This study investigates whether individuals engage in prosocial behavior when it requires an investment of their time, but not money. In a laboratory experiment with rigorous anonymity arrangements, senders receive their payoff at the beginning. They may then engage in a tedious task to increase the earnings of exogenously disadvantaged recipients who otherwise receive no earnings. We find that senders are willing to sacrifice time to benefit recipients. Whether or not the recipient is present in the laboratory during the working time does not alter this decision. However, in a treatment variation some senders also display antisocial behavior.

The strategy method (SM) is, in practice, subject to a possibly severe economic-theoretical bias. Although many studies utilize SM to examine responses to rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), they ignore the fact that the strategic equivalence between SM and DE holds for the monetary payoff game but not the game participants actually play, which is in terms of utilities. We report three results. First, failing to account for estimation bias when decisions at one information set can influence utility at another may result in significant differences in decision-making. Second, the magnitude of this bias can be substantial, comparable to other measured treatment effects. Third, minor interventions targeting salience can amplify these differences similarly, causing treatment effects to differ significantly between SM and DE, even reversing in direction. These findings emphasize the need for reconsideration of the SM’s reliability for economic research.

Neoclassical theory holds that different sources of income are fungible at the margin. In contrast, mental accounting holds that appropriate uses for income vary by source, making them infungible. This study investigates which theory better describes giving at the margin when income may have multiple sources. Dictators accrue differing amounts of (1) earned income from a real-effort task, (2) windfall income, or (3) both. I find that dictators treat marginal earned and windfall income as partially infungible, supporting mental accounting. Dictators who had a single income source gave 14% of a marginal windfall token and 5% of a marginal earned token. Strikingly, dictators who had income from both sources were sharply less generous with each, giving only 2% and 1%, respectively. Multiple accounts enabled greater selfishness at the margin. A follow-up experiment shows that two accounts must be qualitatively different, not just multiple in number, to produce this effect.

This article highlights a potential and significant economic–theoretical bias in the widely used strategy method (SM) technique. Although SM is commonly employed to analyze numerous observations per subject regarding rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), researchers often overlook a critical distinction. The strategic equivalence between SM and DE is applicable in the context of monetary payoff games, but not in the actual utility-based games played by participants. This oversight may lead to inaccurate conclusions and demand a reevaluation of existing research in the field. We formalize the mapping from the monetary payoff game to this actual game and delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic equivalence to apply.

We run an eye-tracking experiment to investigate whether players change their gaze patterns and choices after they experience alternative models of choice in one-shot games. In phase 1 and 3, participants play 2 × 2 matrix games with a human counterpart; in phase 2, they apply specific decision rules while playing with a computer with known behavior. We classify participants in types based on their gaze patterns in phase 1 and explore attentional shifts in phase 3, after players were exposed to the alternative decision rules. Results show that less sophisticated players, who focus mainly on their own payoffs, change their gaze patterns towards the evaluation of others’ incentives in phase 3. This attentional shift predicts an increase in equilibrium responses in relevant classes of games. Conversely, cooperative players do not change their visual analysis. Our results shed new light on theories of bounded rationality and on theories of social preferences.

We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences—trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity—predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (Manag Sci, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.

This paper studies individuals’ preference for reducing advantageous inequality in the distribution of gains and losses. Combining the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3):817–868, 1999) with loss aversion à la Kahneman and Tversky (Econom J Econom Soc:263–291, 1979), we predict the relative dislike for advantageous inequality is lower when outcomes are framed as losses than when outcomes are framed as gains. We test this prediction using data from two modified dictator game experiments. Consistent with the model, we find that the amount of payoff that subjects are willing to sacrifice to increase the net payoff of others and reduce advantageous inequality is smaller under a loss frame than under a gain frame. The results also show that women are more inequality averse than men in both gains and losses.

This paper investigates how process data like response time and click position relates to economic decisions. We use a social value orientation experiment, which can be considered as a prototypical multi-attribute decision problem. We find that in the social value orientation task more individualistic subjects have shorter response times than prosocial subjects. Individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others’ payoffs, and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. Moreover, the response time information and the click position information are complementary in explaining subjects’ preferences. These results show that response times and click positions can be used as indicators of people’s preferences.

We ask whether social preferences measured in subjects who come to the laboratory when invited are systematically different from those of subjects who only respond when an online option is available. Subjects participated in two types of third-party (other–other) dictator games and a trust game, either in the lab or on-line. In the third party dictator games, the dictator divides $20 between two other individuals, one of whom is a member of their in-group. (We also varied types of in-group between a real group and an artificial group.) In the trust game, the first-mover decides how much of the endowment to send to the second-mover. The second-mover receives the amount sent tripled by the experimenter and decides how much to send back to the trustee. Across all the games, we find no statistically significant differences in social preferences measured in-lab and on-line.

The term ‘moral wiggle room’ (MWR) is often used to describe features of social situations that reduce the transparency between behaviors and their consequences. Previous research found that MWR decreases the likelihood of prosocial behavior and inferred that prosocial behavior is driven not only by genuine prosocial preferences but also by the desire to appear prosocially. Unfortunately, this postulation has never been specified as a theory. Consequently, studies testing the MWR effect reveal substantial heterogeneity in the understanding of core concepts, their operationalizations, and boundary conditions. To advance the field of MWR research, we remove these ambiguities by providing a verbal proposition-based theory specification. We first outline the original formulation of the MWR effect and its mediating mechanism, and we identify its loopholes. On this basis, we propose, refine, and distinguish between core propositions and auxiliary assumptions as well as relevant concepts and their operationalizations. The result is a fully testable theory of MWR (MWR-T) that includes a sharpened concept of MWR, distinguishes between three underlying psychological mechanisms of the behavioral MWR effect (i.e., anticipated social image damage, perceived social norms, and anticipatory guilt), and takes into account the role of individual differences in susceptibility to MWR (i.e., the joint effect of dispositional other-regarding preferences and social image concerns). Lastly, we relate MWR-T to existing theories and draw a roadmap for future work. With our contribution, we hope to stimulate more rigorous research on MWR and provide an example of the utility of verbal proposition-based theory specification.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether public discussion before a majority vote increases the saliency of minority interests and results in more egalitarian outcomes or whether voters use discussion to form majorities that benefit at the expense of minorities. When there are two alternatives, we find that public discussion increases the likelihood that individuals vote for equal allocations, but has little to no impact on the group outcomes. When participants choose among one equal and several unequal options, the multitude of unequal options creates a coordination problem, and we find that discussion decreases the frequency of egalitarian decisions. Our findings suggest that the effect of public communication on the fairness of majority voting outcomes depends on the strategic environment.

The strategy method is a powerful method for eliciting conditional cooperation instrategic interactions. Theoretically, players’ cooperation conditionalon a specific level of others’ cooperation using the strategy methodshould be equal to their unconditional cooperation given an equivalent beliefabout others’ cooperation. However, using the Prisoner’s Dilemma,we show that decisions using the strategy method are more selfish than decisionsunder a simultaneous decision protocol predicted from players’ beliefs.This is driven entirely by lower cooperation among conditional cooperators withlow expectations about others’ cooperation. We further show that relativeto simultaneous choice, the strategy method shifts salient norms from anegalitarian fairness norm (‘give half’) to a reciprocity norm(‘match others’ behaviour’). This undermines cooperationamong players with low beliefs about others’ cooperation. These resultsthus show that the strategy method does not merely hold beliefs constant, butalso shifts which salient norms influence choice behaviour. This has importantimplications for the use of the strategy method in eliciting socialpreferences.

Unbiased lotteries seem the least unfair and simplest procedures to allocate scarce indivisible resources to those with equal claims. But, when lotteries are repeated, it is not immediately obvious whether prior winners should be included or excluded. As in design questions surrounding single-shot lotteries, considerations of self-interest and distributive social preferences may interact. We investigate preferences for allowing participation of earlier winners in sequential lotteries. We found a strong preference for exclusion, both in settings where subjects were involved, and those where they were not. Subjects who answered questions about both settings did not differ in their tendency to prefer exclusion. Stated rationales significantly predicted choice but did not predict switching of choices between the two settings.

Revealed preference is the dominant approach for inferring preferences, but it is limited in that it relies solely on discrete choice data. When a person chooses one alternative over another, we cannot infer the strength of their preference or predict how likely they will be to make the same choice again. However, the choice process also produces response times (RTs), which are continuous and easily observable. It has been shown that RTs often decrease with strength-of-preference. This is a basic property of sequential sampling models such as the drift diffusion model. What remains unclear is whether this relationship is sufficiently strong, relative to the other factors that affect RTs, to allow us to reliably infer strength-of-preference across individuals. Using several experiments, we show that even when every subject chooses the same alternative, we can still rank them based on their RTs and predict their behavior on other choice problems. We can also use RTs to predict whether a subject will repeat or reverse their decision when presented with the same choice problem a second time. Finally, as a proof-of-concept, we demonstrate that it is also possible to recover individual preference parameters from RTs alone. These results demonstrate that it is indeed possible to use RTs to infer preferences.

Narrow self-interest is often used as a simplifying assumption when studying people making decisions in social contexts. Nonetheless, people exhibit a wide range of different motivations when choosing unilaterally among interdependent outcomes. Measuring the magnitude of the concern people have for others, sometimes called Social Value Orientation (SVO), has been an interest of many social scientists for decades and several different measurement methods have been developed so far. Here we introduce a new measure of SVO that has several advantages over existent methods. A detailed description of the new measurement method is presented, along with norming data that provide evidence of its solid psychometric properties. We conclude with a brief discussion of the research streams that would benefit from a more sensitive and higher resolution measure of SVO, and extend an invitation to others to use this new measure which is freely available.

In many competitive situations, our investments increase our gains: Developing better products or research proposals may lead to higher contracts or patents or larger grants. Does increasing investment in such cases always guarantee higher gains? We used an experimental repeated competition game in which prizes depended on contestants’ investments (n=108). Contestants invested more when they increased the potential prize (“enlarge the market”), yet in some cases this tendency was counterproductive (“decrease the profit”): Contestants in fact diminished their earnings, compared to sitting out the competition and keeping their initial funds. Moreover, when a contestant’s investment decreased an opponent’s prize, the contestant tended to invest less; this effect, in turn, led to higher overall gains for both contestants. This result implies that prosocial considerations are at play. Notably, in certain situations, excessive competitive tendencies may lead to a larger waste of resources.

The construction of social preferences often requires one to reconcile various social motives, such as concern with unfavorable inequality and maximization of social welfare. We propose a novel theory whereby people’s level of agency influences the relative intensities of their social motives, and thus their social preferences. Agency in this context refers to decision makers’ active involvement in the processes that produce social outcomes. Nonagentic decision makers are not involved in creating the outcomes. Therefore, the comparison between self and others is highly informative for them and they shun settings in which their outcome appears to be inferior. Conversely, agentic decision makers, who take action to influence social outcomes, care more about others’ outcomes and are more inclined to promote social welfare. We report five studies testing the agency hypothesis. Participants were presented with realistic scenarios involving outcomes for themselves and another person. In each scenario, the outcome for oneself was fixed, while the outcome for the other person varied. The participants’ task was to indicate their satisfaction with the other person obtaining either the same outcome as their own or a better one. We found that participants who were involved in creating the outcomes (agentic condition) were more satisfied with the other getting the better option than were participants who were not involved (nonagentic condition). Even low levels of influence on the outcomes were sufficient for a strong agency effect to occur. We discuss the agency hypothesis in relation to theories of social preference, the effects of voicing and participation in decision processes, and trade-offs in public policy.