This chapter conducts an in-depth examination of the US-China institutional competition within the security suborder in the Asia-Pacific region. It offers a comprehensive analysis of two distinct rounds of institutional balancing between the United States and China, which involve key forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM)-Plus, spanning the post-Cold War era. Our argument suggests that this robust rivalry in institutional balancing between the United States and China has given rise to a dynamic security architecture within the Asia-Pacific region. Within this framework, bilateralism, minilateralism, and multilateralism coexist and intersect, resulting in a complex and nuanced security architecture.

Chapter 5 analyzes the evolving security structures in East Asia since the end of World War II. What counts as security for the countries in the region and beyond, and the policy choices made accordingly, have made East Asian security the way it is today. Evolution shapes every component of international security, specifically the nation, the nature of politics, and epistemology. Conventional security theories such as the security dilemma and alliance apply to East Asia partly because Western practice and theory have become parts of East Asian practice and theoretical thinking. At the same time, East Asia had a much longer history, and was not a blank canvas for outside influence. The mixture of the old and new explains why East Asian security concepts and practices seem partly familiar and partly strange, which is characteristic of East Asian international relations.

In this chapter, I trace the negotiating history of the post-war multilateral trading system, from the 1940s to 1995 (i.e. the creation of the WTO), through the lens of poverty narratives. I show how the two main narratives emerged, and how they interacted with each other. I further explain why the narrative that 'won' and achieved dominance for the next several decades was largely unsympathetic to the cause of poverty alleviation, especially when mitigation strategies were discussed in the context of the developing world. I conduct this analysis via three negotiation landmarks, plus a fourth case of decision-making processes. The fifth section of the chapter explores the extent to which the powerlessness of the small and poor extended to other areas of international negotiation as well as other aspects of political and social life.