and in the adjunct services associated with their administration in the decades up to the Pacific War. It asks to what extent the growing scale of employment in Japan's communications infrastructure in this period confirms the existence of labour-intensive growth outside the manufacturing sector, and how far the growth of the labour force in post and telecommunications was facilitated by specific labour-absorbing institutions—that is, formal or informal institutions designed to mobilise or incentivise large numbers of employees. The discussion of these two associated questions shows not only that this area of infrastructure provision was highly labour-intensive in terms of the numbers employed and the diverse tasks undertaken, but also that the government-run postal system in effect depended for its growth and development on labour strategies and labour-absorbing institutions analogous to those usually associated with manufacturing development. The article also seeks to establish how far we can see in this sector the gradual improvement in the quality of labour normally associated with the labour-intensive industrialisation process, providing evidence that the evolving institutions were closely associated with a gradual improvement in the quality of labour and its ability to interact with rapidly changing needs and technologies.
Economic regulation affects us all, shaping how we access essential services such as water, energy and transport, as well as how we communicate with one another in the digital world. Modern Economic Regulation describes the core insights of economic theory on which regulatory policies are based and connects this with evidence of how regulation is applied. It focuses on fundamental questions such as: why are certain industries regulated? What principles can inform regulation? How is regulation implemented? Which regulatory policies have been more, or less, effective in practice? All chapters in this second edition are fully updated to reflect the latest research and evidence, while five new chapters cover behavioural economics and the regulation of rail, aviation, payment systems and digital platforms. Each chapter contains discussion questions and topical case studies, and online materials include over 60 applied exercises that explore real-life regulatory problems from around the world.
This article analyzes the lasting effects of privatization on public-sector telecommunications workers in Argentina's rural interior. I draw on over fifty hours of oral histories carried out from 2015 to 2017 with former ENTel and Telefónica workers in General Pico, in the interior province of La Pampa, Argentina. This unique source base reveals how the material objects themselves acquired symbolic weight in the minds of workers, and how the introduction of new technologies and labor regimes after privatization in 1990 eroded workers' feelings of loyalty toward and ownership over the previously state-run company. This article specifically explores notions of trauma as related to the destruction of the physical materials of work, and the association between that destruction and the mass layoffs that followed. David Harvey's engagement with creative destruction in late capitalism has suggested that “continuous innovation”—whether technological or practical—has meant the devaluation and/or destruction of existing labor relations. I expand this concept to show how this logic of “creative destruction” maps onto spatialized ideas of modernity. The trauma that workers experienced in the 1990s is most productively understood vis-à-vis the unfulfilled promises of “progress” which claimed to bring efficiency, growth, and long-term stability but instead delivered job loss, atomization, and the breakdown of social relations of labor.
This chapter shows how the perceived strategic value of high-tech, globally integrated sectors, represented by telecommunications, for neoliberal development interacts with sectoral structures and organization of institutions. The resultant regulated governance by the Indian government of telecommunications are the micro-institutional foundations of Indian-style capitalism undergirding the globalization and development of such industries disconnected from the post-Independence legacies of the Indian nationalist imagination. The cross-time sector and company case studies show the initial introduction of competition in telecommunications occurred during Big Bang Liberalization supported by pro-liberalization industrial stakeholders disconnected from the existing telecommunications bureaucracy. Today a central-level ministry makes policy and an independent regulator enforces the market entry and business scope of a state-owned fixed-line operator and fiercely competitive mobile carriers and value-added service providers. The role of the state in market coordination and the dominant property rights arrangements vary by subsector as a function of interacting strategic value and sectoral logics. Nehruvian interpretation of Gandhian Swadeshi self-reliance has retained bureaucratic oversight of the development of state- and privately-owned equipment makers, which concentrated on rural automatic exchanges and low-tech inputs until the dominance of Chinese competition pivoted focus to indigenous development in new generation mobile consumer and terminal telecommunications equipment.
This chapter exposes how the perceived strategic value of capital-intensive, value-added sectors, represented by telecommunications, for national security and resource management, interacts with sectoral structures and organization of institutions. The centralized governanceby the Russian state since the collapse of the Soviet Union and further reenforced during the Putin era witnessed in these sectors shows the federal government consolidating in one corporate entity the ownership and management of civilian and dedicated landlines of the Soviet military industrial complex. Centralized market coordination presides over the predominantly privately owned mobile and value-added service providers operating in fiercely competitive markets deregulated in the 1990s. The cross-time sector and company cases further show various lower-level bureaucracies and non-sector-specific economywide rules regulate telecommunications equipment privatized after Soviet collapse, perceived less strategic than the state-owned and managed backbone infrastructure. Similar interacting strategic value and sectoral logics apply to Information Technology (IT) Software, a sector which has benefitted from former science and technology personnel of the Soviet defense industry. In the face of perceived security threats from within and without after economic crises and conflicts with neighboring countries, however, the state has reenforced its control of the information communications infrastructure, including RuNet and cybersecurity, designated strategic assets.
This chapter shows how the perceived strategic value of high-tech, value-added sectors, represented by telecommunications services and manufacturing, for national security and the national technology base, interacts with sectoral structures and organizational of institutions, and shapes the Chinese government’s centralized governance. Two decades after accession to the World Trade Organization, the Chinese government has yet to implement many of its market entry and business scope commitments in telecommunications. The state governs telecommunications with centralized coordination by a supraministry of government-owned fixed-line and mobile carriers and privately-owned but government-controlled value-added service providers and equipment makers. The dominant pattern of centralized governance enables the state to achieve its security and developmental goals even while introducing competition and exposing the industry to global economic integration. The cross-time sector and company cases uncover how reregulation and deliberate state interventions in corporate governance and anti-trust followed the market liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s. From the development of network technologies, such as 5G, to semiconductors, Chinese state-owned institutional and firm-level initiatives have strategically courted foreign direct investment and reregulated to gain corporate control or force divestment. Similarly, foreign investment and private capital have developed value-added services; but subsequent reregulation controls information dissemination and sectoral development.
Historical accounts of the Internet's origins tend to emphasize U.S. government investment and university-based researchers. In contrast, this article introduces actors who have been overlooked: the entrepreneurs and private firms that developed standards, evaluated competing standards, educated consumers about the value of new products, and built products to sell. Start-up companies such as 3Com and Cisco Systems succeeded because they met rapidly rising demand from users, particularly those in large organizations, who were connecting computers into networks and networks into internetworks. We consider a relatively brief yet dynamic period, from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, when regulators attacked incumbent American firms, entrepreneurs flourished in new market niches, and engineers set industry standards for networking and internetworking. As a consequence, their combined efforts forged new processes and institutions for so-called open standards that, in turn, created the conditions favorable for the “network effects” that sustained the formative years of the digital economy.
British Telecom’s 1984 partial privatization set in motion the privatization and deregulation of many international state-owned telecommunications carriers. Most previous research on the privatization and deregulation of state-owned telecommunications carriers has focused on the economic outcomes. However, this was also a time of changes in managerial practice and thinking influenced by organizational theory. This article presents an analysis of the use of the prescriptions of Rosabeth Kanter in the attempted reform of the organizational culture of Australia’s largest business in the 1980s: the government-owned telecommunications monopoly Telecom Australia (now Telstra). It details the attempt to transform Telecom under the incipient threat of the introduction of competition to the telecommunications market and demonstrates how the country’s largest change management program, Vision 2000, represented an alternative approach to telecommunications reform.
In order to start the analysis of the Telecommunications chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it is fundamental, as a first step, to understand the reasons why a plurilateral agreement among twelve countries, whose main objective is to address trade-related issues, includes a specific chapter on Telecommunications.
Although there is no single answer to this question, it is possible to develop some reasons that support the inclusion of this chapter in the TPP.
In this chapter, we return to the American context in order to see how intellectual property develops from within a nationalizing state during the nineteenth century. We see the extent to which America's national legal foundations were, ironically, international and Roman. In writers of early U.S. legal treatises, we see an overt embrace of Roman law as a foundation for the commercial law of the new nation. We see the implications of this in the will theory of contracts and in franchising arrangements that lay the foundations for a telecommunications network, at first for telegraphs and later for telephones. Contracts become a new instrument of legal power, one that facilitates intentional strategy in the consolidation and deployment of unprecedented levels of social power, rooted in the zones of exclusivity enabled by intellectual property. In the Bell Telephone System, we see this consolidated social power at its apex. In the regulatory reactions to this level of social power, we see early foundations for the American administrative state.
Ethernet was invented more than 40 years ago. Originally intended for the IT industry/data centers, it was adopted in a variety of industries. This chapter explains the main developments in these industries to show the starting point for the automotive industry, when adopting Automotive Ethernet.
The COVID-19 pandemic is nowhere near over. Some things, however, seem relatively clear. So far, the agendas of the world's most powerful actors seem unchanged—or, indeed, accelerated. Partly as a result, disease mortality and economic losses have fallen largely on poorer people, though deaths so far have been concentrated among poorer people in rich countries. Consequently, the pandemic's implications look very different at the local, subnational, and international levels—although at all levels, they thus far reflect accelerations of preexisting trends more than new departures. Many developments reflect remarkable gains in human capacity to cope with disasters—a point highlighted by comparisons to the 1919 flu and other historical events pandemics made by the authors in this forum. Those gains are particularly evident in Asia, though they look more precarious in South Asia and Southeast Asia than in East Asia; this has contributed to a marked shift in rhetoric about global “sickness” and health and seems consistent with prophecies of a coming “Asian century.” However, COVID-19 may not be a singular event like 1919 but may portend a wave of environmental emergencies; in that scenario, no world region has exhibited as much resilience as it would need.
This chapter is both a retrospective, and also even a requiem, for the “unregulation” argument in Internet law, and a prospective on the next twenty-five years of computer (or cyber) law. The Internet is not a lawless, special unregulated zone; it never was. Now that broadband Internet is ubiquitous, mobile, and relatively reliable in urban and suburban areas, it is being regulated as all mass media before it. While American policymakers advocated a largely deregulatory approach to the internet over the past twenty-five years, the United Kingdom and Europe have emphasized the hybrid of governmental and private market oversight known as coregulation. This approach to making regulation more adaptive addresses key dilemmas that fast-moving, slippery technologies pose for the traditional regulator’s toolkit.
So far, we have heard a lot about how private actors are trying to regulate the internet. Governments across the world have also been very active in trying to get internet companies to regulate what information their citizens can access and share online. The decentralized, resilient design of the internet makes government censorship much more difficult than in the mass media era, where it was much simpler to embed controls within the operations of a small number of major newspaper publishers and television and radio networks. Governments are adapting, though, and quickly becoming much more sophisticated in how they monitor and control the flow of information online.
In August 2017, several hundred white nationalists marched on the small university town of Charlottesville, Virginia. The rally turned tragic when one of the protesters rammed his car into a crowd of counterprotesters, killing 32-year-old Heather Heyer. The Washington Post characterized the protesters as “a meticulously organized, well-coordinated and heavily armed company of white nationalists.”1
This article examines the role of internet service providers (ISPs) as guardians of personal information and protectors of privacy, with a particular focus on how telecom companies in Canada have historically negotiated these responsibilities. Communications intermediaries have long been expected to act as privacy custodians by their users, while simultaneously being subject to pressures to collect, utilize, and disclose personal information. As service providers gain custody over increasing volumes of highly-sensitive information, their importance as privacy custodians has been brought into starker relief and explicitly recognized as a core responsibility.
Some ISPs have adopted a more positive orientation to this responsibility, actively taking steps to advance it, rather that treating privacy protection as a set of limitations on conduct. However, commitments to privacy stewardship are often neutralized through contradictory legal obligations (such as mandated surveillance access) and are recurrently threatened by commercial pressures to monetize personal information.
Research on regulation has focussed on explaining the independence of sector regulators and assessing the effects of regulations on markets. This article broadens the scope of such research by studying and explaining how regulatory actors interact at the de facto level in a multi-actor regulatory arrangement when making regulatory decisions in the telecommunications sector of Colombia. We propose that regulatory decisions depend on the manner in which actors influence each other. In this article, we are not only focussing on the policy outcome itself but also on the regulatory decision-making process. We performed a social network analysis and used an exponential random graph model to analyse the data. Our findings suggest that actors’ level of influence is affected by the access they have to other organisations, the divergence of positions they have with these other organisations and the power resources of an organisation. In addition, there are structural network characteristics that affect regulatory decisionmaking.
Discussions about deunionisation usually focus on lower levels of the workforce with managers seen as the initiators of deunionisation strategies. Managers, however, occupy contradictory positions as agents of capital, employees and possibly trade unionists. This can place them in the position of being both recipients and conduits in deunionisation strategies. The focus of the study is on Telstra, the major telecommunications carrier in Australia. Using a range of sources such as interviews and company and union materials, this qualitative research shows how between 1992 and 2000 Telstra's senior management's concerns over middle management agency prompted them to reframe the concept of a manager by using a set of managerial practices from the mining company CRA and the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act (1996) to individualise and deunionise their managerial ranks as a precursor to the deunionisation of the wider workforce.