Chapter 4 turns to legal maxims, the second core element of Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s legal philosophy. Beginning with a survey of the evolution of maxim terminology in Shāfiʿī law from the third/ninth to the fifth/eleventh century, I show that Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām was influenced by maxim-based legal reasoning in the works of prominent Khurasani Shāfiʿī jurists. He applied their analytic method to develop his own maxims, which he extracted from substantive law and then used them to analyze the purposes and values of the law discursively. Within Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s legal philosophy, maxims constitute a bridge between the established body of legal precedents and the abstract discourse about the telos of the law as the realization of human well-being.

Chapter 3 focuses on Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s theorization of maṣlaḥa, one of the two core features of his legal philosophy. I first sketch the evolution of maṣlaḥa in the Shāfiʿī school in the centuries before Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām and then analyze his own theory of maṣlaḥa, its underlying moral philosophy, its legal normativity, and its debt to Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s Khurasani Shāfiʿī predecessors. The chapter also considers the challenges to the law’s rationality and morality in the Damascene milieu that likely motivated Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s development of his theory of maṣlaḥa.

The introduction explores the idea of an Islamic legal philosophy within the broader history and historiography of Islamic thought. It situates Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s career and reputation in historical and contemporary sources and situates his contribution in the fields and debates of Islamic intellectual and legal history. It explains the importance of the study and the key contributions it makes. Finally, it presents an overview of the sources used in the study and an outline of each of the book’s chapters.

The conclusion examines how elements of Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s legal philosophy were advanced, reconstituted, or sidelined in the centuries after his death until the present day. It argues that the compilations of maxims, distinctions, and ashbāh spawned by Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s project share inextricable connections and are, together, functionally constitutive of Islamic legal philosophy as a single discipline; and therefore, that none of them can be meaningfully studied in isolation. It also reconstructs how interest in Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s project was rekindled and his legacy contested amidst debates about Islamic legal reform in the twentieth century.

Chapter 6 traces the influence of Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s legal philosophy both during his lifetime and after his death. Its impact is visible in the scholarship of his students and in the continuing transmission, circulation, and teaching of his ideas and writings across regions and legal schools. I attribute the enduring appeal of Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s legal philosophy to the novel legal concepts and forms of legal reasoning that he introduced and developed and that were subsequently taken up by his students and their intellectual descendants. These concepts have given rise to dedicated literatures that evolved into diverse genres whose genealogies, I argue, can be traced back to Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s Qawāʿid.

Chapter 5 returns to Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s biography to examine his attempts to embody, apply, and disseminate his legal philosophy among diverse classes: scholars, students of the law, and a non-specialist public in Damascus and later in Cairo, where he retired. I demonstrate that Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s public activism and frequent embroilment in political controversy are best understood as manifestations of these efforts. I outline the connections between his legal philosophy and the socioreligious goals he pursued, highlighting the continuity between his theoretical scholarship and his embodied activism.

The closing chapter of the book illustrates the practical implications of Kant’s political and legal philosophy for climate change. Texts like the Doctrine of Right and Toward Perpetual Peace are used to rethink the complex political and collective challenges of the climate crisis. These, once again, confound the individualist and nonconsequentialist standard reading of Kant. First, I argue that Kant’s state of nature theorizing leads to prescriptions that are compatible with and justify coercive domestic and international policy to address the crisis. Second, I zoom out to consider whether Kant’s political philosophy as a whole remains too conservative or outdated to provide guidance regarding deep climate adaptation, mitigation, and radical institutional reform, answering in the negative. I close by discussing political obligations owed to peoples, interpreted in the face of the Hobbesian call for a global climate leviathan.

This Introduction situates Reinach and the Foundations of Private Law, and Adolf Reinach, in contemporary currents in private law theory and philosophy.

This Introduction situates Reinach and the Foundations of Private Law, and Adolf Reinach, in contemporary currents in private law theory and philosophy.

The introduction serves a threefold purpose. First, it aims to sensitise the reader to the all-pervasiveness of humanity in international criminal justice, more in particular in the discourse on the atrocity crimes. This part of the introduction argues that the concept of humanity provokes more questions than it is meant to solve. Second, it outlines the book’s methodology to the reader. Third, the introduction sketches the main argument of the book through an overview of the chapters.

Contestations about the contents and validity of laws and legal principles are fundamental to the (international) legal profession. After all, when engaging with legal norms, disagreements about their meaning and validity a central part of the day-to-day work of legal professionals specialising in international law, including legal counsel representing governments, international judges, legal officers working for international organisations and non-governmental organisations, and legal academics. We propose a practice-oriented approach to empirically research such interpretive legal contestations by groups of legal professionals. Using an interdisciplinary perspective, we contribute to IR norms research by drawing on not only IR practice theory, but also Bourdieu-inspired research within the Sociology of International Law and ongoing discussions on legal realism in International Legal Theory, including what we have called European New Legal Realism. After outlining how to implement our approach using either a Bourdieusian perspective or the concept of communities of practice, we use normative contestations in and around climate change law to illustrate its added value. Such an approach not only promises to make interpretive legal contestations visible empirically, but also emphasises how interpretive legal contestations matter as they reflect underlying power dynamics and may result in normative legal change in practice.

This chapter provides a contextual overview of the development and operation of the British prize court system. It then introduces the specific legal rules and precedents, specifically the Rule of the War of 1756, that were developed by Britain during the Seven Years’ War in the pursuit of negotiating neutral rights to Britain’s strategic advantage. The chapter critiques the historiography on the Rule of the War of 1756 and makes the argument that the development of the rule and its influence in subsequent wars can only be understood if its strategic drivers are taken into account. The Rule, in other words, was as much a creation of strategic thinking as it was of legal thinking.