During the Late Classic (a.d. 600–900), Maya stone monuments from the Western Lowlands documented people with the sajal title. This position was associated with corporate group leaders who acted as governors of secondary sites, supervised warfare-related activities, and manufactured and distributed goods. The increase in records, along with the elaboration of monuments by sajals with differing narratives from those of the rulers, has been identified as a contributing factor to the regional political instability that led to the abandonment of Classic Maya capitals. This article aims to analyze monuments from the political spheres of Yaxchilan, Piedras Negras, and Palenque using a discourse analysis approach to identify the discursive strategies sajals used to showcase and strengthen their hierarchical positions. To accomplish this, I will analyze the discourse in relation to the intermediality of monuments to examine how sajals rivaled the rulers of these cities. Additionally, I will explore the correlation between these discourses and the sociopolitical transformations that preceded the regional collapse in the ninth century a.d.

Much like nations, the nation-based order and the domestic and international hierarchies it produces are imagined. Benedict Anderson and scholars in Historical International Relations have frequently approached nationalism and nations as a horizontal division of the world. By contrast, this article explores the imagined hierarchies within and between nations during the 1848 Springtime of Nations. Through an examination of fraternal images found in a variety of textual and visual sources, I investigate how the European national imaginary of 1848 translated into the nation-based order and its corresponding domestic and international hierarchies. The collapse of the 1848 Revolutions brought about a crisis in the national imaginary. The revolutionary fraternity was co-opted in a distorted form by dynastic regimes and opposed by socialists advocating for the international brotherhood of workers. The Springtime of Nations, with its successes and failures, was a pivotal chapter in creating, shaping, legitimising, and challenging the nascent nation-based order.

Thomas Taylor's parody of Mary Wollstonecraft's support for rights of women and humans raises a question: does his satire unwittingly propose a defence of animal rights found in Wollstonecraft's arguments? While Wollstonecraft's later works do not mention animal rights, her early educational writings offer arguments on animal ethics. These works explore the value of animals from moral, theological, and consequentialist perspectives, emphasizing both their instrumental and inherent value. This article argues that Wollstonecraft's moral psychology and theology highlight a benevolent attitude towards animals, underscoring their value beyond their utility.

Relational egalitarians argue that workplace hierarchy is wrong or unjust. However, even if workplace hierarchy is morally deficient in one respect, the efficiency of hierarchical cooperation might vindicate hierarchy. This paper assesses the extent to which relational egalitarians must make concessions to workplace hierarchy for the sake of efficiency. I argue that considerations of hierarchy provide egalitarians with reasons that make workplace hierarchy tolerable despite being unjustified, and, moreover, that under a predominantly hierarchical status quo, the practical import of egalitarian reasons is unlikely to be undercut. This can be the case even if social hierarchy sometimes constitutes social cooperation.

Climate policies are often evaluated using criteria that are heterogeneous and misaligned with the stated aims of these policies. By combining legal research methods with insights from economic theory, we systematically map and analyze the legal objectives of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS), a key climate policy instrument. We find that the EU ETS is shaped by a nuanced internal normative framework, the principal goal of which is emissions reduction, combined with three secondary goals of cost-effectiveness, economic efficiency and equity, and a meta-goal of coherence. Based on the contents and interrelations of these legal objectives, we formulate evaluation criteria that can be used to critically analyze and evaluate the EU ETS performance in a more comprehensive, transparent, and comparable manner. The resulting methodology is applicable to other environmental policies and jurisdictions.

The Maya used dress to help them structure social interaction. Taking a behavioral chain and practice approach, I define dress elements of male courtiers and how they were combined into outfits during the daily practices of dressing and attending court. I identify two groups of headgear, Standard and Special, among courtiers on vases showing historical interaction among humans. Each vase is considered commemorative and must communicate to an audience. I identified six Standard hat types that were widespread in the Maya Lowlands. The distribution implies a basic set of recognizable roles that provided the political-religious structure of the typical Maya court, perhaps as early as the Late Preclassic period. Four of the hat types are connected to glyphic titles. Each titleholder's position in the vase's visual space implies a hierarchy of roles. The results support my hypothesis that dress does identify social roles in the Maya court.

How do states as social actors cope with stigma-induced status anxiety? I propose the concept of “stigma shifting” as a way in which status-anxious states overcompensate for their stigma-induced inferiority and reaffirm their place in the world: by seeking identification with higher-status states and differentiation from lower-status states. In identifying with the desired group of states, stigmatized states engage in approval-seeking behavior and reaffirm their in-group status in areas where they feel discredited. In differentiating themselves from the undesired group, stigmatized states engage in distinction-seeking behavior, claiming their superiority over this “lesser” group in areas that gave rise to their status anxiety in the first place. Stigma shifting, in other words, allows a stigmatized state to take the role of a stigmatizer. To demonstrate the concept's depth and analytical utility, I draw on the case of East Asia in three disparate issue areas: colonial redress, nuclear disaster, and international order making. Japan, stigmatized in all three areas, has reaffirmed its status by shifting the stigma onto its significant but “lesser” others: China and Korea. Ultimately, stigma shifting solidifies status hierarchies in the world—not just the hierarchy as represented by the “Western” dominance of international society but also the regional hierarchies of the non-Western world.

This Article considers how the ranking of states, as perpetuated by the international legal order, may play a role in the considerations of those targeted by global naming and shaming campaigns. To do so, it examines Qatar’s response to being shamed in the lead up to and during the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup. Drawing from international relations literature on status and adopting a critical approach to unpack the prevalence of the hierarchal structuring of states in the contemporary international legal order, the Article claims that the practice of shaming, as a human rights enforcement strategy, inevitably pushes target states to question their status within the international legal community. This could, counterproductively, lead to negative outcomes for the rights of the very individuals these campaigns seek to protect. Furthermore, the Article sketches out a theoretical argument for why certain states may consider the enactment of cosmetic legal reforms to be an attractive strategy for countering a global shaming campaign.

This paper presents a set of theoretical models that links a two-phase sequence of cooperative political integration and conflict to explore the reciprocal relationship between war and state formation. It compares equilibria rates of state formation and conflict using a Monte Carlo that generates comparative statics by altering the systemic distribution of ideology, population, tax rates, and war costs across polities. This approach supports three core findings. First, war-induced political integration is at least 2.5 times as likely to occur as integration to realize economic gains. Second, we identify mechanisms linking endogenous organizations to the likelihood of conflict in the system. For example, a greater domestic willingness to support public goods production facilitates the creation of buffer states that reduce the likelihood of a unique class of trilateral wars. These results suggest that the development of the modern administrative state has helped to foster peace. Third, we explore how modelling assumptions setting the number of actors in a strategic context can shape conclusions about war and state formation. We find that dyadic modelling restrictions tend to underestimate the likelihood of cooperative political integration and overestimate the likelihood of war relative to a triadic modelling context.

In this article, we introduce a hierarchy on the class of non-archimedean Polish groups that admit a compatible complete left-invariant metric. We denote this hierarchy by $\alpha $-CLI and L-$\alpha $-CLI where $\alpha $ is a countable ordinal. We establish three results:

1. (1) G is $0$-CLI iff $G=\{1_G\}$;

2. (2) G is $1$-CLI iff G admits a compatible complete two-sided invariant metric; and

3. (3) G is L-$\alpha $-CLI iff G is locally $\alpha $-CLI, i.e., G contains an open subgroup that is $\alpha $-CLI.

Subsequently, we show this hierarchy is proper by constructing non-archimedean CLI Polish groups $G_\alpha $ and $H_\alpha $ for $\alpha <\omega _1$, such that:

1. (1) $H_\alpha $ is $\alpha $-CLI but not L-$\beta $-CLI for $\beta <\alpha $; and

2. (2) $G_\alpha $ is $(\alpha +1)$-CLI but not L-$\alpha $-CLI.

This article discusses dominance personality dimensions found in primates, particularly in the great apes, and how they compare to dominance in humans. Dominance traits are seen in virtually all primate species, and these dimensions reflect how adept an individual is at ascending within a social hierarchy. Among great apes, dominance is one of the most prominent personality factors but, in humans, dominance is usually modeled as a facet of extraversion. Social, cultural, and cognitive differences between humans and our closest ape relatives are explored, alongside humanity’s hierarchical and egalitarian heritage. The basic characteristics of dominance in humans and nonhuman great apes are then described, alongside the similarities and differences between great apes. African apes live in societies each with its own hierarchical organization. Humans were a possible exception for some of our history, but more recently, hierarchies have dominated. The general characteristics of high-dominance humans, particularly those living in industrialized nations, are described. Dominance itself can be subdivided into correlated subfactors: domineering, prestige, and leadership. Various explanations have been posed for why dominance has declined in prominence within human personality factor structures, and several possibilities are evaluated. The value of dominance in personality research is discussed: dominance has links to, for instance, age, sex, aggression, self-esteem, locus of control, stress, health, and multiple socioeconomic status indicators. The piece concludes with recommendations for researchers who wish to assess dominance in personality.

While there is increasing recognition of the role of race in shaping global politics, the extent to which the construction and operation of international order is entangled with race remains underexplored. In this article, I argue for the centrality of race and racialization in understanding the constitution of international order by theorizing the constitutive connections between race and international order and showing how the two can be examined as intertwined. I do this, first, by articulating conceptualizations of both international order and race that center on processes of regulation and regularization. Second, I bring these together to suggest that race be understood as a form of order that functions to reproduce a historically emergent form of hierarchy and domination across a range of spaces and contexts. Third, I operationalize these conceptualizations by outlining and historicizing some of the key features of this racialized and racializing international order, specifically coloniality, the racial state, and racial capitalism, and thereby illustrate important aspects of the persistence of this order. Centering race in the study of international order, I suggest, helps us better understand how racializing hierarchies and racialized inequalities persist in the present and are reproduced through structures and practices of international order.