This paper proposes a re-reading of Bernard Crick's The American Science of Politics, challenging the notion that it articulated an English aversion to political science per se. When reconnected with its author's evolving thinking in the 1950s and 1960s about the nature of political concepts, the unique character of politics, and the responsibilities of the political scientist, the book can be seen as an attempt to promote a neo-republican conception of the discipline's identity, with a particular accent upon the importance of civic education.

This article defends a set of three apparently mutually inconsistent claims and shows how they can and should be simultaneously held. First, that one of the most pressing normative problems we face is constituted by the wealth of opportunities for transnational domination—of states by other states, of states and individuals by supranational organizations and institutions as well as transnational corporations, of vulnerable individuals by powerful ones. Second, the most appropriate way to tackle this issue, far from being the implementation of a cosmopolitan agenda, is the strengthening of states and their problem-solving capacities. Third, this agenda toward the (re-)strengthening of states requires a demanding form of transnational solidarity, if one that significantly differs from more traditional liberal notions of cosmopolitan solidarity.

The threat of emergency measures introduced in face of COVID-19 has largely been framed in terms of individual rights. We argue that it is not the protection of the sovereign individual that is most at stake, but the relations between political subjects and the institutions that enable their robust political participation. Drawing on Hannah Arendt's analysis of the ways in which isolation and the incapacity to discern truth or reality condition totalitarianism and are exacerbated by it, we argue that the dangers for the evacuation of democratic politics are stark in our era. We consider contemporary political action in concert in Germany to illustrate this critique of COVID-19 emergency measures. Drawing on the legal concept of “appropriateness,” we explicate how the German critical response to the shutdown is founded on a concern for democratic principles and institutions, and aims to achieve two crucial goals: governmental transparency and social-political solidarity.

How can we ensure that global public institutions such as those associated with the United Nations will address the pressing global problems of our time without committing abuses of power? In republicanism, participation by citizens is the primary condition for the protection of liberty. In particular, citizens are expected to be vigilant—to maintain awareness of and protest domination when and where it occurs. Global republican scholars such as James Bohman (2007) have been sensitive to this demanding ideal of citizenship. However, the grounds and mechanisms for fostering allegiance to the state—such as a joint history or language, public education, and the practice of joint participation in political decision making—are still largely absent at the global level, and this has implications for the robustness of non-dominating global public institutions. This article considers whether and how globally vigilant citizenship may be encouraged or cultivated in the short- to medium-term.

This article formulates the concept of democracy as a configuration to overcome the rigid universalist, liberal-proceduralist dominated conceptions of democracy that define invariant core elements and combine them with culturally individualistic features. Instead, the approach presented here focuses on the basic principles behind democracy. Lincoln's often-criticized broad definition of democracy as “government by, of, and for the people” provides the opportunity for an open, transglobal approach that focuses on the premise of political self-efficacy for all citizens and portrays democracy not as a mechanism but as a way of life. Political self-efficacy can be institutionalized in different ways, so this contribution refers to specific models of democracy (e.g., liberal, republican, or communitarian).

The foundation of the Kantian theory of right is the one innate right to freedom. Here, I offer a comprehensive philosophical comparison between Kantian rightful freedom and the conception of freedom as negative liberty or non-interference, a hugely influential view in terms of which Kantian rightful freedom is often understood. This fruitful comparison clarifies the fundamental differences between the two views, emphasizing the resources the Kantian approach offers for contributing to contemporary debates on freedom as a distinctive rights-based republican view. This Kantian perspective also offers a useful lens for critiquing negative-liberty-based views, revealing a dilemma they face.

Scholarship on Roman political thought and its legacy, especially anglophone, has rapidly expanded over the last decade. The main drivers of this renewed attention to Roman political ideas and institutions are an historical interest in the collapse of the Roman republic; a philosophical interest in republicanism; and a growing sensitivity to the originality of Roman thinkers, especially Cicero, in contrast to the older view that they were simply derivative of the Greeks. In this essay I will discuss recent publications on Cicero and Roman political ideas. After offering an overview of key themes in this new scholarship, I seek to suggest promising directions for future research and encourage the growing interest in Roman political thought and Cicero in particular. Cicero provides a fascinating link between ideas, institutions and action on the ground and he is therefore with good reason at the centre of much of the rapidly expanding literature on Roman political thought. In addition, given his interest in developing a theory of justice as the foundation of the state (res publica), a focus on Cicero will help explore the legacy of republicanism from the angle of his ideas about justice while paying attention to scholarship placing these ideas into their historical and institutional context.

This article develops the problem of divine domination. Classical theism describes God as essentially all-powerful, sovereign, personal, omnipresent, and a se. If such a being exists, then he dominates humans in virtue of his essential properties. Since dominative relationships are unjust, the divine-human relationship is unjust. I reject solutions to this problem that appeal to humanity’s childlikeness or divine goodness, justice, or greatness. I conclude by gesturing towards what a solution to the problem might require.

This article addresses Kant’s account of domestic labour from the standpoint of social philosophy. First, I examine the case of the domestic household servant as a paradigm of the legal legitimation of social domination in Kant’s legal philosophy. Second, I explore the intersectionality of gender, race, and class in the outsourcing of care tasks available to wealthy European women in Kant’s theory of labour. Third, I bring Kant’s theory into a critical dialogue with some contemporary challenges of a democratic and equal society. Finally, I draw some conclusions about concrete forms of intersectional domination and exploitation underpinning Kant’s republicanism, before proposing that they are clearly inconsistent, insofar as they exclude large groups of people from the republican demos, even if they essentially contribute to its social reproduction.

In this article, I defend and expand on what I call the republican view of the Kantian state’s duty to the poor. Against minimalist sceptics, I argue that the republican view makes a compelling case for the state’s duty with conceptual resources internal to Kant’s philosophy of right. Against maximalist critics, I argue that the republican view need not limit redistribution to poverty relief and that it provides resources to overcome an important interpretative challenge facing attempts at justifying more expansive redistribution on Kantian grounds.

Kant argues that civic freedom amounts to being subject to laws to which citizens could have assented. Fichte conversely argues that personal freedom is only fully realized in a state of civil freedom and that citizens are only legitimately ruled by laws to which they have explicitly agreed. This paper shows how their differing accounts are rooted in a deeper disagreement about the relationship between transcendental and empirical freedom and the role empirical citizens’ assent (Beistimmung) plays in justifying civil legislation. The confrontation also shows why reading Kant as requiring citizens’ active assent may be problematic.