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Why have regional organizations become authorities over human rights and international intervention, and what explains the differences in regional authority across different regions? Why did leaders in some parts of the Global South go from rejecting any interference to arguing for the central role of regional organizations in international interference? This chapter introduces the central questions addressed by this book and provides an overview of its core argument, focusing on the creation of new regional authority at one important moment: the emergence of regional organizations as authorities over human rights. This was the first time when leaders in the Global South changed from arguing for complete non-interference to arguing that legitimate interference should be carried out by or with the involvement of regional organizations. They did so as a strategy of subtle resistance to new challenges to self-determination, in the form of economic enforcement of human rights by Western governments. In regions targeted by this enforcement, leaders responded by establishing their regional organizations as authorities over human rights, accepting regional interference for the first time.
This chapter begins with a concise overview of China’s economic modernization since the 1980s, highlighting its domestic and international ramifications. It introduces the theoretical framework of political guardianship psychology, emphasizing the importance of studying political psychology within the context of China’s political evolution. This framework offers a valuable lens for understanding public trust in government, attitudes toward democracy, and perceptions of China’s rise in relation to foreign nations. In addition, the chapter elaborates on the book’s central themes and outlines the datasets employed to address the theoretical questions explored throughout the work.
The idea that regional organizations rightly occupy a central place in human rights, global governance, and international intervention has come to be taken-for-granted in international politics. Yet, the idea of regions as authorities is not a natural feature of the international system. Instead, it was strategically constructed by the leaders in the Global South as a way of maintaining their voice in global decision-making and managing (though not preventing) outside interference. Katherine M. Beall explores changes in the norms and practice of international interference in late 1970s and early 1980s, a time when Latin American and African leaders began to empower their regional organizations to enforce human rights. This change represented a form of quiet resistance to the imposition of human rights enforcement and a transformation in the ongoing struggle for self-determination. This book will appeal to scholars of international relations, international history, and human rights.
Why did Japan shift from being a status quo power in the 1920s to a revisionist power in the 1930s? This chapter argues that Japan’s rejection of the international order was hastened by changes in strategic thought reaching back to World War I. The rise of total war during World War I led military strategists to view self-sufficiency in resources and production as the prerequisite to success in modern warfare. This understanding of the importance of self-sufficiency did not influence national policy until the liberal order of the 1920s began to break down. Once the old order began to collapse, desires for autarky served as the backdrop behind a series of natural security solutions that gravitated toward war and establishing a new order in the region. The total war of World War II, in turn, shaped the entirety of Japan’s new order, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Any theoretically informed predictions about the future of international order and global governance must reckon with the power and intentions of the United States. We argue that fundamental changes in the nature of domestic audience constraint within many democracies, and the United States in particular, undermine both the willingness and the capability of the United States to continue its role as the underwriter of international order and global governance. A US government unbound by domestic constraint will have difficulty building broad coalitions to solve national and international problems because it will have reduced incentives to invest in public goods, including national defense, science and technology, and future economic prosperity; reduced barriers to corruption that undermines the quality of and trust in US capabilities; and reduced state capacity, including the capacity to finance wars and other long-term international commitments. We argue that three trends were especially relevant in reshaping domestic audience constraint: information fragmentation, extreme polarization, and a global threat environment that facilitated executive power concentration. Together they reduce the costs and risks for leaders to escape domestic audience constraints, weakening the institutional and accountability mechanisms that give democracies advantages in the international system. Though these trends affect many democracies, the undermining of US domestic constraint is particularly consequential because the United States shaped and buttressed the current system. An unconstrained United States likely means a less cooperative and less predictable global order, irrevocably altering the post-1945 system.
This chapter focuses on the international political origins and ramifications of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first US immigration law to restrict a specific ethnic group. The Act epitomized the politicization of prevalent anti-Chinese sentiment in late nineteenth-century European and “White” settler societies, driven by the forced opening of China by Western powers, the Gold Rush, and America’s westward expansion. We then examine the Act’s global implications, most notably the development of modern Chinese nationalism fueled by a collective sense of racialized resentment and humiliation. By situating the Exclusion Act within the broader context of the rise of a West-centric international order, the chapter underscores its enduring impact on Sino-American relations and the resurgent role of racialized identities and resentments in shaping great power politics.
A defining feature of the post-1945 international system is the American network of allies and partners that has underpinned its global power. Recent developments within the United States and in the international system have severely strained that alliance network. If it collapses, what is at stake? Existing scholarship in International Relations highlights losses in aggregated military capabilities, reduced diplomatic support, and lost trade. In this essay we review these benefits and another that has been overlooked: ally-enabled access. Access refers to permission from allies and partners to engage in military and intelligence missions within their borders on their territory, through their airspace, or in their territorial waters. Access via America’s allies and security partners has enabled Washington to use foreign sovereign spaces for military logistics, military operations, and foreign surveillance to overcome the tyranny of distance. Examples include permission from allies and partners in the Middle East to allow the US Air Force to fly from their bases to strike targets in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, and US intelligence installations built and operated by permission from Pakistani, Turkish, and Japanese territory during the Cold War. We describe the broad functions of alliances and show how access has been key to projection of American military and intelligence power at a global scale. Perhaps limiting or ending America’s global hegemonic role is desirable; perhaps it is dangerous. We argue that accounting for the contributions of access made by allies and security partners is critical if scholars, policymakers, and publics are to properly assess what is at stake in an American turn away from alliances.
With the Liberal International Order (LIO) in decline, scholars have focused increasingly on the possible return to a Westphalian great power system marked by sovereigntist claims and balancing among states. The actions of the Trump administration, however, raise a number of significant puzzles for such accounts—the US seems willing to sign deals with traditional adversaries including Russia and China, while targeting long-standing allies like Canada and Denmark. At the same time, transactional politics often serve narrow personalist interests rather than national objectives. In short, a Westphalian lens focused on states and sovereignty may generate intellectual blinders that misreads the emerging international order. To overcome these limitations, we propose an alternative account, which we label neo-royalism. The neo-royalist order centers on an international system structured by a small group of hyper elites, which we term cliques. Such cliques seek to legitimize their authority through appeals to their exceptionalism in order to generate durable material and status hierarchies based on the extraction of financial and cultural tributes. This short paper lays out the key elements of the neo-royalist order, differentiating it from the Westphalian and Liberal International Orders, and applies its insights to better grapple with the emerging system being promoted by the United States under Donald J. Trump. For policymakers and scholars, the neo-royalist approach clarifies recent events in US foreign policy. Theoretically, the field should take contending ideas of international order seriously, and establish a research agenda beyond a backward looking view to the Westphalian moment.
Political myths, the sacred narratives that legitimize power, are at the core of all political communities and organizations. In the post–World War II era, clear myths emerged around the ordering of the world, placing democracy, order, and peace at the idealized heart of global governance. Today, the international order is markedly changed. Previously dominant myths are routinely questioned and the international order that was built on these myths is beginning to fragment. Myths traditionally change with institutions. At this unique inflection point in the 2020s, however, this is no longer the case—myths crumble while the institutions they once supported persist, creating a vacuum in which novel myths must emerge in what we refer to as the new age of myth. We argue that the global order is in a transitional moment in terms of its governing mythologies. The myths that are born out of this age will underline the institutions, ideas, and ideologies that will shape the trajectory of the international order in the coming decades. In this essay we therefore argue that the study of political myths should be central to future approaches to international relations. Such an emphasis not only provides insight into the pathways of international cooperation and politics that may emerge from the contemporary shattering of the global political order, but also highlights how these sacred narratives will shape its future trajectory.
Despite the widespread and creative use of heritage politics by a range of international actors, such as multilateral institutions and states, the field of International Relations (IR) has paid insufficient attention to the topic. To the extent that these politics have entered the field’s attention, it has been primarily through instances of highly publicized cultural heritage destruction during armed conflict. This special issue brings together eight research articles, as well as a framing introduction and a conclusion, with the aim of launching international heritage politics as an important IR research agenda. Moving beyond destruction to the productive politics of heritage, these contributions show the range of these politics from the construction of international cultural status to forging contemporary international alliances along themes of cultural and historical familiarity. Further, they show heritage politics at work in international institutions, from UNESCO to the ICC, in bilateral and multilateral relations, and as moving between international and domestic politics. In these broad deployments, heritage politics are attached to museum collections, travelling exhibits, archaeological digs, DNA tests, restitution demands, and debates on international land swaps.
After the First World War, the nations of Europe faced exchange-rate volatility, high national debts, and inflationary pressures. In response, many sought to stabilize the economies through extensive fiscal and monetary reforms. One of the key figures in the reconstruction effort was Henry Strakosch. As the Bank’s informal adviser, he was responsible for devising restructuring plans across Central Europe and the British Empire. Leveraging his connections at the League of Nations, the Bank of England, and the City of London, Strakosch led negotiations that resulted in the establishment of both the Austrian National Bank and the South African Reserve Bank. His work exemplified the institutionalization of economic orthodoxy in circles of influence and heralded the rise of the international financial expert. More broadly, Strakosch’s interventions contributed to the state-building process in the interwar years, as new nations drew on expert knowledge to establish their political legitimacy.
In The City's Defense, Robert Yee examines how the City of London maintained its status as an international financial center. He traces the role of the Bank of England in restructuring the domestic, imperial, European, and international monetary systems in the aftermath of the First World War. Responding to mass unemployment and volatile exchange rates, the Bank expanded its reach into areas outside the traditional scope of central banking, including industrial policy and foreign affairs. It designed a system of economic governance that reinforced the preeminence of sterling as a reserve currency. Drawing on a range of archival evidence from national governments, private corporations, and international organizations, Yee reevaluates our understanding of Britain's impact on the global economic order.
Carmen Pavel has recently provided an illuminating analysis of the limits of anarchic legal orders and, by extension, current arrangements for international law (Pavel 2021). Central to her argument is an account of the structural flaws in market anarchist institutions. The current paper argues that market anarchist theorists have robust responses to at least some of Pavel’s criticisms. From the anarchist viewpoint, statist approaches to legal enforcement have problems that are at least as “structural” as those Pavel attributes to anarchism. The paper seeks to articulate this anarchist position and clarify the ways in which it complicates some of Pavel’s claims. It then offers some suggestions regarding what insights this market anarchist perspective might offer for our understanding of international law.
International law is a system of rules, institutions and practices that govern the relations of States with one another. It is designed to distribute resources and solve problems that States identify as relevant for creating order in the world. In a world without a centralised government States use international law and its institutions to generate solutions for emerging and complex issues and problems, such as climate change and terrorism. The effectiveness of international law is often called into question when it fails to stop certain kinds of activities that appear abhorrent to most people from around the world. However, it also manages to resolve and address issues and challenges that would otherwise get ignored without international cooperation. A lot of international law is designed to meaningfully contribute to establishing order. States also use it to legitimise disruptions to global relations.
This chapter focuses on the fact that a major difference between a change in an international order and a change of international order is that the scope and depth of the former are not as great as those of the latter—in other words, change unfolding in an international system is somewhat circumscribed. To reflect on a change in the international order and what this means for its legitimacy, this chapter focuses on three points. First, it examines some of the characteristics that facilitate change in an international system and what this implies for the sense of legitimacy. Second, it mentions the reforms that an international order and its legitimacy can adopt to respond to evolving pressures, alluding to the stress faced by the current international system in the last few years. Third, this chapter ends with an overview of the systemic risk to which the present international system is exposed.
In this book, I have tried to make sense of legitimacy at the international level, especially in relation to international law. I have paid a lot of attention to international law, in particular aligned with the demands of legitimacy and justice. But international law is only one aspect of the forces and the ecosystem that shape international order. Therefore, alone it cannot engineer the change that the international system requires today. This change has to be part of a more comprehensive approach. Here is not the place to offer a full account of the areas on which research could concentrate in the future to further encourage justice and legitimacy at the international level. However, it is worthwhile to present a general overview of these areas. In particular, three domains offer a possible road map for facilitating a constructive path forward: globalization, emotions and passions in social life, and the geopolitics of tomorrow.
This chapter focuses on change of an international order and its sense of legitimacy—in other words, change of the system of an international order and of its legitimacy. Concentrating on the change of an international order and of its legitimacy consists of exploring a type of change that is so transformative that it brings about a change in both how an international order is organized and institutionalized and functions, and how this is justified by the culture of legitimacy that is part of it. As a way to analyze this issue, this chapter addresses three questions: What can be the reasons triggering a change of international order/system and the sense of legitimacy that comes with it? What are the modalities and processes indicating that an international system and its legitimacy are changing? What has shifted—that is, changed—when a new international order and its culture of legitimacy have emerged?
This book addresses some of the following questions: What is the relevance of legitimacy, in general and today? How does legitimacy compare nationally and internationally? What are the components of legitimacy at the international level? What are the limitations of international law when it comes to legitimacy? How does legitimacy change over time at the international level? How can the international system, and the international law that comes with it, be made more just and legitimate? The book is organized into six parts and twenty-three chapters. Part I sets the stage for the book. Part II unpacks the meaning and role of legitimacy in politics. Part III turns attention to legitimacy at the international level. Part IV focuses on how international legitimacy is constructed in international law. Part V addresses change and international legitimacy. Part VI adopts a point of view that is at the same time critical and constructive or, more precisely, reconstructive of international order.
The book examines the significance of the issue of political legitimacy at the international level, focusing on international law. It adopts a descriptive, critical and reconstructive approach. In order to do so, the book clarifies what political legitimacy is in general and in the context of international law. The book analyses how international law contributes to a sense of legitimacy through notions such as international membership, international rights holding, fundamental principles and hierarchy of rights holding, rightful conduct and international authority. In addition, the book stresses the serious limitations of legitimacy of international law and of the current international order that it contributes to regulate and manage. This leads the book to identify the conditions under which international order and international law could overcome their problems of legitimacy and become more legitimate. The book is inter-disciplinary in nature, mobilizing international law, political and legal theory, philosophy, history, and political science.
US–Chinese strategic competition is a defining factor in world politics. The prevailing narrative on US–China relations predicts inevitable conflicts between these two giants, potentially leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy. While fully acknowledging the inherent dangers of potential wars or military conflicts between the two powers, this book shows that competition is not necessarily detrimental. By systematically examining US–China institutional balancing across security, economic and political domains, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, this book highlights three positive externalities or unintended consequences: the revitalisation of regional institutions to address emerging challenges, unexpected collaborations between great powers (the US and China) and regional actors, and the provision of public goods by both nations. The book argues that constructive and institutionalised competition between the US and China, if managed with strategic foresight and restraint, could inadvertently lead to positive outcomes – institutional peace – in the Asia-Pacific region.