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This chapter proposes that singular compositional abduction has four features shared by at least many other instances of abduction: (1) abduction is sometimes used for confirmation, (2) abduction is sometimes used to postulate entities that are qualitatively distinct from the entities cited in the supporting evidence, (3) abduction may rely on background beliefs, and (4) abduction is sometimes used to postulate entities that are not directly empirically detected. It also indicates why scientists take abduction to be truth conducive. It shows how compositional abduction may serve as an alternative to the theory of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. Finally, it suggests a broad range of scientific cases in cognitive science that might be understood in terms of singular compositional abduction.
This chapter provides the second case study of the use of singular compositional abduction based on scientific attempts to determine the biological basis of the Hermann grid illusion. First reported by Ludimar Hermann in 1872, the illusion was first explained in terms of local points of simultaneous contrast. In 1961, Gűnter Baumgartner fleshed out the proposal arguing that the illusion might be explained in terms of activity instances of retinal ganglion cell firings. Further, Lothar Spillman performed experiments intended to support this proposal, whereas Jeremy Wolfe, Peter Schiller, and Christina Carvey described experiments meant to challenge it.
Abductive reasoning is a form of inference that infers some hypothesis because of what that hypothesis explains. Unlike deductive reasoning, it yields a plausible conclusion but does not definitively verify it. The theory of compositional abduction developed in this book provides a novel theory of confirmation. Aizawa uses case studies to analyse how scientists interpret the results of experiments to support compositional hypotheses (hypotheses about what things are composed of) and suggests that they use a kind of abduction. His theory is offered as an alternative account of scientific reasoning that the logical empiricists would have interpreted as hypothetico-deductive confirmation. It is also an alternative to the Peircean interpretation of the role of abduction in science. It will be valuable to philosophers of science, those working on hypothetico-deductive confirmation, Peirce's view of abduction, inference to the best explanation, and the New Mechanism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
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