This chapter analyses compliance motivations and their alignment with existing taxonomies: extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivations, cooperation vs. coercion, and trust-based vs. monitoring-based approaches. It then explores the advantages of voluntary compliance over coerced compliance, both in the short term and in the long term.

This concluding chapter highlights the important contributions that this volume makes in featuring the diversity of forms of leadership in the ancient world and in illustrating how ancient people were asking questions about leadership that we should be asking more often today. It further argues that future research on ancient leadership should help readers to draw connections among the different forms of leadership in the ancient world, especially those readers who are not expert in ancient studies, and also to draw lessons that can help us better lead and better select our leaders. Ancient leadership studies need to play a vital role in helping us understand contemporary leadership as a moral, creative and collaborative art that we can all learn from one another.

As the situation in South Vietnam deteriorates, American Catholics wrestle with the morality of American intervention in Vietnam in light of Vatican II. A triangular relationship develops among those who support US intervention, those who oppose it, and those who are critical of the methods employed by the US and its South Vietnamese ally.

After President Lydon Johnson announces a massive increase in US troop levels in South Vietnam, American Catholics become more deeply engaged in debating the war, particularly in terms of morality. The radical Baltimore protest attracts attention to the Catholic antiwar movement.

Because the full reconstruction emerges piecemeal over the course of the study, this chapter starts by summarizing the most fundamental ways in which Aquinas connects the big-picture elements of his ethics through his understanding of happiness, both individual and common. The chapter then offers reasons for thinking that Aquinas’s ethics of happiness is still worth taking seriously today. In particular, it focuses on three illustrative aspects that make Aquinas’s ethical views distinctive and appealing. The first is Aquinas’s account of the nature of happiness and how that account fits into his broader understanding of well-being. The second is Aquinas’s account of the relationship between the right and the good. The third is Aquinas’s account of the most comprehensive role that virtue plays in ethics and human life.

When the Abbey Theatre faced rioters in 1926 during the first performances of The Plough and the Stars, the theatre managers decided to continue with the scheduled seven-night run and then to revive the piece three months later. However, despite that boldness in the face of opposition, O’Casey subsequently found himself confronted with various kinds of official and unofficial censorship, both in Ireland and elsewhere. This chapter details that censorship and describes its effect on O’Casey’s work and reputation. The chapter examines O’Casey’s work in the theatre, and also examines censorship of O’Casey’s nontheatrical work, such as Windfalls, I Knock at the Door, and Pictures in the Hallway.

Based on the degree of trust established in infancy, the belief in the possibility of control from the toddler period, and the successfulness of practice in peer interactions in the preschool, most children are prepared for the new meanings made possible by close friendships and real world competence of the elementary years. At times, success here can alter somewhat negative meanings brought forward from earlier eras. All children are now armed with logic and a more realistic understanding of causality. This allows them to see things as they are, including comparisons between them and others. A great leap in moral development occurs as children come to understand and affirm the value of rules and norms. Despite limitations in their degree of flexibility, embracing these norms can provide solid ground for the more relativistic and principled understanding of adolescence.

Chapter III delves into the discursive mechanisms through which former Israeli conscripts in this study understood, justified and/or distanced themselves from the violent regime in which they serve(d) – relating this to the broader context of ‘moralised militarism’ so frequently attributed to the Israeli military. Through analysis of the speech acts, moralisations and emotive articulations by former and current soldiers, I argue that traits of emotional expression, reflection and critique – far from being anomalies of militarised masculinity in this context – are central to its legitimation and idealisation, enabling the soldier, and society more broadly, to retain their sense of humanity amidst enduring violence. Rather than performances of stoicism and emotional control with which ‘traditional’ forms of militarised masculinity are normatively associated, a more philosophical, emotive, and cerebral approach to violence appears to be celebrated and encouraged within Israeli militarism – consolidating the supposed relation between militarism, masculinity, and moralism in the settler-colonial state.

This short epilogue concludes the book, with a brief reflection on MacCormick’s final book, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (2008), where MacCormick confronted his own impending death from cancer, and where he once again articulated a relational approach to ethics, politics, and law.

This chapter investigates what Primo Levi called the space “which separates the victims from the persecutors.” It uses historical examination, an anthropological approach to morality, and a historiographical review of writing to assess such “gray zones.” These can include stealing food, the role of Jewish physicians, the Sonderkommandos, or decisions made by prisoner functionaries.

Recent empirical work demonstrates that some instances of material deception are perceived by ordinary people as consent-defeating, whereas other instances are not. One hypothesized account of these divergent lay intuitions draws on the notion of “essence”: Roughly speaking, lies that pertain to the “core” or “nature” of a consented-to act are perceived as precluding consent, whereas lies that pertain to features that are “nonessential” or “collateral” to the act are perceived as compatible with consent. To assess this hypothesized account, an independent measure of “essence” – one that does not rely with problematic circularity on notions of consent – is needed. This chapter draws on an emerging cognitive science literature that deploys linguistic probes to investigate how people intuitively represent human action. Here, we will consider two such probes, the “by” test and the “basically doing” test, and observe that whereas the former predicts judgments of consent, the latter does not.

Pleasure was a problem for members of the Roman elite – or so moralists felt. In his treatise on the good life, Seneca stresses the insidious threat posed by the attractions of sensual pleasure, while asserting that only the subhuman will want to surrender themselves completely ... Seneca’s language presents pleasure as fluid, both engulfing and invading its hapless victims. His insistence on its seductive dangers could be read as betraying a certain fascination with pleasure.