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The degree to which different social groups get along is a key indicator of the cohesiveness of a society. This study examines perceptions of social cohesion among Europeans and explains variations in those perceptions by considering the separate and combined effects of economic strain and institutional trust. Analyses were conducted with the 27 member countries of the EU based on the Eurobarometer 74.1 on poverty and social exclusion conducted in 2010. Results show that individuals living in households experiencing economic strain perceive social cohesion to be weaker than their less economically hard‐pressed counterparts. By contrast, individuals trusting their political institutions perceived there to be higher levels of cohesion. Furthermore, institutional trust substantially moderates the negative relationship between economic strain and perceptions of cohesion. These results are robust to various model specifications. Moreover, extending the analysis revealed that this moderating effect held when considering social relations between the poor and rich and between different racial and ethnic groups. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.
Does economic inequality dampen support for the political system? This question has been answered in the affirmative in prior work studying the relationship between economic inequality and various manifestations of political system support across countries or US states. However, recent work challenges the premise underlying such analyses by showing that citizens are generally ignorant about national-level inequality. Relatedly, work on contextual effects finds that economic and social phenomena are particularly consequential for political attitudes when they reflect palpable everyday experiences. Combining these insights, we suggest that a more theoretically and methodologically appropriate test of the proposition that economic inequality reduces political system support should focus on local, neighbourhood-level economic inequality, which citizens encounter on a daily basis. By linking multiple geo-referenced surveys – both cross-sectional and longitudinal – with Danish registry data, we create micro-contextual measures of local economic inequality and relate them to a range of indicators of political system support. We find no evidence indicating that local inequality reduces political system support.
Results from previous research suggest that terrorist attacks lead to relatively short‐term increases in trust in institutions. The explanation for this increase is known as the ‘rally effect’, whereby individuals respond to crises and threats with more positive support for political leaders and institutions. Even though the number of related natural experiments with survey data is increasing, these studies merely represent case studies of single incidents with limited external validity. To advance quasi‐experimental research on the effects of terrorist attacks on institutional trust, we propose a new methodological approach by assessing all jihadist terrorist attacks resulting in at least one civilian death in a European country that take place during the fieldwork of the European Social Survey and combining the results of eight unique natural experiments in five different countries using meta‐analytic and meta‐regression techniques. The results of this ‘multi‐site natural experiment’ indicate that support for the rally‐hypothesis is mixed at best. While some attacks appear to significantly increase at least some measures of institutional trust (e.g., The Netherlands 2004, France 2015, Israel 2012), others seem to have no effect at all (e.g., Germany 2015, France 2018), or even substantially decrease trust in domestic political institutions (Russia 2012). Summary effects from multilevel meta‐analyses are non‐significant for any institutional trust outcome. These results are robust to a large number of robustness tests and alternative specifications. In comparison with previous research, it appears that a lot of the European evidence for the rally‐hypothesis was based on ‘outlier’ case studies like the Charlie Hebdo attack in France, 2015. Accordingly, our results cast doubt on the unrestricted generalisability of rally effects after terrorist attacks to different geographic, political, social or historical contexts.
We examine whether third-party endorsement and institutional trust can mitigate the potential negative effects of higher levels of executive compensation on the likelihood of future donations to a nonprofit organization. Using an experimental design, we find support for prior expectations that paying higher executive compensation reduces the likelihood of future individual donations. We also find that this negative effect is only significant in the absence of a third-party endorsement so that individual donations significantly decrease when the nonprofit pay is high relative to moderate executive compensation levels. Finally, the likelihood of future individual donations is higher when institutional trust is high. However, high institutional trust does not validate the payment of higher levels of executive compensation. Our results have theoretical and practical implications by showing that nonprofits are better off paying moderate executive compensation levels but not paying too much if they have not attracted respectable third-party endorsers.
We study how Swedish citizens updated their institutional and interpersonal trust as the corona crisis evolved from an initial phase to an acute phase in the spring of 2020. The study is based on a large web‐survey panel with adult Swedes (n = 11,406) in which the same individuals were asked the same set of questions at two different time points during the coronavirus pandemic (t0 and t1). The sample was self‐selected but diverse (a smaller subsample, n = 1,464, was pre‐stratified to be representative of the Swedish population on key demographics). We find support for the view that the corona crisis led to higher levels of institutional and interpersonal trust. Moreover, reactions were largely homogeneous across those groups that could potentially relate distantly to government authorities.
Jan Zielonka's Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (Oxford University Press, 2018) is a furious, worried pamphlet on the challenges that European democracies are currently facing, on the apparent rise of illiberalism. This article critically reviews the book and seeks to offer a somewhat different and perhaps more optimistic picture of the current predicaments of European politics. The main point of reference in this respect is Finland, a country whose political institutions have managed, by and large, to uphold a sense of coherence in society. A commitment to participatory, equality-based, and freedom-generating institutions can indeed be seen as a primary means to counter the decline of liberalism.
This study is part of the growing literature on the effects on civic engagement of attitudinal predictors, such as trust, along with structural predictors. Drawing data from the 2005 Japanese General Social Survey, it examines the association between trust and the probabilities of formal volunteering and charitable giving. A bivariate probit analysis of the data suggests that trust, institutional trust in particular, matters more to predict giving than volunteering. Although the number of membership affiliations is positively and significantly associated with both types of civic engagement, the association between membership affiliations and formal volunteering is significantly greater. Implications of these and other findings are discussed for future studies linking trust to civic engagement in group-collectivist societies such as Japan.
The democratic backsliding literature sees reactionary shifts among the electorates of mature democracies as a reason for the rise of right-wing populism (RWP)—shifts that supposedly fuel citizens’ distrust in democratic institutions and their readiness to support RWP in its efforts to cut back on democracy’s liberal principles. However, the assumptions underlying this democracy falling narrative are more often stated than tested. Filling this void, we analyze data from the European Values Study/World Values Surveys in a cross-national longitudinal design amended by multilevel evidence, covering all EU countries surveyed at two distant timepoints over the past twenty to twenty-five years. We test whether reactionary shifts among socio-economically vulnerable electoral segments increased polarization over four ideological cleavages: right-vs-left on economic issues, nativism-vs-cosmopolitanism on immigration issues, patriarchy-vs-emancipation on sexuality issues, and economy-vs-environment on sustainability issues. Specifically, we examine whether those population segments at the reactionary end of these cleavages lost trust in democracies’ political institutions and their liberal principles in ways that increase voters’ readiness to support RWP parties. Our results provide no confirmation that polarizing shifts in the population account for RWP’s electoral rise. We conclude that the problems explaining RWP success do not originate in reactionary public opinion shifts. Instead, we propose further research into potential representation gaps with respect to nonvoter camps that grew larger during the pre-RWP era and are now mobilized by RWP parties—a game change presumably triggered by the rise of social media.
The police killing of George Floyd, an unarmed Black American, prompted massive protests across the USA and around the globe in the spring and summer of 2020. Like those south of their border, Canadian protesters gathered to bring renewed attention to a longstanding problem: systemic racism and police impunity. While race and dissatisfaction with the police have received a great deal of attention in popular media, surprisingly little political science research considers the relationship between race, attitudes towards the police and protest. Do attitudes towards police differ across racial groups in Canada? Are attitudes towards the police related to protest activity? We answer these questions using data from Statistics Canada’s General Social Survey (GSS) Cycle 34, GSS Cycle 35 and Statistics Canada’s Impacts of COVID-19 on Canadians’ Experiences of Discrimination. We find that Black and Indigenous Canadians express the lowest confidence in police relative to other People of Colour (POC) and compared with White Canadians. We also find more confidence in the police is associated with lower probability of protest (in general).
What is the relationship between social media use and trust in civil society and governance institutions? In many parts of Asia, trust in government remains high despite limited political accountability and civil liberties. This study examines whether online political expression reshapes institutional trust in governance institutions and civil society organizations. The analysis considers the dual role of social media as a site for civic engagement and a channel for disaffection with formal authority. Using data from the Asian Barometer, the findings show that political expression on social media is associated with lower trust in governance institutions and higher trust in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a fundamental part of civil society. These effects vary across regimes and survey waves. The results suggest that online expression may erode legitimacy of formal authority while enhancing trust in civil society, thus shaping the political role of NGOs and social media platforms in restrictive political settings.
Longstanding public support for the Supreme Court of Canada is well-documented and contributes to its public legitimacy. However, the sources of this support and how vulnerable it may be to political factors or negative coverage of events are not well understood. In February of 2023, Justice Russell Brown took a leave of absence from the Supreme Court following a conduct complaint under review by the Canadian Judicial Council. Justice Brown retired from the bench in June of that year, before the CJC concluded its investigation. In the intervening period, media coverage of the events that prompted the attention from the CJC thrust the Court into the spotlight. Using data from an original two-wave survey experiment (n = 1,222) from May and November of 2023, we investigate whether perspectives toward the circumstances surrounding Brown’s retirement hurt perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. We find that the event did not disrupt support for the Court over time but also point to the ways in which opinion toward the Court changed pre- and post-resignation. These findings suggest that support toward Canada’s high court is at present largely stable even in the case of negative coverage of a high-profile event. However, we also acknowledge the potential vulnerabilities that negative coverage of the Court may present.
In the study of politics, many theoretical accounts assume that we are experiencing a ‘crisis of democracy’, with declining levels of political trust. While some empirical studies support this account, others disagree and report ‘trendless fluctuations’. We argue that these empirical ambiguities are based on analytical confusion: whether trust is declining depends on the institution, country, and period in question. We clarify these issues and apply our framework to an empirical analysis that is unprecedented in geographic and temporal scope: we apply Bayesian dynamic latent trait models to uncover underlying trends in data on trust in six institutions collated from 3,377 surveys conducted by 50 projects in 143 countries between 1958 and 2019. We identify important differences between countries and regions, but globally we find that trust in representative institutions has generally been declining in recent decades, whereas trust in ‘implementing’ institutions has been stable or rising.
Over the past several decades, American society has experienced fundamental changes – from shifting relations between social groups and evolving language and behavior norms to the increasing value of a college degree. These transformations have polarized the nation's political climate and ignited a perpetual culture war. In a sequel to their award-winning collaboration Asymmetric Politics, Grossmann and Hopkins draw on an extensive variety of evidence to explore how these changes have affected both major parties. They show that the Democrats have become the home of highly-educated citizens with progressive social views who prefer credentialed experts to make policy decisions, while Republicans have become the populist champions of white voters without college degrees who increasingly distrust teachers, scientists, journalists, universities, non-profit organizations, and even corporations. The result of this new “diploma divide” between the parties is an increasingly complex world in which everything is about politics – and politics is about everything.
Anticorruption audits may deter corruption and signal to citizens that institutions are proactively combating it. However, by detecting and reporting corruption, audits might also unintentionally erode trust in institutions. Therefore, the impact of audits potentially hinges on whether they uncover corruption. Audit institutions, not implicated in the corruption they uncover, might be less likely to experience a decline in trust compared to auditee institutions. This study uses survey and administrative data from Brazil, leveraging a federal anti-corruption program that randomly selects municipalities for auditing. Results do not support the claim that audits boost institutional trust. Individuals in audited municipalities show no different levels of trust in local government or the audit institution than those in non-audited municipalities, and the coefficients may even indicate a negative effect. Additionally, audit institutions may not be better insulated from the corrosive effects of uncovering corruption than the institutions they audit.
This essay documents growing partisan social uprootedness across Latin America over time, manifested in diminishing social trust toward parties, debilitation of links between parties and social collectivities, lowering levels of partisanship, and rising incidence of personalism in the electorate. It focuses on some unrecognized and undertheorized causal factors behind partisan involution in the region, putting emphasis on mutually reinforcing processes. First, it identifies forces endogenous to the traits of origin of diminished parties that foster their uprootedness and decay; second, it lays out some of the manifold ways that the weakening of political parties fuels regime malperformance, in a mutually reinforcing vicious circle; third, it outlines the existence of mutual feedback loops between political agency and structure; fourth, it identifies various agential sources of party decay. There are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to expect continued party deinstitutionalization across Latin America going forward.
This article discusses the results and prospects of the market reform in Dutch health care which came into force in 2006. Attention is paid to the results of the health insurance reform, the experience with the shift from passive to active purchasing and the impact of the reform on healthcare provision and cost control respectively. Other topics discussed are the consequences of the reform for administrative costs, institutional trust in health insurance, and the power balance in health care after reform. The central message is that the high expectations of the market reform have not come true. Dutch health care features a high degree of hybridity and there are indications that the system is becoming ever more hybrid: the system operates much less market-like than the market frame suggests. Currently, the policy narrative on the reform is changing. Policymakers and policy documents underscore the need for cooperation in provider networks and more state direction. The Dutch experience with health care reform illustrates the pendulum theory. After a period of a belief in competition and less state direction the pendulum in policymaking swings back to a belief in cooperation and a pro-active role of the state.
This paper draws on macroeconomics, the economics of institutions and the economics of trust to explain private savings at the national level for 33 OECD (mostly European) countries from 2002 to 2012. More specifically, it raises two questions: (i) is it the quality of institutions or trust in institutions that drives private savings? (ii) if trust matters, what is the appropriate institutional level at which it operates? To answer these questions, we add to the usual explanatory variables of private savings three measures of institutional quality and six measures of institutional trust, distributed between the following institutional levels, presented in assumed hierarchical order: political, legal, financial and social. We find that trust in political institutions is the most significant driver of private savings. This contributes to the literature underlining the importance of subjectivity in social and economic phenomena and suggests, for private bank savings in countries having highly regulated banking systems, the existence of a hierarchy of trust in which trust in the highest-ranking institutions (political – and to a lesser extent legal – institutions) acts as a substitute for trust in every lower-ranking institution (financial institutions and social trust).
The three-child policy constitutes a hotly debated socio-political issue in China. Upon its announcement, many Chinese citizens have ridiculed the move on social media. Adopting the cognitive mediation model and the influence of presumed influence theory, this study examines how social media exposure to three-child policy-related news and discussions could affect the Chinese public’s attitudes toward the policy. The online survey results show that social media exposure negatively predicts supportive opinion via cognitive elaboration and three types of perceived negative effects of the policy (i.e., perceived negative effects on self, on the public, and on females) in serial. It also finds that institutional trust moderates the relationship between cognitive elaboration and policy support. Only among people with high institutional trust, there is a positive effect of social media exposure on supportive opinion through cognitive elaboration.
Vaccine hesitancy impacts the ability to cope with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) effectively in the United States. It is important for health organizations to increase vaccine acceptance. Addressing this issue, this study aimed to predict citizens’ acceptance of the COVID-19 vaccine through a synthetic approach of public segmentation including cross-situational and situational variables. Controlling for demographics, we examined institutional trust, negative attitudes toward, and low levels of knowledge about vaccines (ie, lacuna public characteristics), and fear of COVID-19 during the pandemic. Our study provides a useful framework for public segmentation and contributes to risk and health campaigns by identifying significant predictors of COVID-19 vaccine acceptance.
Method:
We conducted an online survey on October 10, 2020 (N = 499), and performed hierarchical regression analyses to predict citizens’ COVID-19 vaccine acceptance.
Results:
This study demonstrated that trust in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and federal government, vaccine attitude, problem recognition, constraint recognition, involvement recognition, and fear positively predicted COVID-19 vaccine acceptance.
Conclusions:
This study outlines a useful synthetic public segmentation framework and extends the concept of lacuna public to the pandemic context, helping to predict vaccine acceptance. Importantly, the findings could be useful in designing health campaign messages.
In this study, we conceptualize the thus far little explored relationship between expatriate and host country as a form of social exchange governed by the norm of reciprocity. Drawing from social exchange theory and our analysis of 451 self-initiated expatriates (SIEs) living and working in the United Arab Emirates, we examine whether the degree of SIEs’ career and community embeddedness explains their host country withdrawal intention via enhanced perceived institutional trust and a more tolerant attitude toward workplace discrimination. Our results provide general support for our theoretical model and most of our hypotheses. In this way, our article makes three contributions. First, it suggests a novel way to conceptualize the relationship between SIEs and host country as a form of social exchange. Second, it differentiates between two dimensions of embeddedness and explicates how the two contribute to SIEs’ intentions to stay in the host country. Finally, the analysis theorizes and empirically tests two previously little explored mechanisms of enhanced institutional trust and a more tolerant attitude toward workplace discrimination through which SIEs’ host country embeddedness influences their host country withdrawal intentions.