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Barack Obama entered the presidency with a clear plan for engaging Iran. Rather than building on past rhetoric and emphasizing Iran’s "misbehavior," he opted for a new approach. In a speech marking Iran’s new year, he praised Iran’s rich history, then reached out directly to the country's new president, Hassan Rouhani. The approach did not show immediate results, but the two countries, along with European powers, Russia, and China, began to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program – a key issue for the relationship since the 1990s. The P5+1 talks (and secret US–Iran meetings) slowly began to turn the tide. The JCPOA finally came into being, representing a significant diplomatic achievement. Through it would prove to be short-lived, the Iran deal demonstrated that progress could be achieved. After forty years of near-constant enmity, the two countries appeared to be on the verge of détente. When Donald Trump unilaterally pulled the US out of the deal, these hopes were again dashed. But lessons from the negotiations remain for future policymakers hoping to resolve this most confounding of global issues.
The humanitarian issues and nonexecutive advocacy that constituted the basis of ongoing US-Vietnamese dialogue in the absence of formal relations remained of pivotal importance before, during, and after Washington and Hanoi resumed formal economic and diplomatic relations in the mid-1990s. Although American policymakers attempted to conclude the humanitarian programs they had earmarked as preconditions to more formal ties, varying definitions of full accounting, the repatriation of migrants to Vietnam through the CPA, and efforts to bring the HO into line with worldwide standards precipitated profound disagreements. Ultimately, US officials moved forward with formal relations with Hanoi and (re)created special programs for South Vietnamese migrants. The 1996 Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Refugees gave screened-out migrants who were repatriated to Vietnam under the CPA one more chance to apply for resettlement in the US.The 1996 McCain Amendment created loopholes to permit the original, exceptional terms of the HO to remain intact. US-Vietnamese collaboration on humanitarian issues, and normalization itself, persisted after the resumption of formal economic and diplomatic relations. The ties between American and South Vietnamese people outlasted both the collapse of South Vietnam and the resumption of relations between Washington and Hanoi.
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