Karl Schafer develops an account of reason in its theoretical use and argues that a proper appreciation of the end of reason puts one in a position to see that, while Kant rejects the rationalist claim that we can know or cognize the unconditioned, he nonetheless accepts that we are rationally committed to a form of doctrinal belief in the bare existence of something unconditioned. Kant thus takes reason’s interest in systematic comprehension to commit us, even from the perspective of theoretical reason (albeit only on “subjectively sufficient” grounds), to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason – specifically, the proposition that every finite, conditioned thing is ultimately grounded in something unconditioned.

This brief chapter considers what we mean by knowledge, explanation and understanding, aspects that have and remain areas of debate in the philosophy of science. Despite scientists referring to these aspects routinely in ways that suggest their meaning is clear, examples are given that suggest the terms can actually be used in various ways by different people. It is important to consider what is being claimed and why in a claimed explanation or a claim to understanding, because the terms carry different weights and subjectively mean different things. This can lead to confusion and errors of reasoning that can constrain a field.

Stephen Engstrom argues that judgments that amount to knowledge constitute the end of the faculty of understanding. This implies that true judgments and false judgments are not on par in relation to the attainment of this end. False judgments are incomplete realizations of the understanding whose explanation requires reference to a factor that prevents it from attaining its end. Engstrom takes this to show that truth is essential to judgment (and belongs to its form) whereas falsity is not. This is reflected in our original, a priori understanding of judgment, according to which the capacity to judge is the capacity to know (rather than the capacity, say, to judge either truly or falsely). In an appendix, Engstrom relates this account to the notion of objective validity.

This chapter lays out two key tasks in reading Scripture that Augustine identifies in the Confessions, and especially in his exegesis of Genesis: “the task of grasping meaning” and “the task of grasping truth.” The first task is that of discerning authorial intention; the second is that of “seeing for oneself that what the author is saying is in fact the case.” The task of grasping meaning is difficult in part because of the peculiar character of the Scriptures; they are both accessible to all, using ordinary language (which is open to misinterpretation), and yet full of profundities that only the wisest readers can come to appreciate. It is also difficult because we cannot really know what is in another person’s mind; any judgments about authorial intention are provisional at best, and only pride would claim to have identified the uniquely correct interpretation. The task of grasping truth is likewise difficult. When it comes to intelligible realities, Truth speaks inwardly, not through any text, even that of Scripture. When it comes to historical realities, including the central truths about the life of the Incarnate Word, we cannot have knowledge in the fullest sense.

Wetlands have deep geological histories, stories of bedrock, sediment, and sea rise. But the direction and speed of flow has been shaped just as surely by human interests and intervention. This chapter asks how wetland commons were used, managed, and disputed in the centuries and decades prior to improvement projects. Moving from the action of ice sheets and mosses to national legislation and daily work, it examines how environmental and political scales intersected. By the late sixteenth century, communities in the northern fens faced amplified flood risks and conflict over shared commons. But these challenges did not necessarily strengthen intervention by state-sanctioned institutions capable of coordinating at a larger scale. A less linear and more fragmented picture emerges in the northern fens, where environmental politics pivoted on rights and responsibilities defined by local custom. Fen custom was reproduced by communal decision-making and participatory acts of walking, remembering, and working. It formed a flexible fabric, adapted in response to dynamic waterways and porous boundaries and negotiated through confrontations on riverbanks as well as courtrooms.

How did mapping and measurement act as technologies of improvement? By the early seventeenth century, a professional class of surveyors had emerged in England, promoting concepts of geometric justice in print. They also integrated their services into crown estate management, promising to make forest and fen commons profitable. Much has been written about the spread of cartographic literacy among early modern elites, but relatively little is known about how local communities interacted with maps, surveys, and their makers. Fen projects brought the geometric techniques of improvement into contact with local customary knowledge. Examining maps and surveys of the northern fens across three centuries, this chapter traces how they were produced; how they re-organised social environments; and how fen communities negotiated these processes. It situates surveying as one epistemological tool within disputes over the redrawing of land and water in Hatfield Level, which involved legal officials, written documents, crowds, experiential knowledge, and oral testimony. Intended to author and authorise improvement, the boundaries that maps and surveys demarcated did not prove stable.

This chapter illustrates how Greek and Arabic sources influenced the thinking of early scholastic theologians working on the topic of human nature in four main areas. These are debates about the powers of the soul, the composition of the soul, the relationship between the body and the soul, and the theory of knowledge.

This chapter describes the excitement surrounding scientific progress as a driver of medical progress in the Cold War and subsequent theoretical and practical challenges. Medicine, for skeptical theories, was a powerful example that there is no such thing as knowledge that continually approaches the truth, that even the body is historical, and that knowledge is always a tool of the powerful. From the medical side, some respondents were adamant that scientific knowledge about the body is “real” and that medicine is uniquely immune to uncertainties inherent in relativistic accounts of knowledge. The chapter concludes by analyzing two recent examples, evidence-based medicine and health artificial intelligence, which have been praised as objective examples of a particular kind of medical knowledge progress. Throughout, I show the implications for medical progress of larger debates about the progress of knowledge, as well as how an excessive focus on biomedical knowledge gains neglects other, important dimensions of progress.

The conclusion outlines key points in the book. On a Kantian-Kierkegaardian account, thought experiments lead to presentations that justify calling a thought experiment an experience, though not an empirical or sensory one. Without a sensible object, we can nevertheless have givenness, or presence, but not existence. Cognition, for that reason, is not necessarily truthful: although object-directed, cognition on its own does not justify belief in any particular object’s existence. My conclusion that thought experiments provide cognition rather than knowledge echoes Michael Stuart’s claim that thought experiments increase understanding. Cognition is a common basis for knowledge in Kant, but it is not the same thing as knowledge. The conclusion also draws implications for how we understand faith (religious belief) in Kierkegaard and how thought experiments make sense of the complexity of reality.

This chapter offers an illustrative case of theory development from transcultural ethnography in a completely different industry, going from a soft industry like Disney and entertainment to a hard industry – ball-bearings. Theory development around knowledge sharing and challenges based on different types of knowledge are discussed.

This chapter explores the transformative role of knowledge and technology in Europe’s economic history, with a special focus on the Industrial Revolution. It examines how the transfer of scientific and technological knowledge contributed to economic growth and convergence between European countries. The chapter highlights the role of education, institutional frameworks and innovation in facilitating the diffusion of technology across borders. It also considers the factors that limited convergence, such as disparities in institutional and educational development. By tracing the evolution of technological and scientific advancements, the chapter provides insight into the processes that allowed Europe to lead global economic development during the Industrial Revolution and beyond.