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In this chapter, I detail some of the main considerations that have led contemporary epistemologist to largely reject non-attitudinal accounts, which conceive of agnosticism chiefly in terms of a combined absence of belief and disbelief, in favour of views that see agnosticism as involving one or more attitudes. I conclude with a brief survey of the major contemporary attitudinal accounts of agnosticism.
In this chapter, I apply the criteria vetted in Chapter 2 to the non-attitudinal accounts of Russell and Crawford, the metacognitive accounts of Masny and Raleigh, Wagner’s endorsed-indecision account, and Friedman’s question-directed attitude account. I demonstrate that each account fails to satisfy one or more of the criteria for a satisfactory descriptive account of agnosticism.
We often describe ourselves as agnostic on a wide range of topics, such as does God exist, is String Theory true, or will the President win re-election? But what, precisely, does it mean to be agnostic? This monograph employs the tools and techniques of analytic philosophy to offer a broad account of what it means to be agnostic in both theological and non-theological contexts, and offers a critical discussion of the major descriptive accounts of agnosticism in the contemporary analytic philosophical literature. Unlike most other volumes on the subject, which approach the question from a theological point of view, this is the first book-length discussion of agnosticism from a purely philosophical, as opposed to theological, point of view. It serves as a natural starting-point for students and specialists in philosophy and anyone who is interested in the topic of agnosticism through the lens of analytic philosophy.
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