After laying out the substantial challenges faced by the young People’s Republic of China in 1949, this chapter focuses on the particular ways in which revolutionary policies were implemented: by an ever shifting mix of bureaucratic and campaign modalities that were supported by a range of public performances. Bureaucracy was characterized by hierarchy, order, precedent, the strengthening of formal state institutions and a mania for classification, thus radically simplifying complex realities through a process of disaggregation; campaigns mobilized moral commitments through a different type of radical simplification – fusion into morally charged narratives and popular mobilization. Both modalities were in evidence in the two signature campaigns of 1951: the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and land reform. While, in the early 1950s, bureaucratic and campaign modalities were co-constitutive, after the mid 1950s, they were more often in stark tension with each other.

Eliminating the use of weak ḥadīth has been a common call of Salafism. Salafis rejected the use of weak ḥadīth because they were incompatible with their core commitment to textual authenticity. Salafis believed weak ḥadīth to be the source of many superstitions, fictitious beliefs, and many erroneous legal verdicts found in the madhhabs. They hold that the use of weak ḥadīth betrays the scholarly responsibility to preserve Islamic teachings in their pure form. On the other hand, Traditionalists allowed the limited use of weak ḥadīth and insisted that they play an important role in Islamic interpretation. The different stances reflect the various priorities of both groups as well as their contrasting conceptions of truth. Their differences also stem from their different perceptions of the social and ideological consequences of using weak ḥadīth. This chapter ends with an analysis of Albānī’s controversial project of dividing the Sunan and the responses it garnered from Traditionalists.

After presenting the fundamentals of Weberian-institutionalist and Gramsciian-culturalist approaches to understanding the state, this introduction suggests that it is possible to combine the two. Focusing on the unusually successful cases of state building of the “revolutionary” People’s Republic of China in Sunan and the “conservative” Republic of China in Taiwan in the early 1950s, it suggests that the “hows” of state building policy implementation are as important as the “whats.” Both regimes resorted to overlapping and shifting modalities of bureaucratic rule making and campaign mobilization, differing substantively in how these repertoires were performed and communicated to citizens at large.