The advent of Islam in Arabia created a new regional actor: the Rashidun Caliphate. Later caliphates inherited the vast territories of expansion accrued under the Rashidun. The ordeal of civil war was the crucible from which the Umayyad Caliphate arose. Civil crisis had a lasting influence on both the strategic setting and then environment within which successive Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs had to contend. Unity and unification of the caliphate was a necessary political objective for the duration of all caliphates. The Umayyads fused their right to political legitimacy with their military prowess and notions of divine providence. The ideological dependency of the Umayyad Caliphate to an aggressive policy of security-maximising expansionism was predicated upon a politically legitimating doctrine of perpetual war which constantly directed strategic decision making. The dependency upon war serving as the only strategic instrument subordinated to the political ends of security, the Umayyad leadership was distracted from managing growing internal dissent and covert factions brewing rebellion and eventual revolution. The Abbasid Revolution of AD 750 not only ended the Umayyad House, but effectively sheathed the doctrine of perpetual war that the Umayyad Caliphate had wielded for nearly a century. The Abbasids squandered the vast territorial and strategic inheritance within decades of wrestling power. The early course of the Rashidun, Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, was consistently one of political and territorial expansion followed by structural fragmentation, civil strife and subsequent collapse.

In the first half of the thirteenth century, Mongol forces launched raids into areas that are now parts of Iraq and Syria. Raids turned into conquest with Hülegü’s movement into the region in the mid-1250s. Baghdad was taken in 1258, and by spring 1260, much of Syria was overrun by Mongol forces. A small Mongol army, however, was defeated by the Mamluks from Egypt in northern Palestine later that year. After a clear border was established along the Euphrates, for sixty years the Mamluks and Ilkhanids struggled for regional supremacy in major battles, frontier warfare, and diplomatic démarches. Around 1320, this conflict ended after negotiations, with peace agreements in place until the breakup of the Ilkhanate after 1335. Although ultimately unsuccessful in conquering lands beyond Iraq, the impact of the Mongols on greater Syria, Egypt, and Arabia was significant, not only militarily, but in the realm of demography, culture, and economy.

Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1798 invasion of Egypt represented the first modern attempt to incorporate an Islamic society into the European fold. Although the expedition was a military fiasco, it left a lasting legacy in the region. The invasion constituted the formative moment for the discourse of Orientalism, when all of its ideological components converged and a full arsenal of instruments of Western domination was employed to protect it. The occupation itself did little to modernize Egyptian society, because the revolutionary principles that the French tried to introduce were too radical and foreign, and met determined local resistance. But Napoleon created a political vacuum in Egypt that was soon filled by Kavalali Mehmet Ali Pasha, who, within a decade of the French departure, began laying the foundation for the reformed and modernized Egypt that later would play such an important role in the Middle East.

The authoritative texts of the Shāfiʿī school such as the Minhāj began to be circulated, interpreted and advanced across the Indian Ocean rim, where its largest followers had started to take up residence. This transoceanic transmission was mediated by other texts in the interim, mainly by the commentaries of the Minhāj. This chapter analyses the commentarial intermediation between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century with a focus on one commentary, Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj (Tuḥfa) by Ibn al-Ḥajar al-Haytamī, an Egyptian jurist who built up a successful career in Mecca. The trajectories of this commentary reflect many of the contemporary developments in political and cultural realms, such as the decline of the Mamlūks, the rise of the Ottomans and their conquest of the Middle East, and the increased mobility toward Mecca and beyond to the Hijaz. The Tuḥfa addressed its immediate regional contexts, while reasserting the geo-cultural superiority of Mecca and the Hijaz and the racial prominence of the Arabs. Its approach was challenged by Ibn Ḥajar’s colleagues from Cairo through their commentaries. Just as Nawawī once amalgamated two ṭarīqas, now commentators on his Minhāj were divided into two sub-schools.

“A text that revolutionised the Shāfiʿī school of law” is the best way to characterise the law book Minhāj, the central subject of this chapter. Soon after it was written in Damascus in the thirteenth century, it acquired an immense popularity among Shāfiʿī jurists, to the extent that no other text of the school ever achieved. In the following centuries, it not only influenced but also framed the very ways in which they discoursed about their school. It inspired generations of jurists in their legal-textual praxis, leading to the production of a copious amount of commentaries, supercommentaries, abridgements, poetic renderings, etc., and that continues to today. Its story presents an interesting phenomenon in the histories of Islamic law, law and Islam at large. This chapter explores its inception and trajectories. It asks why so many jurists engaged with the text and what made it so idiosyncratic that it influenced the textual discourses of such a large community across centuries. Embedded in the larger commentarial mode of juridical advancements of the time, it argues that Nawawī codified the school’s diverse opinions while synthesising the existing divisions. His own detailed engagements with the broader textual corpus of the school in his other works provided material for him to bring out a concise, comprehensive and coherent work that would address larger pedagogical and juridical requirements.

This chapter argues that in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries the early Ming and the Timurid Empire can very much be thought of as post-Chinggisid polities. Timur (Tamerlane) very deliberately fashioned himself after Genghis Khan, but the early Ming rulers such as Hongwu and Yongle also very much understood sovereignty in the manner of their Chinggisid predecessors. As a result, both the Timurid and the early Ming manifested ambitions of world empire and recognition as well and came close to constructing a world order we may call 'bipolar' in our time. This is the story told in this chapter, as well the demise of this would-be world order in the middle of the fifteenth century – the Timurids lost control over their realm and the Ming jettisoned Chinggisid norms, turning increasingly isolationist. The chapter speculates whether the fragmentation of this world order may have something to do with a period of continental crisis in the middle of the fifteenth century, which caused a coin shortage and disrupted trade flows.

The Black Sea, Russia, and eastern Europe exported slaves throughout the medieval period. Most had been born free but were enslaved through capture or occasionally through sale by relatives. During the eighth through tenth centuries, slaves were traded from eastern Europe and the Baltic to elite households in Byzantium and the Islamic world via the Dniepr and Volga river systems, the Carolingian empire, and Venice. In the thirteenth century, the structure of this slave trade changed as a result of the Mongol invasion of eastern Europe, Italian colonization of the Black Sea, the success of the Mamluk state, and the crusading activities of the Teutonic Knights in the Baltic. People enslaved in the Baltic now tended to be traded westward rather than eastward; people enslaved in eastern Europe and the Caucasus tended to pass through the Black Sea into Italian, Mamluk, or Ottoman hands; and people enslaved in the Balkans were trafficked primarily by Venetians or Ottomans. Many aspects of this trade deserve further study, however, such as political marginality and decentralization as factors that enabled slaving; violations of the principle that slaves should come from a different religious background than their owners; and the logistics of local slave trades.

The Kurdish principalities that were renown since the Middle Ages have soon developed an ambiguous relationship with central states. They used the social and political specificities of their lands and the binarity of imperial powers situation in order to thrive. The Mamluk (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries) and Ottoman (sixteenth to twentieth centuries) eras seem to share some features as for the Kurdish configuration. Both realms intended to integrate while keeping a differentiated Kurdish space aside their core territory as a resource against Iranian (Ilkhani and Safavi) attacks. Although the Mamluks did not fully aggregate a Kurdish entity, two centuries later the Sublime Porte finally made this leap and created a fully Ottoman Kurdistan. The circumstances under which autonomy was granted to Kurdish principalities that recognized the one and only Ottoman rule were multifaceted. To take a few factors at stake, the troubled political situation that preceded the incorporation of Kurdistan, the deal that the Ottoman bureaucrats, among which the infamous Idrîs Bidlisi, crafted for the Kurdish mirs as well as their religious siding, were crucial. However, the process of full integration of Kurdish lands into the Ottoman imperium resumed at the end of the nineteenth century by crushing the weapons it once utilized against their neighbours.

The reign of al-Mustansir represents a continuum to al-Nasir's in terms of the stability of a caliphal state centered on the region of Iraq and Khuzistan. With the primary focus of Mongol invasions on Russia and Eastern Europe, the Abbasids thrive with affinity to the Ayyubids and Rum Seljuks. The Abbasid construction of the Mustansiriyya madrasa marks a new type of patronage for a project that diverged from previously endowed structures, such as caravanserais and Sufi lodges. The inclusion of all four Sunni sects of jurisprudence changed the idea of the madrasa while the generous support for students indicated Abbasid affluence. New wavesin the arts (the Baghdad school of manuscript painting) and architectural decorative forms (the girih and the muqarnas) flourish alongside developments in Arabic calligraphy with the famous Yaqut al-Musta'simi. A situation of Mongol belligerence and Abbasid disarray in the reign of the last caliph, al-Musta'sim, accelerates the pace to the conquest of Baghdad in 1258. A shadow Abbasid caliphate lives on in Mamluk Egypt until the Ottoman conquest in 1517.

This chapter first reviews the normative bases for penal state violence, in particular for capital punishment and torture, in Islamic law and Islamic political theory. The chapter then moves on to discuss a number of examples of violent punishments, culled from Islamic historiography, first from the reign of the Seljuq sultans of Persia, Iraq and Syria (c. 1040-1194) and then, second, from that of the Mamluk sultans of Egypt and Syria (c. 1250-1517). It argues that a gradual shift took place in this period, supported by changes in the legal doctrine of torture and punishment based on utilitarian considerations of the public interest, towards a proliferation of violent punishment and torture. By the end of the Mamluk period, the law was so underdetermined and so riddled with loopholes that only little opposition could be mounted to check the rising tide of penal violence by the state.