Commerce is not zero-sum. There are gains from trade. This insight grounded Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. This issue heralds the 250th anniversary of its publication. We consider its context, including influences such as David Hume and especially Smith’s own The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

The purpose of this essay is to explore Adam Smith’s work for ideas relevant to modern-day discourse on pluralism (understood as methodological pluralism). It is argued here that the emphasis on difference of perspective in his theory of human nature is potentially foundational for pluralism. I explore Smith’s philosophy of science, where his theory of human nature explains the motivation for building knowledge, the conduct of enquiry, and the appraisal of resulting theories. Finally, I explore exemplars of pluralist practice in Smith’s treatment of alternative approaches to economics to his own as well as in his account of different approaches to history and astronomy.

Governments are increasingly targeting academic institutions such as the Central European University in Hungary, Boğaziçi University in Turkey, or CIDE in Mexico. These attacks represent the most visible symptoms of the deterioration of academic freedom. What is the cause of this trend? We argue that populism, being a thin ideology that polarizes the public sphere into virtuous citizens and a corrupt elite while emphasizing the will of the people, has made universities and academics natural targets for leaders who seek to impose a narrative in which only they possess the truth and represent the will of the people. Universities are characterized not only by a pluralism of ideas but also possess an elitist character: these attributes are in direct conflict with the values and vision of populist leaders. To support this argument, we present a global statistical analysis correlating the degree of populism exhibited by executive leaders with the extent of academic freedoms between 2000 and 2021, based on data from the Global Populism Database and V-Dem, and we illustrate our arguments with an in-depth analysis of the case of CIDE in Mexico.

In this article, I argue for a “multifunctional account” of political feasibility and against recent attempts by several theorists to defend accounts of political feasibility that reduce feasibility judgments to a single function. According to the view I defend, political feasibility can (and should) serve multiple useful functions in our political deliberative practices. This pluralist and context-dependent approach allows us to retain the insights provided by various monofunctional accounts, while avoiding the limitations of each.

In a commercial society we see gains from trade. Entrepreneurship involves alertness to opportunities for gains from trade along with a willingness to bear risks that go with being on a frontier of innovation. Social entrepreneurship, whatever else it may be, is first of all a form of entrepreneurship.

In his widely anthologized article on the therapy-enhancement distinction, Resnik argues that, from a moral point of view, the claim that something is not health related cannot be a dispositive argument against the permissibility of enhancements. He further states how the permissibility of an intervention will depend on considerations like the intention for its use and the likely consequences that will ensue, and whether these violate any moral standards. Within this framework, in this paper I first argue that enhancements may be morally permissible on autonomy grounds (its political conception); and secondly, that this permissibility does not dissolve a moral distinction between therapies and enhancements, with the reason being that there is still a difference between something being generally permissible (i.e., therapies) and something being conditionally permissible (i.e., enhancements). But that is not all that is important for a moral therapy-enhancement distinction. I also argue that the distinction — apart from being about “permissibility” (at the level of regulation of individual use) — is also about regarding justice more broadly (at the level of what is owed to individuals). What captures the moral distinction more fully is that therapies are, generally speaking, not only morally permissible but also owed to persons (due to being enablers of social cooperation and competition), whereas, at this stage, enhancements can only be morally permissible. I demonstrate the appeal of this view by considering its stability and usefulness across specialized bioethical contexts and across various kinds of enhancements and show that its practical value for policy lies in its legitimizing / anticipatory and prioritizing functions.

In this contribution we ask how Přibáň’s theoretical choices shape the capacity of ‘European constitutional imaginaries’ to account for the ever more necessary work of recognition and redistribution within European society. While ‘European constitutional imaginaries’ reveal the intricate ideologies at play within European law and politics, as well as their power in motivating dominant currents of European political life, the project remains limited in that it accepts essential tenets of functional differentiation in society, obscuring the conditions of possibility for the formation of differentiated systems. Put differently, ‘European constitutional imaginaries’, both as forms of life and analytic concepts, have difficulty in conceiving the frontiers of imaginaries, their beginning and end, their formation and transformation—and in so doing, risk naturalizing their initial differentiation as a priori excluded from political contestation.

This article examines the democratic potential of global network governance. It critiques conventional legitimacy frameworks that focus on the institutional qualities of governance networks for evading deeper ethical questions about how to deal with diversity as a fundamental condition of global life. Drawing on contestation theory, English School pluralism, and radical democratic theory, I argue that democratic network governance thrives by embracing diverse norm interpretations and fostering agonistic engagement among its members. I illustrate how this idea can guide a critical analysis of global governance networks through a case study of humanitarian governance in Southeast Asia. I assess to what extent diverse humanitarian actors have been able to assert and practise their own interpretations of humanitarian norms, how they relate to the fact that others advance competing understandings, and whether the boundaries for legitimate norm enactments are drawn on legitimate grounds. By highlighting the ethical significance of these dynamics from a pluralist standpoint, the study offers a novel way of thinking about democracy in a world that is characterised by complex policy problems, diffuse authority, and vocal demands for recognition by an increasingly diverse array of actors.