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Hu Yaobang's death sparked student protests in Beijing, which escalated when protesters felt ignored by officials after Hu's memorial service on April 22, 1989. General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Premier Li Peng disagreed about how to handle the protests before Zhao left for North Korea on April 23. In Zhao's absence, Li and other officials presented their views to Deng Xiaoping, who labeled the protests "turmoil," sparking a march of approximately 100,000 people disputing this characterization.
There were many alternatives to shooting unarmed civlians in Beijing. Soldiers or police could have used non-deadly force. Leaders could have ignored the protesters and waited them out. More military officials could have followed the lead of General Xu Qinxian, who refused to carry out martial law, or of He Yanran, who passively resisted on June 4, 1989, and allowed soldiers under his command to disperse. The massacre was not inevitable.
There were escalating sources of unhappiness and frustration during the 1980s in China, including anti-crime campaigns, crackdowns on student protests, the one-child policy, corruption, inflation, and an ossified political system characterized by old-man politics. These problems added up to a volatile situation in 1989.
Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng clashed on how to handle the student protests, with Zhao arguing for a more open press and for democratic and legal solutions. Students declared a hunger strike shortly before Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. Millions of Beijing residents hit the streets to support the hunger strikers. Deng Xiaoping decided to impose martial law. When Zhao Ziyang refused to implement martial law, Deng decided to replace Zhao as general secretary with Shanghai Party secretary Jiang Zemin.
In late May and early June 1989, Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng prepared the People's Liberation Army to enter Beijing and forcibly clear Tiananmen Square.
Details remain murky about the order for the PLA to open fire on protesters, but it is clear that there was an order. Soldiers received verbal orders permitting them to shoot as they advanced toward Tiananmen Square on June 3.
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