Drawing on the diary of Heinrich Krone, Chapter 1 opens by exploring social and cultural changes in West Germany at the end of Konrad Adenauer’s long ascendancy. The Christian Democratic milieu was losing its lock on politics, and the successes of German integration into Atlantic and European communities gave rise to new questions about whether NATO or the EEC had precedence; how German unity could be pursued in the face of détente; and what relationships were possible with the Soviet bloc. Adenauer’s choice was to intensify relations with de Gaulle’s France, with the 1963 Elysée Treaty defining the partnership between France and West Germany as a Cold War bulwark against détente and the USSR. This approach was challenged and significantly modified by the chancellor’s critics in the Bundestag, who feared alienating the United States and pushed for Ludwig Erhard to replace Adenauer. Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder pushed for a “policy of movement,” intended to represent the cause of German unity more forcefully. Controversies over military aid, relations with Israel, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty showed that Adenauer’s long delay in resigning had left a vacuum of leadership.

World War II memories constitute the backdrop of Chapter 3. The Auschwitz Trials presented a daily reminder of German crimes; and a stretch of 20-year anniversaries from D-Day to V-E Day provided numerous occasions to invoke the “politics of the past” in putting pressure on Erhard’s Germany. The USSR, Britain, and France all aimed to forestall the MLF project, blocking West German access to nuclear weapons. France also won significant concessions on EEC agricultural policy from Bonn, thanks to de Gaulle’s ability to mobilize “Gaullists” in the CDU/CSU against the chancellor. In the face of intense Israeli pressure, Erhard’s panicky decisionmaking created a Middle East debacle in spring 1965; Bonn canceled its tank deliveries but established diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, prompting ten Arab states to break relations. West German leaders felt increasingly isolated. Even U.S. opinion wearied of West German rigidity, particularly when German cabinet ministers seemed to contest the territorial status quo in Poland or Czechoslovakia. Real interest in promoting German unity was waning among all of Bonn’s allies; Bonn was at an impasse.

Chapter 2 outlines Ludwig Erhard’s efforts to position West Germany as a Cold War partner to the United States, as pledged during a visit to Lyndon Johnson’s ranch in December 1963. Defense minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel strongly advocated German participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF); and he and Erhard signed off on a $1.35 billion offset agreement calling for massive purchases of U.S. weapons. They also agreed to a secret scheme to funnel surplus U.S.-built M-48 tanks to Israel. The Bundestag refused to sanction German deployments overseas, however – whether peacekeeping in Cyprus or a field hospital to Vietnam. “Gaullists” within Erhard’s CDU/CSU party, notably Franz Josef Strauss, complained about Erhard’s neglect of France, and his decision to placate Johnson by refusing a trade mission to China. Motion toward German unity remained stalled; Erhard’s idea of “buying off” the USSR with massive economic aid went nowhere, as did Gerhard Schröder’s policy of “small steps” toward the East. A holiday pass arrangement allowing visits across the Berlin Wall, arranged by Mayor Willy Brandt, offered the strongest evidence for Germans’ sense of belonging together.