Blame for the pointless attacks and scorn for men’s lives that the Italian commanders were so often prone to is usually set down to the evil doctrines of Luigi Cadorna’s notorious libretto rosso, probably the war’s most execrated book of regulations. Yet the red booklet was no eccentric anomaly in the prevailing military climate of Europe. Cadorna’s recommendations were consistent with the cult of the offensive, faith in the bayonet charge, and harping on moral principles as the key to victory that could be found in all international military teaching in summer 1914. The real problem was that the commander of the Italian army then proved unable to adapt to the disquieting novelties of a war based on materials and trench combat. More and more problematically, Italy’s Supreme Command went on issuing orders designed for a quite different war than was actually being experienced by the frontline troops.

This chapter examines the presence and role(s) played by elite women in military camps during the early Principate. The chapter starts with a consideration of our sources for elite women and the nature of Roman authors’ treatment of military women. Status consciousness was ever present so the authors define which women could be considered as elite in military settings. After reviewing evidence for elite women in camps the authors examine elite women through the lens of Agrippina the Elder. As a member of the imperial family Agrippina received an unusual level of attention from ancient authors which results in more evidence about her activities in camp. Comparing Agrippina’s behavior with the diverse evidence for other elite women yields a sense of how these women were comporting themselves in military settings. The study reveals that elite women were not disruptive troublemakers. Perhaps not surprisingly, elite women behaved in accordance with Roman culture expectations and elite gender norms, as would have been expected of a Roman matrona.

This chapter explores the topic of Roman military families’ mobility in the late first through third centuries CE by discussing a case study of British families abroad. It surveys the evidence for families that came from Roman Britain and settled on the continent. In doing so, the author assesses and compares various types of evidence (literary, epigraphic, and archaeological) to discuss the case of British military families on the move, families that had been present in the Roman Empire but not accounted for in the modern scholarly literature. The sources analyzed include literary texts, inscriptions, military diplomas and personal dress accessories that the members of such families took with them as part of personal possessions during their travels. Since most sources available to trace such families come from the Roman military context, the focus lies on emigrant soldiers’ families. The first section relies heavily on the historical texts and epigraphic material while the second part is devoted to the discussion of the potential and limitations of material culture in our search for migrant communities. The chapter provides a case to support the view that British military families traveled far and wide in the empire.

This chapter examines how the episode in Pliny Ep. 6.31.4−6 relates to Roman concepts of gender and warfare. The emperor Trajan judged the case of Gallitta, a military tribune’s wife who had committed adultery with a centurion. Since the reign of Augustus adultery had been criminalized. The Augustan legislation on marriage and adultery has received much scholarly attention, but relatively little has been paid to cases involving military officers. This study argues that the repression of adultery and the control of officers’ wives culturally maintained military discipline, in particular the hierarchy of command. Adultery in this instance subverted military hierarchy; the young officer’s cuckolding of his senior and his failure to display self-control vitiated his fitness for command. The stability of the imperial order depended on the reinforcement of normative gender roles on the frontiers as well as in the city of Rome.

Throughout most of the Anglo-French Wars of 1793-1815, the burden of defending France’s interests against Britain fell primarily upon its navy. Having suffered several major defeats and the loss of New France and other colonies, France and its navy re-emerged to contest Britain’s dominance at sea during the American Revolutionary War in1778-1783. Although the French navy had scored several strategic victories for their American allies, the defeat at the Battle of the Saints in 1782 left France with little to show for its efforts except a massive debt. As a navy required extensive logistical systems to mobilize both its resources and manpower, this endeavour presented ever increasingly strenuous challenge to the French monarchy. Faced with needs to modernize both its fiscal, social, and political structures, the French monarchy failed to navigate the tumultuous process of reform. While the resulting French Revolution removed some of the impediments to reform, it also presented its own difficulties as revolutionary principles often clashed with the needs of military service. Although Napoleon Bonaparte brought relatively stability to France and invested massive amount of resources to regenerate the French navy, his insatiable desire for aggrandizing the French Empire and the nearly constant state of war made it difficult to achieve his naval aspirations.

Building on a comprehensive conscription system established ahead of the French Wars, the Habsburg Monarchy could raise armies almost as large as those available to Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. But fielding a large force was not enough to win. Among the more prominent factors undermining Austria’s military capacity was the collective ethos of her officers, whose meagre pay, low social standing, and limited promotion opportunities bred indifference to military professionalism. While reform efforts by the talented Archduke Charles substantially improved the fighting effectiveness of the Habsburg troops, the Archduke never enjoyed the full trust of the emperor. Against Charles’ advice, in 1805 the army was pushed unprepared into war, resulting in a crushing defeat. In spite of far better military performance in 1809, the Monarchy’s attempt to take on the Napoleonic Empire single-handedly led to another costly failure. Forced to scale down its army in the Peace of Schönbrunn, Austria covertly retained much of its veteran manpower. In 1812, while nominally a French ally, further arrangements were set for a rapid expansion and training of her forces. When the Habsburgs have re-joined the war against Napoleon, the size and quality of the Austrian contingent tipped the balance in favour of the Allied Coalition ensuring Napoleon’s final defeat.